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Abstract
The advent of Speculative Realist and object-oriented philosophies has drawn attention
to how objects are understood and experienced, and stimulated renewed interest in the
aesthetics of these encounters. Taking photography as the site of such encounters, this
dissertation asked what implications do these philosophies have for objects or entities
that are complex structures or systems made by humans?
The writings of Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Timothy Morton informed
an investigation of this question in the first three chapters: The first chapter The Object
versus Post Object Question in the Australian Art World during the 1970s, considers how this
question was addressed the context of a historical debate on the status of the artwork as
self-sufficient object or relational social process. The second chapter, Something to be Seen,
A Picture on a Screen, further asks if photographs can be thought of as self-sufficient
entities, then why is a non-human centric approach to the photographic image desirable
and what would it look like? The third chapter, Photo| Vision: Photographing Place, asks
how do these perspectives inflect representations of place? This is discussed in
reference to Walter Benjamin’s expanded concept of the Denkbild (thought-image) and
applied to the project Konvolut K (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman). The fourth chapter,
From Beyond, drawing upon Ian Bogost’s concept of a ‘practical ontography’ , seeks to
formulate the outlines of a speculative and realist photography. This would be a
speculative (notions incapable of analysis in terms of other notions) photography that
via analogy, metaphor, and allusion, paradoxically encapsulates both an anti-realist
epistemology (concerning the limits of human knowledge) and a realist ontology (the
argument that aspects of our reality are independent of our conceptual schemes).
The Conclusion of the dissertation suggests that if photography exists in its own right
as an autonomous entity apart from human interpretations, acted upon and acting upon
other entities, then historical occult photography, with its ambition of making visible a
beyond, presents a model of such a speculative realist photography. The practical
component of this dissertation is a photo-book. Twenty-five images are arranged on the
twenty-six pages of a concertina book. With the exception of the twenty-first image—a
panoramic photograph that spreads over two pages, each image occupies a single page

and can be viewed alone, in pairs, or in concert with the other images as a sequence by
unfolding the book. No details such as locations are given in the book; the images are
simply labelled alphabetically with specific reference to Hollis Frampton film Zorns
Lemma. Each photograph seeks to conjure up the realist conceits this dissertation
investigates by imaging the imprint, or trace, that objects produce in their encounter
with photography.

Introduction
Research Parameters: The question
Photographs were once understood as presenting an incontrovertible photographic
truth. This was what one of its inventors thought. William Henry Fox Talbot declared
that now ‘Nature would draw itself’.1 Photography was believed to employ a type of
‘blind sight’.2 As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison explain, 'The mechanical, objective
photograph had allegedly been traced by “nature’s pencil” alone and nature was entirely
artless’.3 It was an objective optical and mechanical recording machine that obeyed the
laws of physics and chemistry and ‘provided a new model for the perfection towards
which working objects of science might strive’.4
When nineteenth-century scientists called for objective photographs to
supplement, correct, or replace subjective drawings, they did not, in the first
instance, fear imposture, except perhaps in cases such as inquiries into
spiritualism. Rather, they worried about a far subtler source of error, one more
authentically subjective and specifically scientific: the projection of their own
preconceptions and theories onto data and images. 5

Though the fear that the observer’s subjectivity may distort knowledge was temporally
overcome with the advent of the photograph’s ‘mechanical reproduction;’ this new
mechanical truth would also become suspect, opening a philosophical abyss in which
truth and objectivity become increasingly difficult to pin down.6 A tension developed
between the eye and its subjectivity and the objectivity of the mechanism. Photography,
it was thought, would need to be constrained by a methodological system and be under
the close supervision of the scientist. Luc Pauwels in Visual Cultures of Science warns, all
recording devices tend to distort data and this distortion must be taken into account to
achieve scientific objectivity:
Instruments, in addition to capturing or recording data, invariably both reduce
(or lose) data and tend to mold (and add) data in a particular way. These two

1

Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 125-133.
Ibid. 138.
3
Ibid. 133.
4
Ibid. 138.
5
Ibid. 135.
6
Ibid.
2
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phenomena in themselves should warn against a naively realistic view of the
merely technical aspect of representation. 7

Photography is understood as a social process of theoretical and empirical validation
into which subjectivity inevitably enters. It's apparent objectivity does not arise from a
process of adequation, between the thing and its representation, but inter-subjective
agreement that is, in the final analysis, performative. Quentin Meillassoux, in After
Finitude, describes the necessity of agreement between the universal and particular via
the test of inter-subjectivity in these terms: ‘since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined
with reference to the object in itself (in terms of the statement’s adequation or
resemblance to what it designates), but rather with reference to the possible universality
of an absolute statement’.8 As discussed in greater depth in the Overview, and as
explained by Daston and Galison, this understanding of objectivity owes its origins to
Kant’s transcendentalism:
It was Immanuel Kant who dusted off the musty scholastic terminology of
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ and breathed new life and meanings into it. But the
Kantian meanings were the grandparents, not the twins, of our familiar sense
of the words. Kant’s ‘objective validity’ (objektive Gültigheit) referred not to
external objects (Gegenstände) but to the ‘forms of sensibility’ (time, space,
causality) that are the preconditions of experience. And his habit of using
‘subjective’ as a rough synonym for ‘merely empirical sensations’ shares with
later usage only the sneer with which the word is intoned. For Kant, the line
between the objective and the subjective generally runs between the universal
and particular, not between world and mind.9

In this context, all recording information, including photographic images, though they
may have a measure of objectivity guaranteed by an inter-subjective test, is, like human
thought, unable step out of the context in which it is produced. Meillassoux describes
this limit to human knowledge in the following way:
We cannot access any form of the in-itself, because we are irremediably
confined in our relation-to-the-world, without any means to verify whether
the reality that is given to us corresponds to reality taken in itself,
independently of our subjective link to it.10

7

Luc Pauwels (ed.), Visual Cultures of Science: Rethinking Representational Practices in Knowledge Building and
Science Communication (New Hampshire: Darmouth College Press, 2006), 9.
8
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, tr. Ray Brassier (New York:
Continuum, 2010).
9
Daston and Galison, 30.
10
Rick Dolphin and Iris van der Tuin, ‘There is contingent being independent of us, and this contingent
being has no reason to be of a subjective nature”: Interview with Quentin Meillassoux’, in New
Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2012), 71-115.
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Recently two overlapping developments have opened up the conceptual horizons of
how this limit is understood. Speculative realism and object-oriented ontology call
attention to what we can know about objects. Parallel with this has been a renewed
attention to the aesthetics of these encounters. Both of these developments have
resulted in a focus on object-object interactions outside of the mediating factor of
human perception. This dissertation aims to explore this issue with an emphasis upon
the photographic image. Responding to the conceptual horizon opened up by the
speculative realist critique of correlationism this discussion asks: how does the critique
of correlationism impact upon our understanding of photographic realism?
This introduction outlines the parameters of this dissertation’s research and its
approach to the question outlined above. It does so in the following ways: First, in
Theoretical Perspectives, I describe key thinkers and terms that have formed the theoretical
directions explored here. The second section, Practice | Research: P and Not- P, describes
the interaction between the practical and written components of this dissertation. Then,
in the Chapter Outlines, a synopsis of each of the chapters is provided. The Conclusion
tackles the question of the relationship between the theoretical and practical
components of this dissertation.

(i) Theoretical Perspectives
In March 2007 Ray Brassier’s essay, ‘The Enigma of Realism: on Quentin Meillassoux’s
After Finitude’, was published in the journal Collapse.11 Brassier reported that Meillassoux
had devised unique arguments in support of a speculative materialist position. In order
to address issues raised in Meillassoux’s book, Brassier suggested a symposium be held
to discuss this new materialist, speculative, and realist direction. As the participants
recall, the term Speculative Realism was suggested and adopted as a useful label
describing a common tendency in what were otherwise highly divergent positions
amongst the philosophers who attended.12 As the announcement of the conference
11

Ray Brassier, ‘The Enigma of Realism: On Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude’, Collapse, 11 (2007), 1555.
12
See Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism
and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011).
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itself declares: ‘Speculative realism is not a doctrine but the umbrella term for a variety
of research programmes committed to upholding the autonomy of reality, whether in
the name of transcendental physicalism, object-oriented philosophy, or abstract
materialism, against the depredations of anthropocentrism’.13 The proposed conference
was held in 2007 at Goldsmiths College. Brassier, Harman, Meillassoux, and Ian
Hamilton Grant each presented papers that outlined what they argued were the
characteristics of this new realist direction in philosophy. As such, speculative realism is
still very much an evolving set of ideas and approaches without a single overarching set
of philosophical values, but rather a broad descriptive term encompassing a
reinvigorated realist tendency in contemporary philosophy.14
Subsequently the publication of The Speculative Turn in 2011 sought to anthologize this
renewed direction in thought. 15 The title was understood ‘as a deliberate counterpoint
to the now tiresome “Linguistic Turn”…’ 16 and its focus on linguistic philosophy and
the significance of language in the constitution of a knowable human reality. While
there are as many varieties of what is meant here by realism and objects as there are
speculative realists, what each speculative realist philosophy holds in common is a
critique of the necessity of a correlation between thought and being. Meillassoux terms
this linkage ‘correlationism’ and defined it in the following way: ‘By “correlationism” we
mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’.17
Graham Harman’s particular object-oriented critique of correlationism will be a focus
for this project. Harman, in Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things,
The Quadruple Object and elsewhere, argues that the unbridgeable gap between object and
subject is not a privileged gap between humans and the world per se, but is rather a
13

See Continental Philosophy Bulletin Board announcing the workshop posted on 29 March 2007.
Farhang Erfangi, ‘Speculative Realism’, Continental Philosophy Bulletin Board [webpage], (29 Mar. 2007)
<http://www.continental-philosophy.org/2007/03/29/speculative-realism/>.
14
Many of the philosophers who attended this conference or who have become associated with
Speculative Realism, have subsequently rejected it as an entirely inadequate description of their position,
and others including Harman and Levi Byrant have coined their own terms to describe their perspectives.
To avoid terminological confusion I will use this term here except when more exact terms are required to
describe specific positions.
15
See Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman.
16
Ibid. 1.
17
Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5.
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constitutive feature of any relation whatsoever. By critiquing what Harman has called
‘philosophies of access’, what he terms his ‘object oriented philosophy’ resurrects the
object as a central concern. In his words these objects include ‘those entities that are
neither physical nor even real. Along with diamonds, rope and neutrons, objects may
include armies, monsters, square circles, and leagues of real and fictitious nations. All
such objects must be accounted for by ontology, not merely denounced or reduced to
despicable nullities’.18
Timothy Morton in Ecology Without Nature and The Ecological Thought, has investigated the
conceptual and historical intersection between concepts of ecology, nature and
aesthetics. Morton’s more recent Realist Magic: Object, Ontology, and Causality, further
develops these themes to propose new understandings of realism. Morton’s perspective
has been particularly helpful in developing an understanding of realism and what it may
mean for a radically expanded concept of the ecological.
In addition to the thought of Meillassoux, Harman, and Morton, networked
communication and the ‘ecologies of knowledge’ it forms have played important roles.19
Examining the role of telematic communication in any depth in the formation of
object-oriented philosophies and speculative realism(s) is outside the scope of this
dissertation. It is worthwhile to make a few comments in so far as this dynamic has
helped give form to this dissertation and the theoretical perspective it explores. Harman
updated blog readers daily on the writing of the The Quadruple Object, and while none of
the materials in the book appeared on the blog, he would occasionally summarize the
ideas he was working on at the time.. The release of Levi Bryant’s book The Democracy of
Objects was preceded by its development on his blog, Larval Subjects, in response to
readers’ comments and suggestions. Morton’s blog Ecology without Nature, and Steven
Shaviro’s The Pinocchio Theory, as well as Adam Robberts’ Knowledge Ecology have, amongst
others, helped develop a perspective on the issues raised in this dissertation. Thinkers,
including Manuel De Landa, Brian Massumi, and Jane Bennett provided further critical
and contextual literature. At another level, the work of philosophers including Alfred

18

Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester, Zero Books, 2011), 5.
For more on the concept of knowledge ecologies see Adam Robbert, Knowledge Ecology [website], (20123) <http://knowledge-ecology.com/>.
19
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North Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, Bruno Latour, and Alain Badiou provide a theoretical
background that acts as both a resource and sometimes catalytic antagonist for the
various speculative realists.
From the above short discussion it can be seen that one of the difficulties with a project
such as this is achieving reasonable consistency in the meaning of terms and how they
are used. Realism, speculation and materialism are notoriously difficult to pin down and
are used in a bewildering array of ways by the various authors discussed here. In order
to achieve some measure of consistency, at least in how the key terms of speculation,
realism and object(s) are understood in this dissertation, I have attempted to define how
I have used them below.
Realism and Objects
Realism and materialism are often conflated. While the materialist believes (s)he can
know things or objects outside of the mind-thing correlate, realists are not necessarily
materialists, although often the materialist is a realist of material. For example, the
idealist posits ideas as real, and may understand material as a mere epiphenomenon of
an underlying ideal form, hence realism does not necessarily entail a realism of the
material world. It is a claim that some ‘things’ or entities are more real, that is have
ontological priority over some other entities. Lee Braver’s book, A Thing of this World: A
History of Continental Anti-Realism, has been an important catalyst for speculative realist
thinking and captures important elements of the meanings that ‘object’ and ‘Realism’
have in the first, and primary, component of his Realism Matrix:
The first component of the Realism Matrix is metaphysical: a set of objects or
states of affair, which does not rely upon us for existence or for essence,
excluding trivial examples of things we have made or which depend upon us
in relatively uninteresting ways, such as our thought or beliefs. The fact that
these entities are—and that they are what they are—is unaffected by what we
think, or say.20

Speculation
The most influential exponent of a philosophy of speculation was Alfred North
Whitehead. Whitehead’s philosophy is notoriously difficult and his philosophical
contributions are too large to be covered here. Nevertheless, a description of the nature
20

Lee Braver, A Thing of this World: A History of Continental Ant-Realism, (Evanston Illinois: Northwestern
University Press, 2007), 15.
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of his speculative approach, further discussed in the Overview, is relevant for its ability to
capture the intended meaning of this term in this dissertation. Johan Sieber wrote this
characterization of Whitehead’s speculative method and its implications for speculative
philosophy more generally:
Speculative thinking deals with ultimate notions, notions incapable of analysis
in terms of other notions, more far-reaching than they. This means that there
can be no definition of the notions we employ in speculative philosophy, at
least not in the sense of providing an explanation of these notions in terms of
other notions, which supposedly have a meaning that is fixed and clear, at
least insofar as their use in the definition is concerned. Speculative ideas
presuppose each other, and can only be elucidated by bringing out the ways in
which they presuppose each other. Because each one of them presuppose all
the others there is not privileged starting point, so the movement of
speculative philosophy is not one of a linear exposition of ideas or theories in
terms of clearly stated fundamental notions. It is a circular movement, going
over the same notions and issues over and over again in order to explicate
more and more what is contained in them. An exposition more geometrico is in
the nature of the case impossible.21

Whitehead understood speculation as entailing an essentially critical, creative, and
cohesive approach. These steps are reflected in Whitehead’s discussion of his
speculative method in the introduction to Process and Reality, where he argues a
speculative approach to experience, properly understood, is akin to ‘the flight of an
aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the
thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation
rendered acute by rational interpretation’.22 That is, it is a mode of thought that appeals
to empirical evidence, formulates general observations, and tests them against
coherence and experience. Crucially, it can be understood as a method of thinking that
is closely associated with, and indeed, reliant upon experience. As such, it can be
understood as a method of disclosure, one that deploys re-descriptive concepts that
have the effect of disclosing the significance of experience. Isabelle Stengers, in Thinking
with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, explains ‘that the interest of the
speculative scheme he [Whitehead] has constructed resides in its applications, in the
transformations it carries out in our way of explaining, or characterizing our
experience’.23
21

Johan Siebers, The Method of Speculative Philosophy: An Essay on the Foundations of Whitehead’s Metaphysics
(Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2002), 12.
22
North Alfred Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay on Cosmology, ed. David Ray Griffin (New York:
The Free Press, 1978), 5.
23
Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 17.

7

Whitehead’s critique of deductive reason as the sole test of truth can be understood as
an example of the application of his speculative approach. Whitehead’s critique is not a
call to unreasoned speculation or a call to disregard empirical experience, but an
emphasis upon deduction’s proper context: ‘It will be observed that logical notions
must themselves find their place in the scheme of philosophic notions’.24 Relied upon
too avidly in philosophy it leads to incoherence and becomes inadequate in the sense of
being unable to explain the logic of its own position. That is, it fails to open up
adequately explanatory conceptual parameters:
It has been remarked that a system of philosophy is never refuted, only
abandoned. The reason is that logical contradiction, except as temporary slips
of the mind – plentiful though temporary – are the most gratuitous of errors,
and usually they are trivial. Thus, after criticism, systems do not exhibit mere
illogicalities. They suffer from inadequacy and incoherence.25

Understood from this perspective, speculation is a statement of method, not simply of
orientation or tendency. It is a ‘method of imaginative rationalization’ of a cohesive,
creative expansion of conceptual parameters in order to understand how experience
coheres to discover ‘the obvious solidarity of the world’.26

(ii) Practice | Research: Dialetheism
My intention in this dissertation is not to try and arbitrate between the two poles of
anti-realism and realism. It is to consider the practical consequences and possibilities
represented by speculative realist and object-oriented thought. In this way, this project
reflects Charles Sander Peirce’s empirical maxim: ‘Consider what effects, which might
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object’.27
William James cited this maxim in his series of lectures Pragmatism: A New Name for an

24

Ibid. 3.
Ibid. 6.
26
Alfred North Whitehead, cited in Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed
Understanding of the Place-World (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 66.
27
See Charles S. Peirce, ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’, Popular Science Monthly, 12 (1978), 286-302.
25
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Old Way of Thinking.28 James foregrounds the question of what is actually meant in practice
when an epistemological question is asked. To illustrate his point he famously used the
question of a person’s spatial relationship to a squirrel hiding behind a tree:
the human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round
the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the
opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so
that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem
now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? The question is
answered by the practical question of what you mean by going around. Thus it
is a question of the dissolution of a metaphysical problem of ultimate truth via
the practical question of how to answer it. What are the practical implications
of answering it? What do we mean by going around in this particular empirical
experience?29 [Emphasis in the original]

This fraught relationship between knowledge and action was central to James’s concept
of ‘radical empiricism’, developed further by Alfred North Whitehead and discussed in
Chapter Two. How John Dewey broadened Peirce’s and James’s empiricism with an
even greater emphasis upon the relationship between knowledge and action is also
relevant. This issue was a focus for Dewey’s lectures titled The Quest for Certainty:
How has the separation of intellect from action affected the theory of
knowledge? […] What forces are at work to break down the division? What
would the effect be if the divorce were annulled, and knowing and doing were
brought into intrinsic connection with one another? What revisions of the
traditional theory of mind, thought and knowledge would be required, and
what changes in the idea of the office of philosophy would be demanded?
What modification would ensure in the disciplines which are concerned with
the various phases of human activity?30

Questions such as these have a continuing relevance and have been further investigated
in the writing of social geographer and latter day pragmatist Nigel Thrift. Thrift usefully
describes an understanding of practice that can help illustrate what I mean. For Thrift
practice is ‘inherently dialogical and affectively charged’, a matter of social knowledge in
use.31 No particular mode this knowledge takes—whether conceptual, written, and/or
materially embedded know-how—can claim a monopoly on the descriptive verb practice.
Practice, for Thrift, is a matter of knowledge in action within a social context, action
that is temporally grounded in pragmatics and thus evolving.32 The question is one of
28

See William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longman, Green
and Co., 1922).
29
Ibid. 27.
30
John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty; A Study of the Relation Between Knowledge and Action (New York:
Minton Baltch, 1929), 6.
31
Nigel Thrift, Spatial Formations (London: Sage Publications, 1996), x.
32
Ibid. x.
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how to find one’s way, the senses of why, what kind of experience does it encapsulate,
and what does it mean or potentially mean? The question here then is not a matter of
attempting to develop a novel theoretical object—a post-correlationist photo-object?
Instead, it is more a matter of reflecting on the encounter with photography and how
these broader questions intersect with it. This entails asking if there is a way of thinking
about photographic imaging that is not itself simply reflective of either of the two poles
of naive realism or dogmatic anti-realism; that is, is photography as always an inherently
self-reflective practice in which humans are at the centre of knowing? The intention is
to develop what Jane Bennett, following Steven K. White, describes as a weak onto-tale;
that is, a cohesive account of a direction in thought oriented towards a problem of
practice. 33 The aim of such an onto-tale is to provide a set of conceptual grid
references, rather than proofs, for why one acts in one way rather than another, in
ethical, practical and aesthetic dilemmas. Such a practice of a weak ontology can help
address, if not answer, the question of how we understand objects and their relations.
Bennett explains the concept of a weak ontology in the following terms:
This is the name that White gives to an emerging genre of social theory that
develops its political analysis in conjunction with a set of contentions about
the fundamental character of human being and the world. The practitioner of
weak ontology believes that “such conceptualization for the self, other and the
world are necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical and
political life”. What distinguishes a weak ontologist from a traditional
metaphysician is that the former emphasizes the necessarily speculative and
contestable character of her onto-story and thus does not try to demonstrate
its truth in any strong sense.34

In the context of formulating a weak onto-story, the context of how the question of the
relationship between art practice and research arises is more relevant for this project
than trying to formulate a coherent response of what the relationship between art
practice and research may be. To this end Scott Brook’s article Beyond Practice-led
Research35 will now be discussed within the context of Timothy Morton’s treatment of
dialetheism.36

33

Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001), 160.
34
Ibid. 160-161.
35
Scott Brook, ‘Introduction: Part 2. The Critique of Practice Led Research’, TEXT [online journal], 14
(2012), < http://www.textjournal.com.au/speciss/issue14/Brook%20(Intro%202).pdf>.
36
Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2013).
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Brook sees the issue of how knowledge is generated as central to understanding why the
question of the relationship between art practice and research has become entangled in
institutional, governance, economic, and ideological discourses. Symptomatic of this is
how the words ‘led’ and ‘based’ have become interchangeable. This situation is linked to
the history of policy agendas and talk of creative economies, as Brook explains:
The former [practice-led research] has become the dominant term in Australia
since 2005 when it was promoted as part of the creative industries policy
agenda. At this time it could be confidently assumed that readers would
understand the term as meaning ‘not research into, or about, creative practice,
but research through creative practice’, with the corollary that outcomes of
creative practice might be regarded as research outputs (Green 2006: 5,
original emphasis). What was perhaps distinctive about this application was
that the push for recognitive justice for creative arts lecturers that had been
underway since the mid-1990s was now conjoined with policy rhetoric on the
importance of creativity for an innovation economy. 37

To clarify what is at stake in this debate Brook describes four critiques of the
relationship between art practice and research: the aesthetic critique, the academic critique,
the bureaucratic critique and the educational critique. Brook believes the aesthetic critique is
the central critique in these debates. This critique argues the status of knowledge is
specific to forms of practice and cannot be translated. Art practice, because it is tied to
forms of experience, cannot be translated into discursive conceptual forms. To do so
threatens the integrity of art as art. Yet, as Brook points out, ‘Although such a critique
might seem radical, this position is in fact in line with normative twentieth-century
thought on creativity, where it inherits the Romantic account of aesthetics as a critique
of knowledge’.38 Pragmatist Dewey, Brook notes, is often cited in support of this
position. Dewey’s Art as Experience situates the artist as the paradigm of the situated
practitioner who is able to overcome the gap between knowledge and experience by
sublimating knowledge to a situated critique that engenders experience. In this way, art
trumps research by demonstrating that research is practice and the artist is the
practitioner par excellence. As Brook explains:
The reflective practitioner internalises this radical doubtfulness of the world
around them and discovers it within themselves as a failure of a priori
concepts, thus overcoming the alienation of self from world produced by the
presumption of knowledge and cultivating a self that is prepared for what the
materials will reveal. The echoes of the Kantian sublime should be enough to
remind us of what is at stake: the artist’s capacity to suspend foreknowledge

37
38

Brook, 2.
Ibid. 3.
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and remain open to contingency has become an ethically exemplary
performance of the proper relation between self and world. 39

The next critique Brook examines is the academic critique, which foregrounds conceptual
forms of knowledge and is suspicious of the romantic echoes within the aesthetic
critique:
[The academic critique] endorses the view that the university system is not a de
facto form of arts patronage, and that art making and art objects are not
research methods or outcomes, even if they can be informed by the research
of those artists who are also scholars (‘research-led practice’). In its generous
form, this critique might accept that art constitutes research if and when it is
accompanied by legitimating practices that are accepted by a group of peers. 40

Brook argues that both these positions are subsumed within the bureaucratic critique; that
is, they are deployed as instrumental means to enact policy objectives arising out of
ideological dictates that are often framed as economic imperatives. The market and
managerial imperatives of neo-liberalism are contemporary manifestation of these.
Within this critique the creation of knowledge must, out of economic necessity, be
subsumed by the needs of economic production. The practical problem then becomes
how to ‘develop a new administrative lexicon and political settlement’ which would
bring artists, art schools, universities, and students within the productivist ethos of a
creative knowledge economy. 41 As such, the administration of this settlement is equally
if not more important than any theoretical questions raised by the relation between
practice and research. Consideration of such issues will be subordinate to more pressing
concerns:
Although discussions of practice-led research may involve claims about the
status of art and knowledge, such claims are instrumental to a reformist
project whose success does not wait on the final outcome of any intellectual
debates concerning whether such claims are true.42

Any practical outcome is determined by the alignment of art schools within a university
setting wherein information production agendas are paramount. These include:
the training and examination of higher research degree (HDR) candidates; the
assessment of staff research outputs on annual PDR forms; the allocation of
competitive research funding within the university sector. In each instance,
intellectual principle needs to be tempered by institutional pragmatics. 43
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Notwithstanding this, the educational critique argues that none of this relates to what
artists actually do: ‘The irony is that discussions of practice in practice-led research
sublimate their object into a highly aestheticised mode of self-presentation that,
although morally exemplary in the seminar room or PhD dissertation […] risks
obscuring what creative artists actually do (i.e. “in practice”).’44 The practice of being an
artist, actor or musician is subordinated to a setting, which is at least as much about
producing research as it is about producing art. The temptation, Brook asserts, ‘to
append hyperbolic claims of methodological ‘reflexivity’ to their work’ is just one of the
dangers awaiting the artist researcher. 45
Brook’s description of these four critiques broadly characterizes a field of contention
rather than a theoretical question of the relationship between practice and theory. How
the relationship between practice and research is formulated is itself symptomatic of the
unstable, contentious context within which the issue exists. Any claim that seeks to
answer how the relationship between the artwork and research is constituted, then, is
likely to downplay or ignore other aspects of their relationship and thereby the
institutional, governance, and policy context within which this issue has gained such
urgency. Brook concludes that the context within which the question is posed ensures
the question of whether artworks constitute research cannot be answered in an open
way:
But do artworks constitute research? As unavoidable as this question is,
perhaps we need to read it as a demand rather than a real question. Whetherand-how the terms of this statement are capable of prompting a credible reply
is an important issue in relation to the administration of the tertiary creative
arts sector – we learn as much from the bureaucratic critique. But what we
learn from a range of other critiques is that this question is of limited value in
relation to the requirements of teaching, understanding and appreciating
creative practice. If the notion of practice-led research does seem capable of
meeting the terms of this question, then we might reconsider whether this
always counts in its favour.46

Arguments linking art and research, like many previous attempts to define the essential
qualities of artworks, have a descriptive utility of qualities (discussed briefly in Chapter
One) that may or may not be present in artworks. Brook’s analysis suggests it would be
more helpful to describe the ecologies of knowledge and practice from which the
44
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question of the relationship between practice and research has emerged. In this context
a concept of the ecology of practices as knowledge, as a form of speculative pragmatism
touched upon above, and geared towards not just understanding the outcomes of
certain policies and practices but also the intentional invention of new possible(s) (as
opposed to just probable(s)), would be useful. Isabelle Stengers’ concept of practice
ecologies is thus relevant. In Cosmopolitics 1 Stengers writes:
Ecological practice (political in the broadest sense) is then related to the
production of values, to the proposal of new modes of evaluation, new
meanings...they are about the production of new relations that are added to a
situation already produced by a multiplicity of relations47

The conditions for the emergence of new possibilities intersects here with Jamesian
pragmatism, Stengers’ description of Whitehead’s ‘free and wild creation of concepts’—
and perhaps also with Jane Bennett’s attempt to create ‘weak onto-tales’—with the aim
of creating ‘symbiotic agreements’ between the formation of new practices and
knowledge and the communities of humans and nonhumans they conjoin or fragment.48
It is this invention of new possibilities that the institutional modes of practice based or
led research may have a problem. The possibility of a radical break with the actual in
favour of new realities is central to Morton’s discussion of dialetheism in his Realist
Magic. Realism is properly speculative, and hence ‘magical’, in Morton’s terms, partly
because it refuses the current actual existing states of affairs, often a materialism or
idealism claiming to be a realism, by dispensing with the principle of non-contradiction
in favour of an ‘aesthetics as causation’.

(iii) Chapter Outlines
In this dissertation the issue of how the artwork may be re-conceptualized from a postcorrelationist perspective provides a context for three questions, which are explored in
the first three chapters. In brief, I approach these questions in the following ways:
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First, How does the critique of correlationism help us to understand a self-sufficient art
object apart from relational or social contexts? This is addressed in Chapter One, The
Object Versus the Post Object Debate in the Australian Art World during the 1970s.
Then the second chapter, Something to be Seen, A Picture on a Screen, deploys a postcorrelationist perspective to ask why is an anthrodecentric approach, (i.e. a ‘decentering’
of the anthropocentric), to the photographic image desirable and what would it look
like? 49
The third chapter, Photo | Vision: Photographing Place, asks how correlationism inflects
representations of place. The focus of this discussion is the collaborative online work
Konvolut K (Jo Law and Redmond Bridgeman), (Appendix 2.) and a photographic essay
of ‘new urbanist’ spaces, titled Project X, (Appendix 1) that forms a companion piece to
this work. This discussion is framed by the question of whether Walter Benjamin’s
expansion of the literary concept of the Denkbild (thought-image) to include various
artefacts, images and textual quotations can be further stretched to include objects that
are not the product of human artifice.
How the dissertation proceeds in these first three chapters is outlined in more detail
below:
Why is it important to understand an artwork as an independent entity, existing beyond
its relational or social contexts? This question is addressed in the first chapter, The Object
Versus the Post Object Debate in the Australian Art World during the 1970s. Here it is argued
that much post-object art was trapped in a bifurcation between subject and object. This
is, in part, a reflection of Donald Brook’s account of post-object art, which, it is argued,
is firmly situated in what Meillassoux calls the ‘correlationist circle’ (touched upon
above and discussed in more detail in the Overview). Because this bifurcation is left
largely intact, rather than freeing art from the dictates of the arbitrary exercise of
authority, as was hoped, such authority was actually affirmed. By positing an entirely
relational and human view of the art object, and installing authenticity in various guises
49
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as the real test of value, the hoped-for escape becomes impossible. Could the only
alternative be, then, to argue for the irreducible otherness of art works, what Harman
calls the withdrawal of the real object, so that art objects cannot be thought of as simply
subject to a process that transfigures them into human things? Perhaps the only way out
of this subject-object bind is, then, the recognition of the non-reducibility of the
artwork to its varied relations, perhaps even including its origins in human praxis?
The second chapter, titled Something to be seen, a picture on a screen, builds upon the
previous chapter’s argument for the non-reductive object hood of artworks. 50 In order
to do this I ask: why is an anthrodecentric approach to the photographic image
desirable? This question is addressed in the following ways: In A Picture on a Screen, two
perspectives on visual perception are sketched. These perspectives are James J. Gibson’s
account of a anthropocentric perspective that he termed ‘aperture vision’ and Kinji
Imanishi’s account of the perceptual relations between living and non-living things in
The World of Living Things. The intention here is to illustrate the types of visual
relationships that are produced by different concepts of nature. Alfred North
Whitehead’s discussion of the ‘the bifurcation of nature’ in The Concept of Nature, is then
outlined to help describe the origins of the anthropocentric perspective. Then, in An
Ecology of Practice, how object-oriented philosophy (primarily Harman’s concept of
vicarious causation and Morton’s account of the ‘ecological thought’ and ‘the mesh’ ’)
suggests an anthrodecentric understanding of ecological relationships is canvassed.51 In
the Conclusion, Alphonso Lingis’ claims about photography is presented as an example of
how an anthrodecentric approach could be applied to the photographic image. Lingis
argues that photography is brings about an encounter with the ‘images that the things,
and not the human mind, engender’.52 For Lingis, photographs are capable of producing
an anthrodecentic experience. They help us:
recognize that the things themselves engender ‘images’ or doubles of
themselves – shadows, halos the images of themselves they project on water,
on the glass of windows – and also on the surfaces of the eyes of mammals,
birds, fish. For example, the puddles of water that appears to be shimmering,
on the surface of the road ahead in a hot day is not ‘subjective’ produced by
50
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the mind; it is engendered by the road, and the sun, and everybody in the car
that sees it.53

The third chapter Photo | Vision: Photographing Place asks, how has correlationism
inflected representations of place? Siegfried Kracauer and Ernst Bloch, amongst others,
sought to describe contemporary experience using the short narrative essayistic Denkbild
(thought-image). The Denkbild was concerned with the interdependence of parts that, in
critic Karoline Kirst’s words, ‘…presents an image as an integral albeit not immediately
recognizable part of the thought’.54 Walter Benjamin’s deployment and ‘intensification’
of this in, for example, One Way Street, and later in The Arcades Project, experimented with
a materialist expansion of this device to include images, quotations, and artefacts. The
German Baroque emblematic tripartite structure, Inscriptio (motto), Subscriptio (epigram),
and Pictura (icon, device, image), provided Benjamin with a model for his method.55
Benjamin produced a profane materialist version of the emblem in his attempt to find a
form equivalent to the experience of modernity.
How Benjamin’s expanded concept of the Denkbild can be deployed is explored in the
following three ways: In the first section Inscription, Benjamin’s use of the Denkbild as a
means of deciphering contemporary experience is discussed (through reference to the
writing of Susan Buck-Morss, Howard Caygill, and Karoline Kurst). Then in Pictura:
Project X a process of aestheticisation of urban space is described via urban development
and public art works, in Perth, Western Australia. In the third section, Subscriptiao:
Konvolut K: Dream City and Dream House, Dreams of the Future, Anthropological Nihilism, we
address the work Konvolut K (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman) and how this work sought
to employ some of the strategies of Benjamin’s expanded concept of the Denkbild.
Analysis of the urban landscapes describe in chapter three often makes the point that
any social reality is necessarily occluded by visual representations. But another
conclusion is possible; perhaps photographs are capable of operating in what video
game creator and theorist Ian Bogost, citing the photography of Steven Shore, describes
as an ontographic mode, a mode, Bogost argues, which is able to present how the ‘tyre
53
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and the chassis, the ice milk and the cup, the buck shot and the soil […] exist not just for
us but also for themselves and for one another, in ways that might surprise and dismay us’.56In
the fourth Chapter, From Beyond, some of the implications of Bogost's claim and the
possible features of a ontographic mode of practice are explored.
First in A Speculative Photographic Realism, Tom Gunning’s argument for representational
realism is discussed. My intention here is to contrast ontological realism with
representational realism via an account of the intrusion of presence in photographs- to
produce a kind of photographic realism. Then, in A Practical Onto-graphy, I draw upon
Harman’s account of ‘ontography’ and Bogost’s concept of ‘practical ontography’ to
explore a strategic practical framework for an ontographic photography. In the
Conclusion Reza Negarestani’s account of ‘anonymous materials’57 and Eugene Thacker’s
concept of occultism, are discussed as possible tactics for the practice of an ontographic
photography. This discussion takes place in relation to two projects. 58 These are the
short film A Natural History Primer (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman),(Appendix 3) and the
project From Beyond wherein the role of speculation, realism, and how these may
intersect with concepts of the preternatural is investigated in a current series of
photographs. (Appendix 4) The aim of this project is to conjure up an encounter with
the shadowy or ghostly presence of objects stripped of their correlationist context.

(iv) Conclusion
The first chapter is a return to and reconsideration of a historical debate of the status of
the artwork as self-sufficient object or relational social process. This chapter reconsiders
ideas originally published as an essay in Australian Cultural History: Antipodean Modern.59
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The second chapter developed out of a paper, The Ethics of Looking, presented as a short
discussion paper at the symposium The Aesthetics of Care: The artistic, social and scientific
implications of the use of biological/medical technologies for artistic purposes.60 The third chapter
concerns a collaborative photographic project with Jo Law set in Perth, Western
Australia. The fourth chapter, in part, incorporates a forthcoming short essay (coauthored with Jo Law) appearing in O-Zone: A Journal of Object Oriented Studies,61 and
draws on the preceding research to explore a conceptual framework for a speculative,
realist, and preternatural photography.
In the context of the preceding discussion of the relationship between research and
practice, the discussion in chapter four is not an attempt at an explication of the photobook that accompanies this dissertation. Rather the discussion formulates a future
oriented approach to praxis, a term which, for Pascal Gielen, has a number of
contemporary meanings:
What matters is not only the correct balance between theory and practice, but
also the way in which they interact. Ideally, material reality is explored through
theoretical knowledge and theoretical insights are, when necessary, corrected
in a tactile way. In Marxist jargon such correct interaction may also be referred
to as praxis. Though it is not necessary to copy or subscribe to Marx’s
ideological backdrop as such, praxis can be considered to be a sort of
embodied knowledge. However, the term also refers to a bilateral relationship
between theory and acting which may be referred to as acting through
theoretical knowledge and through an acting theory. It is a relationship of
continuous interpenetration of theory and practice.62

Thus chapter four is not concerned with the production of particular works but of
opening a conceptual space within which, by its very nature, there can be no predicable
product. Maarten Simon and Jan Masschelein’s discussion of the aetiology of the word
‘school’ further develops the meaning of praxis in this situation: ‘School is literally a
place of schole, that is the space of free time […] Disconnected from both the oikos and
polis, and hence freed from daily and economic and political occupations, the school was
a real space with a real inner place and time, where people were exposed to real
60
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things’.63 In these senses this dissertation can be understood as striving to create space
for an approach to praxis in the context of new considerations, such as object oriented
ontology, of realism, ecology, and objects (or things). Simon and Massschelein explain:
The school could be regarded as a particular medium, a means without ends,
that is a free place and time where something is being offered without
establishing a particular destination or orientation. Schole, then, is not simply a
time/space of passage (from past to future, project time or initiation time). It
is the time and space of attention.64

Consequently, the last chapter in the dissertation is not structured solely around the
explication of existing work. In addition, arising from the research described in this
dissertation, the conclusion briefly describes a future oriented direction. This is
primarily practice-oriented and will employ obsolete photographic technologies and
image-making techniques such as cyanotypes, electro-photography (Kirilian
photography), ambrotypes, and the remnant silver gelatine photography. Following on
from the discussion of photography and the preternatural in chapter four, it will put
forward the hypothesis, to be investigated via future research, that a historical model for
conjuring up a realist beyond is offered by occult and spirit photography with its
ambition of making visible various materialisations and other effluvia.
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Overview
If philosophy begins in wonder, then where does it end? What is its end?
Aristotle said that while it begins in wondrous questioning, it ends with “the
better state” of attaining answers, like an itch we get rid of with a good scratch
or a childhood disease that, once gotten over, never returns. How depressing!
[…] Wittgenstein once wrote that a “philosophical problem has the form: “I
don’t know my way about” which was the symptom of he deep confusion that
constituted philosophy for him. But Heidegger loved wandering aimlessly in
the woods, following Holzwege or paths that lead nowhere, stumbling onto
dead-ends which could also be clearings. 65
Lee Braver
On Not Settling the Issue of Realism (2013)

Introduction
This Overview refers to speculative and object-oriented philosophies to the extent that
they are able to, in Lee Braver’s words, address ‘the issue of realism’ and the creative
endeavour discussed in this dissertation. The terrain covered here is rather expansive
and since the writing of each of the thinkers discussed is dense and complex, only the
insights from each writer that are most relevant to this question will be discussed.
However, by necessity neighbouring thinkers will be drawn on for support (Harman,
for example, cannot be understood without some insight into Martin Heidegger). I will
try and limit these secondary readings only to their most essential components. This
overview will not adjudicate between these various thinkers, and where differences do
arise, unless they are immediately relevant to the primary questions, they remain outside
the scope of this Overview.
In the first section, Philosophies of Access, a background for the subsequent discussion of
correlationism and the critique of philosophies of access is provided. The second
section, Correlationism and Philosophies of Access, outlines the impact of Meillassoux’s
account of correlationism, the types of response it engendered amongst speculative
realists and the important role that the necessity of contingency plays in Meillassoux’s
argument. In the third section, Graham Harman and Timothy Morton: Object Oriented
Philosophy, Graham Harman’s privileging of the human-world dyad (i.e. his agreement
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with Meillassoux regarding the prevalence of correlationism), in particular Harman’s
account of withdrawal and vicarious causation, in The Quadruple Object, are described as
key components of any alternative to a human-centric ‘correlationist circle’. Then
aspects of Timothy Morton’s argument in Realist Magic are canvassed for how they apply
an expanded concept of ecological to our understanding of objects, relations and the
implications this may have for aesthetic endeavour.

(i) Philosophies of Access
A central theme in this dissertation is the question of access; that is, can knowledge of
being(s) be had as they exist apart from humans? This question of access has been at the
forefront of philosophical questioning. It is beyond the scope of this section to address
this question in any depth; rather the intention is to provide a context for Meillassoux’s
account of correlationism and how it intersects with Harman’s and Timothy Morton’s
perspectives on the question of access. The most useful place to start is Rene Descartes’
split between extended and mental substances, which he argued for in Meditations on First
Philosophy.66 For Descartes matter possesses extension in space, but minds do not; but
nevertheless our minds have a distinct existence greater than any external matter:
And certainly the idea I have of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, not extended
in length, breadth, or depth, or having any other bodily properties, is much more distinct than
the idea of any bodily thing.67

The mind’s distinct existence creates a pivot point for Descartes. This condition is
guaranteed by God because the mind’s existence is analogous to God’s own existence—
it is the Innate Idea that is self-guaranteeing and hence is able to establish firm
foundations for knowledge of the external world because it exists in both space and
time but is outside, or external to, these at the same time. This distinction between
extended and mental substance, and how it is reconciled in the mind of both man and
God, continues in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Though he
rejected Descartes’ concept of Innate Ideas as having no source in experience, Locke
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asks: from what source could knowledge come? It comes from experience, impressing
itself upon a tabula rasa, a blank slate. Locke explains:
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all
characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes
it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted
on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason
and knowledge? To this I answer in one word EXPERIENCE.68

Locke argues this experience is produced from a correlation between primary and
secondary qualities. Primary qualities are properties that objects have that are
independent of an observer. These include solidity, extension, motion, number and
figure. These are facts about the nature of reality and exist independently of subjective
judgments. Secondary qualities are the affects or sensations that primary qualities
engender in the observer. They are not objective facts, but are rather their subjective
effects, in the mind of the observer produced by the nature of reality. Thus, knowledge of
the external world depends upon the mind reconciling these facts of experience and
providing reliable knowledge. Experience provides the material of knowledge quite
literally via the causal relationship between it and the secondary, albeit subjective, effect
on the mind. This reciprocal relationship between mind and the external world
guarantees knowledge, as in the Cartesian relationship between extended and mental
substance.
For Locke the gap between mind and matter could be overcome via experience. But for
David Hume this is problematic. At the commencement of his An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, Hume states that his intention is to describe ‘the secret springs and
principles in which the human mind is actuated in its operations’.69 Yet he soon deduces
that, at the very least, in so far as it is provisionally valid, what knowledge we have
results from an interaction between perceptual experience and ideas. Ideas are
secondary; combinations of the basic building blocks of perception that, as Hume
explains, ‘compound, transpose, augment or diminish the materials afforded us by the
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senses and experience’.70 Perceptual experience, the basis for these ideas, can be likened
to a type of impression:
Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them impressions; employing
that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term
impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see,
or feel, or love, or hate or desire or will. And impressions are distinguished
from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious,
when we reflect on any of these sensations or movements above mentioned. 71

Yet, for Hume, scepticism was the only truly justifiable attitude to experience that, at
best, could only provide a posteriori corrigible knowledge about the external world. For
Hume argued that, while experience is the foundation of knowledge, it could never be
certain knowledge. This was because the causal relations necessary for experience to be
understood as such had no necessity of their own. That is, causal relations could not be
described or predicted in terms of a priori reason. The mind, Hume argued, cannot
apprehend any necessary relation between ‘a’ and ‘b’. A precedes b and indeed seems to
cause b, but this is only via an inductive inference on the part of the observer as a
matter of habit. The causal interaction can only be empirically verified; hence it is a
matter of a posteriori knowledge arrived at by inductive reasoning. For example, while it
is reasonably likely that for many Earthlings the sun will rise tomorrow, there is no
necessary reason, that is a reason arising from logic alone, that it should. However
unlikely, a situation where it fails to rise for all Earthlings can be imagined, as Douglas
Adams amongst others have imagined.72 Its rising is a local, non-necessary event that is
only inductively true in relation to our experience. This event, or conjunction of the
earth, humans, and the sun in a certain relationship to each other, is not the same type
of conjunction as 1+ 1 = 2, which cannot be imagined otherwise.
The connection between mind and matter as the self-guaranteed relationship of
Descartes and the empiricism of Locke was broken. It not only eliminated the idea that
there existed a law of cause and effect but also brought into doubt the testimony of the
senses altogether regarding the nature of the external world. Locke’s faith in the senses
as a conduit for experience, and hence empiricism itself, was severely undermined.
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Experience became merely a succession of sensations, yet Hume’s withering scepticism
impelled Kant, who is discussed next, to ask: what then were the conditions necessary
for us to know anything?
The terrain of Immanuel Kant’s corpus is justifiably formidable and any adequately
comprehensive discussion of it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The most
important consideration, for us, is not the details of its logic as a system, but the
dominance of his Copernican Revolution on subsequent thought. Two passages from
the Critique of Pure Reason, the first concerning the nature of the Copernican inversion
and the second what this means for what we can truly know about things and objects,
can help illustrate what the new conditions for justified knowledge would be.
In the first passage, Kant sets out to discover the extent and limitation of reason’s
capacity to know anything about the external world. The problem Kant set himself was
to ask how things or objects conform to our cognition rather than the reverse. By
asking how objects conform to the mind, rather than how mind conforms to objects,
the focus shifts from the nature of reality to how it could be possible for the mind to
know reality in the first place. A question concerning the fundamental nature of things
becomes an epistemological question concerned with the nature and limits of our
knowledge concerning things. Under what conditions or framework of understanding
does the mind know the world? Asking these questions, Kant develops his famous
critique of the possible framing conditions and limits of knowledge. Kant likened his
approach to a kind of Copernican Revolution in thought. This was because it is an
inversion of the type of question asked. It was a move from questions concerning the
nature of reality, to what state of affairs would have to exist for questions such as this to
be possible in the first place. It is also, in the context of the discussion of
correlationism, a situation in the which observers construct what they observe, though
Kant argued that this was not wholly the case, as objects must conform to our
cognition:
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to
objects, but all attempts to find something about them a priori through
concept that would extend our cognition have, on that presupposition, come
to nothing. Hence, let us once try whether we do not get further with the
problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must confirm to our
cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a
priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before
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they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus,
who, when he did not make good progress in the estimation of celestial
motion if he assumed the entire celestial host revolves around the observer,
tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer
revolve and left the stars at rest.73

In matters of causation following Hume, Kant argues the mind, it appears, has no
reference point outside of itself to which it can refer. Any specific event once described
is only a description of the event’s local causes. While such an event may be described
via reference to mathematics or general laws, there is no general law in operation that
explains causation in itself. Here the transcendental bridge of Kant’s system kicks in. It
is the mind’s structure, Kant argued, that by necessity, because it is part of reality and
shares its fundamental features, provides a framework that guarantees certain forms of
knowledge:
Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuitions of
objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of objects, then I do
not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an
object of the senses) conforms to the faculty of our intuition, then I can very
well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these
intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer to them as
representations to something as their object and determine this object through
them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this
determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the
same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I
assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which
alone they can be cognized, (as given objects) conforms to these concepts, in
which case I immediately see a way out of the difficulty, since experience itself
is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to
presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which
rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience
therefore necessarily conform, and on which they must agree.74

In this way, Kant describes the constructive framework that determines the extent and
nature of knowledge of the external world. It is within this context that objectivity gains
its meaning. The claim of objectivity is not a claim to know objects apart from the
framework; objects can only be known via the framework that makes human knowledge
of anything possible. Justified knowledge becomes a type of provisional certainty about
objects, things of which we have been able to apprehend a degree of factual, objective,
if provisional, knowledge. Thus our knowledge of objects can be said to be different
from our speculation about the nature of things. Objects are produced by our framework
of objectivity, a form of knowledge that situates them in relation to us, ‘We suppose
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that our representations of things, as they are given to us, do not conform to these
things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as appearances, conform to our
mode of representation’.75
Science has a basis upon which it makes corrigible truth claims regarding objects and
their possible causal relations. But it is a certainty about our knowledge of our
intuitions, or what Kant called Sensibility. Descriptive facts about the world, Kant
allows, are knowable to this extent, but can and do change because: ‘The order and
regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could
never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind,
originally set them there’.76
Though we cannot know things-in-themselves this does not mean they do not exist. It is
just because we cannot know them, that they remain noumena, outside of and unavailable
to experience, and hence unavailable to the transcendental model of knowledge.
Phenomena are, in contrast, sensible to our understanding in a way that is amenable to
empirical verification via the scientific method. Kant’s is in this way a transcendental
model of knowledge—justified knowledge claims about the external world are
dependent on empirical experience, but because of the nature of the framework within
which they occur, they are able to formulate inductive generalizations and describe
objective, if corrigible, facts. All claims regarding objects are framed by this fact, they
are only known in so far as they correlate with, or conform to, the human mind’s
framework of understanding. The limits that the Kantian view places on the extent of
our knowledge of the external world have profound and continuing consequences for
continental philosophy. As Harman, in Guerrilla Metaphysics, writes: ‘Like all events of
shattering genius, the Kantian revolution is so victorious that it is now taken for
granted’.77 The next two sections outline how these limits have been recently contested,
and some possible consequences for our conception of the artwork and aesthetics more
generally.
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(ii) Correlationism and the question of Access
Quentin Meillassoux’s description and critique of correlationist arguments has had a
significant impact within contemporary philosophy and beyond. As argued in After
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Meillassoux hopes to disrupt the previous
genealogy, outlined above, of Kantian transcendentalism by contesting the limits and
conditions that the Kantian framework imposes on what can be known. My intention
here is to introduce Meillassoux’s account of correlationism in order to lay the
groundwork for an exploration of some of the implications it holds, reactions to it and
counter models of access such as Morton's ecological account.
In 2007 Ray Brassier reported that Meillassoux had devised a unique account of a
particular form of argument. Brassier reported,
Meillassoux has given it a name: ‘correlationism’. Correlationism affirms the
indissoluble primacy of the relation between thought and its correlate over the
metaphysical hypostatization or representationalist reification of either term of
the relation. Correlationism is subtle: it never denies that our thoughts or
utterances aim at or intend mind-independent or language-independent
realities; it merely stipulates that this apparently independent dimension
remains internally related to thought and language. 78

Brassier proposed a symposium be held to discuss the consequences correlationism
held for materialist, speculative, and realist directions in thought. The conference, titled
Speculative Realism: A workshop, was held in 2007 at Goldsmiths College. As the
announcement of the conference itself declares, ‘Speculative realism is not a doctrine
but the umbrella term for a variety of research programmes committed to upholding the
autonomy of reality, whether in the name of transcendental physicalism, object-oriented
philosophy, or abstract materialism, against the depredations of anthropocentrism’.79 As
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such the term ‘speculative realism’ was simply understood as a useful label that helped
describe a common direction in thought.80
So what is correlationism? Meillassoux’s description of correlationism places emphasis
upon the mind-dependent nature of the relationship between thought and being. Any
distinction between inside and outside must collapse under the light of the pragmatic
contradiction that is committed if it is held otherwise. Thought cannot catch itself in the
act of observing unobserved: once something is thought it is always within thought. In
Meillassoux’s words:
By ‘correlationism’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have
access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term
considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any
current of thought, which maintains the unsurpassable character of the
correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every
philosophy that disavows naive realism has become a variant of
correlationism.81

The question for the correlationist is no longer what is the fundamental cause of things
‘but rather to ask who has grasped the more originary correlation: is it the thinker of the
subject-object correlation, The noetic noematic correlation, or the language referent
correlation? The question is no longer ‘which is the proper substrate’ but “which is the
proper correlate?’82 This leaves thought within ‘the cloistered inside.’83 confined to
subjective or intersubjective verification. It is no longer a question of whether our
concepts adequately describe the outside, a question of adequation;84 rather the correlate
itself creates an inter-subjective actuality that renders any question of the outside
redundant:
For it could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great outdoors, the absolute
outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as
indifferent to its own givenness to what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are
thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of
being on foreign territory - of being entirely elsewhere.85
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But this inside produces a paradox, for thought is both inside and outside at the same
time. Language and consciousness, which act as the two principal correlates between
thinking and being, create their own ‘object worlds’. 86 Thought is enclosed within itself
but nevertheless looking out at the object world it has created:
For we are well and truly imprisoned within this outside proper to language
and consciousness given that we are always-already in it (the ‘always already’
accompanying the ‘co’ of correlationism as its other essential locution), and
given that we have no access to any vantage point from whence we could
observe these ‘object-worlds’, which are the unsurpassable providers of
exteriority, from the outside. But if this outside seems to us to be a cloistered
outside, an outside in which some may legitimately feel incarcerated, this is
because in actuality such an outside is entirely relative, since it is—and this is
precisely the point—relative to us.87

Legitimate knowledge is now defined within these confines and anything outside of
these internal relationships is considered pre-critical: ‘These postulates characterize
every “post-critical” philosophy, i.e. every philosophy that sees itself as sufficiently
faithful to Kant to not want to return to a pre-critical metaphysics’.88 Now that we have
glossed Meillassoux’s general account of correlationism it is necessary to go into some
of the details of his argument. By doing so two goals will be achieved. First, it allows a
clearer idea of the concepts of realism, materialism and speculation and how they are
deployed in this thesis. Secondly, as will be shown in the third section, Graham Harman
and Timothy Morton: Object Oriented Philosophy, it enables important distinctions to be
drawn between Meillassoux’s argument, and those of Harman and Morton.
Meillassoux’s aim is to reinvigorate a materialism that commits itself to ‘two principles
that belong to any materialism: being is not thought, and thought can think being’.89 In
order to pursue this goal, he first sought to develop an account of the model of
argument form that would be its main adversary. It was with these aims in mind that
Meillassoux describes the argument form he terms correlationism; which is distilled into
two forms, each of which will now be described. The first form he describes as the
‘correlationist circle’. It is a circular argument from which there is no apparent escape: If
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a person claims to know of something outside of thought he commits a pragmatic
contradiction, for in order to state this belief in the first place or to think it, he or she
must deploy thought even though it is impossible to be ‘acceding through thought to a
being independent of thought.’90 Because our thought is inherently linked to our
subjectivity, for the correlationist ‘thought cannot escape from itself so as to accede to a
world not yet affected by the modes of apprehension of our subjectivity.’91 And our
subjectivity, as Meillassoux explains, is tied to our thought:
I call ‘correlationism’ every form of de-absolution of thought that, to obtain
this result, argues for the closure of thought upon itself, and its subsequent
incapacity to attain an absolute outside of it. I call ‘speculative’ every
philosophy that claims on the contrary, to attain such an absolute. I call
‘materialism’ […] every thought acceding to an absolute that is at once
external to thought and in itself devoid of all subjectivity. 92

There is no stepping outside of this, one always steps into thought and thus into our
subjectivity; ‘thus [I] call the “correlationist circle” the argument that consists in
affirming that a vicious and essentially pragmatic circle is inherent in any materialism
that posits the absolute existence of a reality outside all representation.’93 So within this
schema the only question that makes any sense is: what is the correlate? What is the
relation between thought and being? Is it the subject-object correlate or the
‘consciousness-given, noetico-noematic correlate, being in the world, languagereference, etc’?94 The correlationist circle forms its own inescapable circular logic, that
seemingly rules out knowledge of the absolute, of anything outside the correlation
between thought and being. Arguments that claim such knowledge of the outside are
revealed as self-refuting pragmatic contradictions. Yet there is an escape from the
correlate. This, Meillassoux argues, is the escape offered by what he terms
‘subjectalism’. Subjectalism absolutises the correlate itself. It does this via overcoming
the correlationist argument by accepting its main tenet. If no knowledge can be
obtained of a materialist outside, then rather than indicating the finitude of human
knowledge, or its limits, it actually indicates the absolute quality of human subjectivity
itself. In this way the correlate does not mark a limit but rather marks an absolute.
Meillassoux defines subjectalism in the following way: ‘We shall thus define as
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subjectalism every metaphysics that absolutised the correlation of being and thought,
whatever sense it attached to the subjective and objective poles of such a relation’.95
How subjectivity is construed is then the issue of debate for the subjectualist. For
Meillassoux, all the various non-fideist arguments for this owe their origin to the finality
of innate ideas. These, in absolutising subjectivity, offer various ideas about what this
consists of:
The critical force of this word ‘subjectalism’ is to put into the same camp
these currents that claim to be radically opposed, to put them all together Hegel, Nietzsche, and Deleuze included - into the camp of Berkeley himself.
For Berkeley, inventor of the argument of the correlationist circle, was not a
correlationist, but a subjectalist: a philosopher for whom there existed only the
subject-minds and their ideas.96

In response to the logic of subjectalism, Meillassoux states his project in the following
way:
My project - a neo-materialist project - can be formulated as follows: how can
we escape from both correlationism and subjectalism - from all of their
historical variants, and even all conceivable variants. How can we carry out the
conjoint recusal of skepticism, criticism, transcendental and existential
phenomenology, and post-modernism (so many correlationisms), and
idealism, spiritualism, and vitalism, in their various forms so many
subjectalisms.97

So if we wish to escape the correlationist circle, the question thus becomes how do we
escape subjectalism? For the subjectivist what is unthinkable, that is the thing-in-itself,
which is affirmed by the correlationist circle, does just not exist, it is impossible. The
only absolute is the thought side of the correlation: ‘The strict necessity with which
correlationism demonstrated that we can never think outside of subjectivity, is
transmuted into the thought of an ontological necessity: subjectivity is always
experienced as a necessary, and hence eternal, principle from which no one can
escape’.98 Nevertheless, Meillassoux finds the means of escape within the correlationist
circle itself. For in order for the correlationist to counter the subjectivist absolutising
their own subjectivity, the correlationists have to affirm the non-absolute quality of
correlationism itself. How do the correlationists do this? They argue that the correlation
between thought and things is itself not absolutely necessary. That is, for correlation
itself to operate it must posit the very possibility of the thing-in-itself as a possibility.
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Even though the correlationist intention is to prove the un-knowability of what is
outside the correlation, the correlationist argument requires this possibility for its own
self-coherence. It needs to understand the correlation as itself non-necessary within a
possible schema that includes the ‘unknowable entirely-other’. Meillassoux calls this the
thesis of correlational facticity:
Thinking can think its own absence of necessity, not only qua personal
consciousness, qua supra-individual structure. It is only on this condition that
correlationism can claim to think the very possibility of an unknowable entirelyother of correlation.99

If it does not accept this, as a possibility, it must accede to the subjectivist’s argument.
For it indeed has then only become a form of subjectivism itself. If correlationism is to
escape this it must exist within a realm of other, albeit unknowable, possibilities. Hence,
Correlation may be unsurpassable, but it is not given in the manner of a
necessary foundation; nothing in it indicates its own necessity, even thought
we cannot think it being-otherwise, even thought we do not know how to
escape from it to accede to its radical outside.100

Within the decision process of the correlationist exists first the logic of the pragmatic
contradiction that occurs if being is thought outside thought. The second decision
process is that this framework itself requires the recognition of the principle of
factuality itself, not as an absolute, but as a fact, that governs correlationism. That is,
from the first it requires the recognition by correlationism itself of a latent ‘principle of
facticity’. This principle allows correlationism to resist its absolutisation by subjectivists.
By absolutising factuality itself—not specific facts, but the principle of facticity—
correlationism is able to stave off subjectivism. But in so doing, it is absolutising its own
enabling condition, the principle of factuality that allows it to escape subjectivism. It
needs to posit at least one absolute fact itself, as its own condition of not being an
absolute:
It is a matter of showing that the ultimate thesis of this de-absolutizing
thought conceals a hidden absolute: facticity—indeed arche-facticity. Why
does facticity constitute a hidden absolute of correlationism? Because the
latter must admit that we are capable of thinking our possible non-being, so as
to stave off the subjectivist absolute that declares it’s unthinkable. 101

The subjectivists by their own account cannot think the non-existence of the
correlation. To admit the possibility of the absence of the correlation, like the possibility
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that things can be known outside it, is to commit a pragmatic contradiction. ‘The non
correlated is, according to him [the subjectivist], a wholly absurd notion, and thus just as
inexistent as the square circle’.102 In contrast to the subjectivists, the correlationists,
while admitting being trapped within the correlationist circle, observe that this fact is a
fact of their observation of their situation, and that while they are unable to prove the
absolute quality of the correlation or the absolute truth of things outside of correlation,
the fact that ‘I cannot think the other of correlation […] represents the factual limits of
my thought’.103 Or as Meillassoux suggests in the title of his book, After Finitude, it’s
finitude.
To summarise, the correlationist accepts the absolute possibility of our non-being, as it
is this possibility that affirms correlationism itself and the limits that it describes on
what can be known regarding the absolute. In contrast, the subjectivist cannot allow, by
absolutising the correlation itself, the possibility of its non-existence. A condition of this
absolutisation is the impossibility of its non-existence. Unlike the subjectivist, the strong
correlationist must know one absolute, that of the principle of factuality that allows the
absolute possibility of our non-being. Indeed, this possibility makes possible the
framework of correlationism itself as a framework of knowledge, and a framework that
can only exist within the context of other possible, if unknown, possibilities, so that
‘there is indeed an effectively thinkable absolute, by the very admission of the correlationist, one that
he can no longer refute since he presupposes it’.104 [emphasis in the original]
To continue then, the principle of facticity, the arche-fact collapsed into one, enables
Meillassoux’s principle of contingency: ‘we know that what is, could not be; and that
what is not, could be’.105 Contingency is thus understood as necessary:
Things, people, events, physical laws, correlation itself; to be is to be determinate—to be this or
that—and thus to be able to change without any reason whatsoever, in perfectly contingent
fashion, within a time capable of destroying every entity, whatever its mode of being. What we
took to be the limit of thought—facticity—is an absolute and thinkable property of that which
is.106
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The correlationist, if wishing to avoid the charge of subjectivism, accepts the principle
of facticity—‘to be is to be’ and rejects the principle of ‘to be is not to be’, which is the
principle of in-consistency and is indeed the result of subjectivism which, in absolutising
the correlate and hence only subjectivity, de-absolutises contingency. In this way
Meillassoux’s materialism does not absolutise any material reality. It only absolutises
contingency itself via the principle of facticity. It is a materialism that does not
absolutise any one form of materialism or quality, which he argues are forms of
naturalism. The only exteriority to thought that is encountered ‘is that of the radical
contingency of our own world’.107
Within this scheme speculative thought has a specific role. Its role is not to affirm any
one particular state of affairs, material or otherwise as the Real. Rather, speculation is
concerned solely with demonstrating the necessity of contingency itself and affirming its
importance as a realm of possibilities in which anything (asides from infringing the
principle of non-contradiction) can happen. In this context, Meillassoux affirms the
necessity of an empirical approach to experience. For, he affirms, the empiricist ‘is
absolutely correct’ but it is also here he finds his disagreement with the empiricist.108 For
the absolute quality of empirical experience for the empiricist has an element of
necessity. But it is not the empirical in itself that lends empiricism its importance. The
encounter with contingency means that it is only via ‘regimes of experience’, in which
the inherent absolute quality of the contingent within experience is encountered, that
the empiricist’s efforts gain their validity.109 The question for Meillassoux is not to
legislate on what is, but to affirm the right of such ‘disciplines of experiences’ to do
so.110 For Meillassoux, while scientific knowledge is affirmed by the necessity of
contingency, it is, nevertheless, always corrigible and open to amendment because of its
contingent nature. The enemy of experience as the main font of knowledge is thus
metaphysics. This is coupled to Meillassoux’s account of speculation as necessarily
produced by the recognition of the absolute quality of contingency:
For I call ‘speculative’ any philosophy that claims to accede to an absolute.
But I call ‘metaphysical’ any speculation that claims to accede to the absolute
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according to a more or less extended modality of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason.111

It was just this principle of sufficient reason that Hume found wanting in our
experience of causation and which he displaced by habit. It is also just this principle that
Meillassoux finds inimical to contingency and its absolute quality. This is because it
affirms a necessity where there is not one, the long search for a sufficient reason for
things: ‘a necessary reason to be as they are rather than otherwise’ offends against
correlationism because it argues that things should be one way rather than otherwise.112
In so doing it presents an absolute, one that correlationism has always sought to
contest. The door to the feidist is opened who simply wills things to be, whether
justified by reason or empirical demonstration and which, Meillassoux explains, leads to
dogmatic or absolutist positions, to which he
oppose[s] an ‘absolutizing’ position, i.e. a speculative but non-metaphysical
position; the factial position, maintains the absolute falsity of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, and thus relinquishes any right to intrude, with its necessary
reasons, into the sphere of what actually exists.113

The nature of speculation as conceived by Meillassoux therefore becomes clearer:
For consider the effects of the thesis according to which materialism must be
speculative, and not metaphysical, and thus should be prohibited of speaking
of what is, and content itself with speaking of the contingency of what is. We
are materialists in so far as we obey the two principles that belong to any
materialism: being is not thought, and thought can think being. On one hand,
I establish that the being of everything is its contingency - the fact that a being
is rather than is not. In After Finitude, I try to prove (my materialist ontological
proof) that if contingency is eternal, then there must have existed for all
eternity contingent beings - and not nothing. For contingency is nothing
outside of what is contingent - it is not a ‘free floating’ principle, but always
the property of determinate beings.114

Within this proof lies the consideration of dead matter in another way, other than as
subjectivist anthropomorphic human projects. Its supplemental qualities are understood
as simply radically contingent events. They mark the refusal of the principle of sufficient
reason. These little miracles without reason are ‘founded on the principle of pure
contingency of everything and of every world’.115
For in this world of dead matter, it turns out that there is a radical ex nihilo
emergence of realities, (sensations, perception etc.) that absolutely did not
exist before, not even potentially (for the potential combinations of organic
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matter yield only physical complexes which never have any reason to
supplement themselves with a regime of sensations). 116

As explained above, Meillassoux sought to answer the question of how is a materialist
knowledge possible? He thereby seeks to develop a concept of radical contingency that
is in turn absolutised. The concept of sufficient cause, which Meillassoux describes
using the formulation ‘all x’s are y’s’, in favour of the formulation; all x’s are not ‘by
necessity’ y’s. This formulation, he argues, is the guarantee that the ‘correlationist circle’
while it cannot just be stepped out of; can be refuted so that a new delimitation of the
conditions of knowledge is possible.
Meillassoux’s analysis of correlationism expands the question of our relationship to
objects and what we can know about them. He sees two positions as the main
opponents of his argument described in After Finitude:
In my book I frontally oppose two positions: a) ‘strong correlationism’ which,
in my opinion, is the most rigorous form of anti-absolutism, and therefore of
contemporary anti-metaphysics, and b) a metaphysics I call ‘subjective’, which,
conversely, is nowadays the most widespread philosophy of the absolute, one
which consists in posing this or that feature of the subject as essentially
necessary—that is, its status as part of a correlate.117

Though these two positions would seem themselves to be in opposition, but for
Meillassoux, they are closely linked. Indeed strong correlationism, in which the
necessary correlation between thought and being rules out any independent knowledge
of being outside of thought, produces an absolutizing subjectivity. While Kant’s form of
correlationism, in which though the thing-in-itself cannot be known, it can at least be
intuited, is rejected by strong correlationism:
Kant claims that we know something exists in itself, and that it is thinkable
(non-contradictory). ‘Strong’ correlationism does not even admit that we can
know that there is an “in-itself” and that it can be thought: for this we are
radically confined in our thought, without the possibility of knowing the initself, not even its taking place and logicity.118

Yet, Meillassoux argues strong correlationism is a form of inter-subjective Idealism. It
does not allow the thing-in-itself because it is simply unknowable. The only objectivity
possible is via inter-subjective agreement. Strong correlationism and absolutism
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engender a metaphysics of the subjective as the only necessary absolute. Meillassoux
continues, that by ruling out all metaphysics, independent of subjectivity, what was
formally impossible from the strong correlationist perspective--the existence of God for
example--moves from impossible (i.e. unthinkable) to simply unknowable, where this
un-knowability becomes a matter of faith. Ironically, consequently faith is thereby
recuperated as a valid critique of critical thought. Thought, which is inherently reliant
upon its own enabling conditions of rationality—namely, the principle of noncontradiction—is deemed to be itself ungrounded. In this way, Meillassoux argues,
fideism, the belief that subjective faith alone has access to the absolute, returns via the
back door as the thing that trumps thought, because thought, it turns out, understood
here as rationality, has no right to rule on a faith that is, like the thing-in-itself, beyond
thought’s legitimate domain. Thus thought’s own process of critique forces itself to
recognize its limits.
Meillassoux describes what he believes is the now dominant version of correlationism,
as an onto-theology—an unexamined faith in the subjective constitution of reality. It
construes subjective reality as the only possible, and hence absolutised, separated view.
We are left with a form of inter-subjective Idealism in which adequation, that is, a
correspondence between statements and the thing, is displaced by inter-subjective
agreement. The subjectivist conflates what can be known with what exists, and thus
produces its own ontological claims concerning the absolute. This produces an antirealism, the favourite target of which is naïve realism. A metaphysic of presence is
created that entails human subjectivity as the only real that is knowable. Meillassoux
explains:
For the subjectivist the statement conversely means that the a-subjective is
absolutely impossible: ‘it cannot be’ = ‘it cannot be in itself’. Metaphysics of
Life or of Spirit, transcendental philosophy, or strong correlationism: all
converge in the denunciation of “naïve realism” proper to an Epicurean type
of materialism asserting that some non-subjective exists (atoms and void) and
that we can know it.119

For Meillassoux, what he termed ‘subjectalism’, absolutizes subjectivity and then
projects it upon all things. Subject, will, and perception are projected onto matter, but in
doing so the radical contingency of things is thereby domesticated and humanized. The
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project of de-subjectification, characteristic of much contemporary thought involving
the critique of reason, will, freedom, etc., are in fact, Meillassoux concludes, monist:
…these models are monist, even when they seek to be pluralist: in them,
everything is universally subject, will, creative becoming, image-movement,
etc. … And nothing can be distinguished other than by differences of degree
(sometimes re-baptised ‘intensive differences’) that tie together all things with
the same, sempiternal identity of nature.120

Meillassoux continues by arguing that this position is achieved via an
anthropomorphism that merely democratizes subjectivity. What we need rather, is the
recognition of the ‘pure difference’ in nature, ‘numerous regimes of the real’ of
factuality coupled to the absoluteness of their contingency. Meillassoux declares:
We do not need a monism - or a Deleuzian mono-pluralism, a ‘monism =
pluralism’ that ultimately comes down to a ‘pluralism = monism. On the
contrary we need dualism everywhere - pure differences in nature, without any
continuity whatsoever between that which they differentiate, between
numerous regimes of the real - matter, life, mind, society, etc—whose possible
coordination does not allow us to think their reconciliation, unless in the brute
mode of blind facts.121

He allows that there is nothing in his principle of factuality that would disallow such a
monist-pluralist world:
It is even possible - why not? That our world should be as unified in its
diversity as the subjectalists think it is (one same subjectivity, indefinitely
ramified, attenuated, diluted […] But it could be (and speculative materialism
gives us the right to hope for this). That the world is infinitely richer, more
absurd, more cracked and dualized everywhere, than is dreamt of in the
philosophies of subjectalist hyper-physicists or metaphysicians.122

In contrast, Meillassoux argues, no matter what form such subjectivities take, they are
nevertheless forms of anti-materialism. For materialism ‘affirms that one can think that
which is, independently of all thought, of all subjectivity’ no matter what form it
takes.123 They all seek the same end: ‘that of abolishing the idea of de-subjectivized
matter’.124 Nevertheless, in their subjectification of matter, rather than offering a critique
of the subject and human anthropocentrism—in mind and matter—they are merely
affirming the human subject. They do this by absolutizing human subjectivity itself that,
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now apparently uncoupled with anthropocentrism, is made the absolute principle of
universal existence:
It is a question as above, of breaking (so we are told) with the derisory
anthropocentrism in which man believes himself the sole repository of the
subjective faculty that one intends to absolutize; of showing that man is but
one particular representative, misguided by the prejudice of his consciousness,
of a sensibility, of a life, that overflows him in every direction. He must, so it
is insisted, go back down within himself to the infra-conscious level, to
participate fully in this a-human subjectivity whose flux conveys him and
transpierces him.125

Such a realism, Meillassoux continues, cannot lay claim to be a materialism and would
offend again his own concept of a speculative materialism. Why this is so is inherent in
the difference between materialism and realism. Meillassoux’s formulation of this
difference is useful:
I call realism every position that claims to accede to an absolute reality - every
speculative position then. But we now understand that realism can be either
materialist or subjectivist. So every materialism is a realism, but not every
realism is a materialism (it can be a subjectalism: Berkeley is a realist of the
spirit and ideas).126

But what would the artwork, if it was to escape correlationism, look like? Meillassoux’s
perspective may mean that the art object with out a human observer consists only of its
primary qualities, size, shape, mass, defined as mathematical qualities. But what of
Graham Harman’s and Timothy Morton’s perspective on the art object? The next
section will outline how Harman and Morton’s , perspectives can help develop an
understanding of what an object oriented ontology may mean for our understanding of
artworks and aesthetic endeavour as something other than materialist things described
by their mathematical qualities albeit perhaps on Meillassoux’s account, as necessarily
contingent and speculative.

(iii) Graham Harman and Timothy Morton: Object Oriented Ontology
Harman’s understanding of objects presents a response to correlationism and helps us
to better understand the aesthetic qualities of an art object apart from its relations with
humans. But Harman is not simply responding to Meillassoux; he had already theorized
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his own relational account of real objects via Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour, and
Alfred North Whitehead prior to his encounter with Meillassoux. The question for
Harman is not to finally account for the mind-world correlate and the gaps it generates.
Rather, Harman argues, our perspective needs to be widened to answer two main
questions: ‘(1) What is the medium through which different objects or poles interact,
and how does this interaction occur? (2) What is the reality of these objects or poles in
their own right?’127 Harman’s object-oriented ontology seeks to answer these two
questions. For Harman the problem with correlationism, as Louise Morelle explains, is:
the reduction of every statement to its epistemological preconditions, that is to
say, to human knowledge; the original sin of correlationism is the implicit
presupposition of the superiority of the epistemological relation of knowledge
over all other relations.128

For Harman an object-oriented ontology, because it downplays the epistemological
relation over others, produces a realist account of things that reflects reality’s inherent
weirdness once freed of the strictures of a correlationism defined by the human limits
of access:
Against the model of philosophy as a rubber stamp for common sense and
archival sobriety, I would propose that philosophy’s sole mission is weird
realism. Philosophy must be realist because its mandate is to unlock the
structure of the world itself; it must be weird because reality is weird.129

But what are the features of Harman’s account of this weird reality? As suggested, at its
core is a de-centering of humanity. This is reflected in Harman’s unique response to
correlationism. Harman describes correlationism thus:
If we try to think a world outside human thought, then we are thinking it, and
hence it is no longer outside thought. Any attempt to escape this circle is
doomed to contradiction. This is not just a word trick: it is the tacit or explicit
credo of a now lengthy tradition of philosophy that might be called the
philosophy of human access.130

Harman believes that taking account of this question of access is at the core of any
serious philosophy. It is a question that cannot simply be dismissed by a return to a preKantian non-critical philosophy. Thus a re-construal of Kant’s things-in-themselves is at the
centre of Harman’s own model of relations:
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my own complaint against Kant is not that he preserved the things-in-themselves,
but rather that he saw them as haunting human knowledge alone rather than
relationality more generally. Like Whitehead, I hold that the in-itself is real. Yet,
I also hold that this reality remains unattained by inanimate causal relations no
less than by human subjects. For there is, in fact, a cotton-in-itself that
withdraws from fire no less than from human awareness. 131

In this way, the strategy Harman employs is to argue that the unbridgeable gap between
object and subject is not a privileged gap between humans and the world per se, but is
rather a constitutive feature of any relation whatsoever. But what are these objects? In
his words objects include ‘those entities that are neither physical nor even real. Along
with diamonds, rope and neutrons, objects may include armies, monsters, square circles,
and leagues of real and fictitious nations’.132 But objects are never the subjects of
another; they always possess their own independent identity that accounts for the weird
reality that is coupled to the object itself:
My thesis is that objects and weirdness go hand in hand. An object partly
evades all announcements through its qualities, resisting or subverting efforts
to identify it with any surface. It is that which exceeds any of the qualities,
accidents, or relations that can be ascribed to it: ‘an I know not what’, but in a
positive sense.133

By rejecting the connection between thought and being, the human centric aspect of the
apprehension of objects within the correlate is removed. It is a de-centering of the
correlation rather than an attempt to re-centre human knowledge by simply rejecting
correlationism and the implicit finitude it places on human knowledge. For Harman,
that there are limits on the possible relations between objects is in the nature of things,
and all objects share these limitations. In this way, Harman’s model of the relationship
between objects could be described as a re-assertion of Kant’s Copernican revolution,
but one in which the human epistemological relation is no longer deemed to be the
central one. Everything is an act of translation, all objects distort their relata and this
cannot be overcome. Indeed, Harman’s complaint is that Kant’s epistemology remains
essentially Ptolemaic, ‘whereas Copernicus drove the earth from the centre of the
cosmos and put it into action, Kant restores humans to the centre in a manner more
reminiscent of Ptolemy’.134 This approach, Harman argues, has had a profound impact
on thought:
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We might ask what is most typical of the Kantian position. It is surely not his
theories of space and time or his doctrine of the categories, since few
philosophers still adhere to these views and yet Kant continues to dominate
mainstream philosophy anyway. […] No, what is truly characteristic of Kant’s
position is that the human–world relations takes priority over all others […]
What is always at stake for him is the relation between human subject on one
side and the world on the other.135

The consequences of this, Harman continues, is the transfiguration of objects into
reflections of social constructs and relations outside themselves, so that their reality as
entities is hardly acknowledged. The only meaningful question about knowledge claims
becomes an epistemological one concerning the criteria by which we know something so
that ‘the human-world relation takes priority over all others’.136 Two characteristic
features of how objects are understood follow from this priority. The first is what
Harman describes as ‘undermining’, which consists of the claim that objects are nothing
more than the manifestation of deeper forces or substance. The second, which Harman
calls ‘over-mining’, is the claim that they are merely symptomatic of greater forces such
as relations, ideas or physical forces. Undermining is the reduction of objects to quarks,
particles, waves, atoms, or in ancient Greece to fire, water, air, etc.; while over-mining is
a reduction to history, ideas, social construction, cybernetics, linguistic systems, relations
etc. Both stances devalue objects in themselves and hence disavow any knowledge of
them in themselves. The essential question becomes what is the real essence, substance,
force or relations that give form to this or that object? And this, Harman argues, is
always from an anthropic viewpoint. A true Copernican revolution would remove the
human at the centre of knowing so that, in Harman’s words, ‘All relations are on exactly
the same footing’.137 But if they are all on the same footing then the question is not what
are the relations between the human and objects, but between objects and other
objects? Referring to Heidegger’s concept of tools in Being and Time, Harman, in ToolBeing: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, puts forward a reinterpretation of the
concept of withdrawal as a fundamental feature of this relation. Heidegger’s concept of
ready-ness to hand is expanded so that the withdrawal of objects from human-centred
thought is universalized. So Heidegger’s analysis is inverted with the object now
defining the relationship.
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But how does Harman describe this inversion? Harman begins with Heidegger the
phenomenologist and argues all ‘objects are units that both display and conceal a
multitude of traits’.138 Therefore objects make available or withdraw traits in the sense
that no object could ever be entirely available to other objects no matter what kind of
object they happen to be. From here he is able to show that objects (which he now
describes as tool-beings) withdraw from both human perception and practical use so
that no object can be exhausted by its encounter with a human being. Following
Heidegger’s teacher Edmund Husserl, Harman argues that these inexhaustible toolbeings are not just a series of profiles or adumbrations, but are unified entities
possessing a series of intrinsic (though veiled) qualities. This means the object is split in
two ways: the object as a substance is split apart from its relations, and the unity of the
thing is split from its plurality of features. Harman explains in Guerrilla Metaphysics: ‘The
thing torn apart from its relations is actually not an empty bare particular, but remains
torn apart in its private vacuum between its irreducible unity and its colorful
particularity’.139
In order to describe the dynamics of the relationships produced via this process of
withdrawal, Harman develops an account of what he calls vicarious causation. Vicarious
causation is a post-Humean understanding of causation in which the subjective
apprehension of cause via habit is displaced by an account of relations that ‘must always
be indirect or vicarious, since no object can enter fully into interaction’.140 The two
leading forms of interaction between objects are the real and the sensual:
Real objects withdraw into obscure cavernous underworlds, deprived of causal
links. Sensual objects, by contrast, are so inclined to interact with their
neighbours that we wonder why they fail to do so at every instant. In other
words, the only place in the cosmos where interactions occur is the sensual,
phenomenal realm.141

Harman’s model of the ‘quadruple object’ describes the set of relationships that is
engendered in the interaction between real and sensual objects.142 Four tensions are
produced between sensuous objects, sensuous qualities, real objects and sensual
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qualities. These tensions are structured by forms of polarization between the real and
the sensual, and between objects and their qualities. Described only in outline here,
Harman develops the following model of these interactions: First, between sensual
object and sensual qualities, wherein sensual objects are present but enmeshed within a
‘mist of accidental features and profiles’;143 second, sensual objects or real qualities,
whereby their structure of conscious phenomena is forged from experientially
interpretive qualities intuited intellectually;144 third, the real object’s sensual qualities, in
which a withdrawn object is translated into sensual apprehension via a ‘surface’ accessed
by thought and or action;145 and finally, the real object and real qualities, a coupling that
grounds the ability of objects to differ from one another without collapsing into
indefinite substrata.146
In this schema the human world correlate becomes just one measure of relations of
interaction between objects. Husserl’s phenomenological catch cry ‘To the things
themselves’ is taken literally at the expense of the human-world correlation. Now,
object relations are multi-directional. They do not describe simply a human relationship.
In Harman’s words, that:
is certainly true of pitchforks, shovels, knives, tunnels, and bridges, which
invisibly perform their labors while also sometimes existing as phenomenal
images before the mind. But it is also true of entities not usually regarded as
‘tools’: for even colors, shapes, and numbers all have a reality that is not
exhausted by the exact way in which a thinker considers them. 147

That an object has a fourfold structure has important consequences: since the object
cannot be reduced to its appearance(s) to human perception or use, and since the object
is posited to have its own intrinsic qualities and features, the partitioning of the world
into objects is not the unique achievement of human intervention into an otherwise
unified cosmos. The cosmos is metaphysically plural at its basic level: no object fully
encounters any other object; rather, each object with its array of parts and particularities
encounters another object and its intrinsic parts and particularities only through these
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particular features, and not as the other object is in itself. The interaction between two
objects forms a medium:
A medium is any space in which two objects interact, whether the human
mind be one of those objects or not. Human sense experience is only a
particular zone or medium of the world, and possibly not even the most
interesting. The medium between two objects is the glue that makes possible
the entire carpentry of things—without it, the world would remain a set of
noncommunicating crystalline spheres sleeping away in private vacuums. 148

This understanding of media is what Harman calls ‘vicarious causation’, and it serves to
explain how the relations between real entities are fundamentally aesthetic. Ontography
is the term that Harman adopts (from ghost story writer and medievalist M.R. James’
short story Oh Whistle, and I will come to you, my lad) to describe the description and
engagement of these aesthetic relations between objects. Harman defines it in the
following way: ‘Ontography would deal with the limited number of interactions that can
occur between objects’.149 It would concern the practice of ontic engagement with things
by mapping ‘the basic landmarks and fault lines in the universe of objects’.150 It seeks to
account for differences and relationships by engaging with the tensions implicit in their
interaction, producing a form of aesthetic entanglement:
if we now say that the universe has an aesthetic or metaphorical structure, this
has nothing to do with the shopworn theme of a conscious human artist
projecting values onto an arbitrary perspectival universe. Instead it is an actual
metaphysical statement about the way that raindrops or sandstorms interact
among themselves even when no humans are on the scene. […] Causation
itself as music, sculpture, and street theater.151

Ecological thinking and its implications have been a central theme of Morton’s thought.
For Morton what is original about object oriented ontologies is the orientation towards
objects, broadly conceived, in such a way that the anthropocentric theme of the
corrolate between human thought (or subjectivity) is democratised. But rather than
seeing it from Meillassoux’s perspective as an entrapment, in which the Kantian finitude
of the human-world correlate for thought defines human limitations, Morton
understands it as an opportunity to radicalise and re-orientate out understanding of
objects, relations, and hence ecology. To do so Morton propels causation, aesthetics,
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and objects to the centre of our understanding of ecology in his recent investigation of
these themes, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality152 Morton now universalizes
aesthetics as sensuous interaction between all objects so that in his words ‘the aesthetic
dimension is the causal dimension’.153 Morton declares, ‘As part of the project of objectoriented ontology (OOO), the philosophy whose first architect is Graham Harman, this
book liberates the aesthetic from its ideological role as matchmaker between subject and
object, a role it has played since the days of Kant’.154 Morton does not mean perception;
in the sense of human perception, rather he means how things encounter each other,
their causal relations. Causality is not something that is observed by something or
somebody watching. It is common to all things and their interactions. It radiates from
objects:
When the light-sensitive diode detects my shadow, it perceives in every
meaningful sense, if we only accept that objects exert an aesthetic influence on
one another (aisthēnesthai, Greek ‘to perceive’). When I am caught in
another’s gaze, I am already the object of causal influences. Causality does not
take place ‘in’ a space that has been established already. Instead, it radiates
from objects.155

The question thus is how do we get from humans being the sole bearers of aesthetic
interpretation, to aesthetic interpretation being a feature of causality as such? The
aesthetic interaction between things is not a one-sided apprehension of an object by a
subject. Causal interaction is vicarious in the sense of its dependence on the nature of
the quality of withdrawal of things. In Morton’s words, ‘Withdrawal isn’t a violent
sealing off. Nor is withdrawal some void or vague darkness. Withdrawal just is the
unspeakable unicity of this lamp, this paperweight, this plastic portable telephone, this
praying mantis, this frog, this Mars faintly red in the night sky, this cul-de-sac, this garbage
can’.156 Hence, Hume’s critique of causation is universalized and radicalised. It is seen to
apply not just to human perception but also to the perceptual relationship between all
things. Perception, Morton continues is simply causal interaction and no longer always
requires the level of complexity that may accompany some of its forms, i.e. human
sensual interaction with the world. This means that causation between things becomes
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proper to the field of aesthetics. Therefore, it is concerned with the interaction between
objects whereby the aesthetic dimension is now understood as the causal dimension:
Realist Magic is an exploration of causality from the point of view of objectoriented ontology. I argue that causality is wholly an aesthetic phenomenon.
Aesthetic events are not limited to interactions between humans or between
humans and painted canvases or between humans and sentences in dramas.
They happen when a saw bites into a fresh piece of plywood. They happen
when a worm oozes out of some wet soil. They happen when a massive object
emits gravity waves. When you make or study art you are not exploring some
kind of candy on the surface of a machine. You are making or studying
causality. The aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension. 157 [Italics in the original]

A little further down some of the implications of this for human aesthetic or creative
endeavour are listed:
Paintings have always been made of more things than humans. They have
been made of paint, which is powdered crystals in some medium such as egg
white or oil. Now when you put the painting on the wall, it also relates to the
wall. A fly lands on it. Dust settles on it. Slowly the pigment changes despite
your artistic intentions. We could think of all these nonhuman interventions as
themselves a kind of art or design. Then we realize that nonhumans are also
doing art all the time, it’s just that we call it causality. But when calcium
crystals coat a Paleolithic cave painting, they are also designing, also painting.
Quite simply then, the aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension, which in
turn means that it is also the vast nonlocal mesh that floats “in front of”
objects (ontologically, not physically ‘in front of’).158

By declaring that the aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension, Morton critiques a
metaphysics of presence. He posits a rift between essence and appearance, and suggests
the sum total of appearances between entities (their sensual or vicarious interactions)
cannot account for the entirety of what is real. Rather, what does not become present is the
driving force of causality (i.e. the withdrawn real objects). In this way, the conceptual
horizons for creative endeavour are expanded into a field of perception that is no longer
hierarchically defined by human aesthetics. For Morton there is the withdrawn real
objects (one kind of entity) and the present sensual object (a different kind of entity). In
this situation objects generate sensual traces even in their absence:
Like a petrified slab of ancient mud with a dinosaur’s footprint in it. Like a
glass whose shape was molded by blowers and blow tubes and powdered
quartz sand. Every aesthetic trace, every footprint of an object, sparkles with
absence. Sensual things are elegies to the disappearance of objects. 159
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Within this situation causation operates in apparent mystery. The cause of something
occurring and existing is not something that can be answered finally. ‘Causality is
mysterious, in the original sense of the Greek mysteria, which means things that are
unspeakable or secret’.160 One result is to question, as Morton argues in accord with
much of modern physics, the notion of the object as a discrete entity that is acted upon
in a direct way. This perspective can now only have a descriptive utility. This is because
the object is both discrete and not at the same time. It is both withdrawn and present
not only to itself but also to other objects as well, so that an object ‘is therefore both
itself and not-itself, at the very same time’.161 Morton deploys the concept of
dialethesim, the view that statements can be both true and not true at the same time, to
describe this situation. Presence is not simply a matter of relations or of objects, but is
both at the same time.
Now we can turn to the question of realism and its weirdness. Once the question of
realism is displaced from a human-centric account of objects and our access to them, it
takes on new meanings so that its speculative nature is affirmed. However, this quality is
no longer devalued because of an insistence on a fixed certainty that is simply not in the
nature of things. In addition, both ecological interactions, that is the relationship
between objects and objects themselves, are given equal ontological weight. In this
situation the real, rather than becoming an irredeemable outside where only the noncritical may venture, becomes an arena for discovery, albeit tempered by a non-humancentric account of the real and its inherent persistence of mystery, of the yet
undiscovered. Morton clarifies:
The title Realist Magic is also meant to provoke thoughts about philosophical
realism, the idea that there are real things. Realism is often considered a rather
dull affair, with all the panache and weirdness on the antirealist side of the
debate. We shall see that this is far from the case. The trouble with many
theories of causality is that they edit out a quintessential element of mystery. A
theory of cause and effect shows you how the magic trick is done. But what if
something crucial about causality resided at the level of the magic trick
itself?162
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Meillassoux’s, Harman's and Morton’s perspectives are applied and developed in
thinking about a human-centric consideration of objects and relations in the following
chapters via practical examples and historical situations. The questions these chapter
asks are: First, Chapter One asks how do object-oriented philosophies help us to
understand a self-sufficient art object apart from relational or social contexts? Chapter
Two, explores why is an anthrodecentric approach to the photographic image desirable?
Chapter Three investigates how could a critique of correlationism influence our
conceptions of the photographic image? While Chapter Four investigates how both
speculation and realism, can help develop the application of a ‘practical ontographic’
approach to photography. Finally, the Conclusion, referring to the proceeding
argument, briefly touches upon how a re-conceptualized occult photography, in which
causation and aesthetics are intertwined in a ghostly realism of the object, may
demonstrate a mode of art making that intervenes in the problem of correlationism, and
thereby suggests a model for a future speculative and realist photography.
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1: The Art Object Versus the Post Object Debate in the Australian Artworld
during the 1970s
Introduction
In order to address the question of how object-oriented philosophies may help us
understand a self-sufficient art object apart from relational or social contexts, this
chapter revisits debates concerning object and post-object art that occurred in the
Australian artworld during the nineteen seventies, and which were also part of a global
movement associated with conceptualism. With the pervasive rise of an emphasis upon
the social constitution of aesthetic experience, as well as the legitimacy of the situation
generated by the artist facilitator or the dynamics of a specific aesthetic setting, the
status of the art object has in more recent times received new currency.163 This is
particularly apparent in Nicolas Bourriaud’s influential call for a ‘relational aesthetics’,
and more recently in demands for situated art of various types that generally extend
Bourriaud’s view.164
The leading advocate on behalf of post-object art in Australia during the nineteen
seventies was Donald Brook. Brook sought to identify a direction in art that he termed
post-object. This direction characterized artwork as being brought into being by its
viewers and participants—something constituted by an audience of participant
creators—as a purely relational entity, defined by the social processes in which it is
immersed. Brook placed emphasis upon what an artwork does within human praxis.
Brook and others, have continued to advocate on behalf of such a conception of art.
Brook argued, and has refined and expanded upon, the notion that the real work of art
was not the art object itself, but rather its publicity and capacity for innovation. More
recently, and deploying Richard Dawkins’ concept of memes, in The Awful Truth About
What Art Is, Brook has developed his argument, continuing to contest the continuation
of a separate activity called ‘art’ and ‘the art object’, arguing these are redundant and
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historically specific categories.165 For Brook the social generation of creative meaning
should be the object of critique rather than the art object itself.
This chapter does not seek to defend a notion of art objects (or their validation via an
artworld, which was the subject of Brook’s critique). Nor does it seek to affirm the
tradition of post-object art on behalf of the everyday and life. The intention here is not
to rehearse the various conceptualist arguments promulgated for or against this
direction in aesthetic endeavour, but to deploy elements of the post-object critique of
object-based art, a critique that has a continuing resonance within both an Australian
and international artworld, to draw out an alternative perspective.166 Towards this end I
suggest that Brook’s critique remains largely trapped within a bifurcation between
subject and object. This bifurcation is left intact by a perspective that, while successfully
critiquing the subjectivism of Idealist art, is itself enmeshed in an equally subjectivist
model of art, albeit now in a dematerialised and post-object form. Consequently, rather
than freeing us from the dictates of a subjective and arbitrary exercise of authority by
the art critic and the artworld, —as was hoped—the arbitrary exercise of subjective
authority continued to be affirmed in the transfigured form of subjectivity itself as an
absolutised principle.
This argument proceeds in the following way: first, in Post-object versus Object, I describe
the post-object critique of the art object as articulated by Brook and others. Then, in
Object versus Post-object, how this critique is itself caught up in a subject/object bifurcation
that ensures that there is no escape from the subjectivist, and hence arbitrary, exercise
of authority that Brook lamented is examined. Finally, in the Conclusion, I touch upon
what a speculative yet realist stance, referring Bernard Smith’s writing, may involve. This
approach, it is suggested, offers a possible alternative to the perceptual solipsism
described here.

(i) Post-Object Versus Object
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During the 1970s a number of claims were at the centre of debate in the Australian
artworld. These included the questions raised by the notion of an Australian national
‘identity,’ new models of avant-garde practice (described as a new avant-garde by
Gregoire Muller, who was an influential commentator at the time) and whether a decentred internationalism was possible.167 A focus was on whether experience could (or
should) be articulated through artistic objects and what an artwork actually is. Was it a
discrete object brought into being by an artist? Was it the work that art did, i.e. a
situated practice embedded in a social, political and communication milieu? Perhaps the
answer lay in viewing the artwork as a socially constructed situation, event, or process?
That is, was an artwork brought into being by its viewers, something constituted solely
by an audience of participant creators—a purely relational aesthetic entity finally defined
and produced by the human processes in which it is immersed and from which it
emerges?
In 1971 Brook believed that if art in Australia was to address questions such as these it
would have to escape a provincial bind which created the centre it was trapped within.
This bind created a centre that rendered anything outside of it marginal and thus
ensured that the question of authenticity and legitimacy, of any particular provincial art,
was always answered elsewhere, by a metropolitan centre. It seemed the only escape
from this situation was somehow for the provincial to become a centre itself, whereby
‘Australian art cannot in the nature of things produce a metropolitan art until Australian
cities become international cultural centres with metropolitan powers of taste
making’.168 But this, as Brook was aware, just reproduced the metropolitan provincial
logic that created this situation in the first place.169 The most important strategy to
escape this endgame of avant-gardism and provincialism was what Brook called postobject art. Brook developed a particularly philosophical defence of post-object art that,
while being unique in Australian criticism, proved very apt to the theoretical turn of art
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at this time. This defence was articulated in contrast to the ‘Greenbergian Modernism’170
that Brook retrospectively believed had dominated ‘advanced Australian art until well
into the Seventies’.171
The American critic Clement Greenberg’s concept of the avant-garde was first
articulated in 1939. By the late 1960s Greenberg, very aware of the conceptualist threat
to his conception of avant-garde art, sought to regain his embattled position in the
Power Lecture presented in 1968 in Sydney entitled Avant-garde attitudes: New art in the
Sixties.172 Greenberg described a distinction between a ‘popular’ avant-garde and an
‘unpopular’ or a ‘real and original avant-garde’.173 The first of these, Greenberg argued,
derived from the example of Marcel Duchamp and sought to rise above issues of
quality. By turning the idea of difficulty back upon itself, this bogus avant-garde
produced works that, instead of being new, created the impression of difficulty and
newness. The avant-garde impulse towards renewal is thus reversed upon itself, and its
function of making the new is transformed into the production of transient novelties.
Greenberg argues, in contrast, that the authentic avant-garde is driven by the necessity
of making things new, and innovates rather than rebels against tradition. It is an avantgarde that gives priority to art activity that strives to define itself through the
investigation of its formal means of being. For this authentic avant-garde, Greenberg
provocatively argued, judgments of value are not simply a matter of arbitrary choice but
are, following Kant, authentic and objective expressions of the mind’s freedom.
As Greenberg often acknowledged, his argument proceeded from a Kantian
understanding of aesthetic judgement. Kant’s third Critique claimed that free beauty, as
opposed to ‘dependent’ beauty, depends upon form alone. It was a position that
delimited aesthetic judgement as inherently disinterested in the specificity of the
situation and dependent upon the working out of an inherent logic.174 Kant developed
the concept of a transcendental logic, that is a self-sufficient logic, to place ‘any future
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metaphysics upon a firm footing’.175 The mind’s rationality, while providing the
framework within which the phenomenal world was apprehended, also offered a facility
that projects its inherent rational form upon the material world and takes delight in this
process. In this way, the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter was bridged by an
act of Judgement. The mind’s freedom, as set apart from the causal world of things,
was thereby confirmed. Historian Michael Podro explains the relationship of aesthetic
Judgement in Kant’s schema as one of the mind recognizing its own universal essential
disinterested rational capacity, and hence its freedom in the phenomenal world of
things:
Kant sustains the distinction between the satisfaction of appetite - part of our
causally conditioned relationship to the world - and the aesthetic judgement’s
free relation to the world, not only by pointing to the universality of the latter
(which would be rather inconclusive) but by the way he relates aesthetic
judgement to material objects: for Kant the satisfaction expressed by pure
aesthetic judgement is satisfaction in a spontaneous activity of the mind
concerned with itself, it is not concerned with the material outside the mind,
except insofar as the material provides the occasion for the mind’s exercise.176

The task for art then is the progressive realization of this awareness and the isolation of
those formal qualities that are able to embody or reflect the mind’s recognition of its
own freedom. This task marks the historical and material evolution of avant-garde art:
[It must] perform in opposition to bourgeois society the function of finding
new and adequate cultural forms for the expression of that same society,
without at the same time succumbing to its ideological divisions and its refusal
to permit the art their own justification. The avant-garde, both child and
negation of Romanticism, becomes the embodiment of art’s instinct of selfpreservation […] The arts, then, have been hunted back to their mediums and
there they have been isolated, concentrated and defined [...] The purely plastic
or abstract qualities of the work of art are the only ones that count. Emphasise
the medium and its difficulties, and at once the purely plastic, the proper,
values of visual art come to the fore.177

For Greenberg Kant established the theoretical ground of Modernism:
I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of this
self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant. Because he was
the first to criticise the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first
real Modernist.178
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For the Modernist the task is to ‘establish and maintain the intrinsic capacities and
limits of particular practices’.179 By realizing the essential rationality that underlies their
being the artist is able to give form to that rationality. The realization of the formal
truth of things becomes the goal of a purified art. As Podro explains, Kant’s conception
of aesthetic experience as a means whereby we obtain a new freedom in an otherwise
causal and determined world of things echoes earlier Platonic writings. The connection
it highlights the importance that essentially Formal qualities take on in opposition to the
particularity of things. Judgements of value in this context are autonomous. They are
the expression of a universal and a-priori necessity that has no other agency or cause. It
involves isolation of the judging capacity and determination of value from other
historical, intentional, social and other contextual concerns. For Kant, then, the whole
function of the aesthetic faculty is to create an arena of freedom outside the material
world of cause and effect. However, for Greenberg this material world, specifically the
materiality of the medium, frames the artwork’s internal logic. This developmental
principle and the question of judgement are stated emphatically in Greenberg’s essay
Modernist Painting:
for the sake of its own autonomy painting has had above all to divest itself of
everything it might share with sculpture. And it is in the course of its effort to
do this—I repeat—to exclude the representational or the ‘literary’, that
painting has made itself abstract.180

Brook responded to Greenberg in two main ways, first by critiquing the basis of
Greenberg’s authority and secondly by proposing a new model for artistic practice. His
first response was in an article titled ‘Art Criticism: Authority and Argument’, the
second was in his own Power Lecture titled ‘Flight From the Object’ delivered in
1969.181 In his second lecture, Brook described how the objectification that
representation was believed to involve could be stepped out of by dismantling a divide
between art, conceived as autonomous representational processes, and life. Brook
enumerated the various types of flight from traditional notions of the art object, and the
rationale behind them, by setting up a series of oppositions to describe the types of
objecthood possible. These included the public object (in contrast to the subjective), the
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material object (in contrast to Ideal entities), the real object (in contrast to hermetic
objects, context-sited, or observer-related entities, viewers, settings etc.), elevated
objects (in contrast to commonplace things), proper objects (in contrast to dimensional
illusion or deceit), and immutable objects (in contrast to processes). Finally, Brook
detailed the traditional notion of the art object,
Ozymandias notwithstanding, there is a paradigm of the work of fine art that
would have it as a public object, a physical object; a perceptually unambiguous
object; hermetically indifferent as to context; specially attractive of reverence;
dimensional proper and immutable. The Great Pyramid probably fits all
counts.182

Brook contrasted ‘fine art objects’ such as these, which he equated with Greenbergian
formalism, with two principles by which he hoped to describe how the flight from the
object would be in his words ‘commendable’.183 The two principles he outlined are, first,
the principle of publicity, and secondly, the principle of exploration. By publicity, Brook
means communal interaction—an interaction that must be coupled with creative
exploration and engagement. The two principles, he argued, displace these features of
the traditional or non-traditional art object by foregrounding the essential role that art
fulfils within culture more broadly. Together they undermine, he believed, the status of
the art ‘object’—whether an actual or Ideal object—as something that is static, objectlike, representation, and can accumulate exchange value. These two principles, Brook
believed, lend art an inherently creative, and hence radical, function. Art is thus able to
fulfil its proper role—the generation of creative meaning within a broader system of
meaning of which it is an essential part. Consequently, phenomena that demonstrate, or
potentially demonstrate, these attributes should be the real ‘object’ of criticism. Art
would then take its proper role, Brook argued, in the transition from an object-oriented
to a system-oriented culture, where ‘change emanates, not from things, but from the
way things are done [because] the priorities of the present age revolve around the
problem of organization’.184
Brook maintained that the significance placed upon the art object was tied to the
importance placed upon the artist as hero—an idealist who gives Being to Ideal and
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Transcendent Forms, and to the continuing existence of a specific institution called Art
and its associated social forms. Conversely, Brook claimed that post-object art proceeds
from a more fundamental premise than this.185 The concept of post-object art offered a
more radical model of contemporary practice that stepped outside of the existing
importance placed upon objects, whether Ideal or actual. Brook explains,
The proper sense of ‘post-object’ needs to be spelled out not in terms of any
artist’s motivation but in terms of specifically identified components of the
notion or conception of an art object as this sort of entity was generally
understood around and a little after the mid-century. […] Post-object art
might have developed before or after any of the ‘-isms’. It is not parasitic by
reaction upon any previous particular style, but responsive to a concept of art
going much deeper than style.186 [Emphasis in the original]

Brook’s account of post-object art sought to make the centre/margin framework
redundant. It rejected Modernism, equated with Greenbergian Formalism, and sought
to replace its imperial qualities by the personal, the local, and the everyday. Brook’s
conception of creative endeavour was more fundamental than any specific style,
artwork, or social form (i.e. the artist performs a specific social role, in galleries and
various institutions). Brook displaced the ‘object’ by focusing upon the attributes and
relations that the object holds within a system of aesthetic or social interaction,
interactions which Brook argued are more fundamental, and hence more real, than the
art object itself.

(ii) Object versus Post-Object

Here, I push against Brooks’ analysis and ask, is this really an escape from the ‘object’?
Is it not, rather, a reduction of the art object’s meaning and purpose to a solely humancentred context of meaning and purpose? By tying the object exclusively to its human
contexts (i.e. its human-centric situations and systems), and thereby viewing relations
and processes as fundamental, is not the object’s own irreducibility devalued?
Irreducibility is central to Harman’s arguments for withdrawal and vicarious causation.
Because no object directly experiences any other object, no object can be translated into
any other object without a remainder. Harman takes this view from Bruno Latour.
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Harman quotes Latour in Prince of Networks: ‘Nothing can be reduced to anything else,
nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything may be allied to everything
else’.187 Harman continues: ‘An entire philosophy is foreshadowed in this anecdote.
Every human and nonhuman object now stands by itself as a force to be reckoned
with’.188
So, is it a regressive move to simply affirm the subject side of a bifurcation between
subject and object? This is a shift away from the artwork’s own existence as an entity in
its own right to something the meaning of which is entirely constrained by an
anthropocentric valuation. It is also a shift in the artworld’s authority, away from the
critic and market, and towards that of human subjectivity. The problem here is that the
latter judgments can also be arbitrary and authoritarian. In Meillassoux’s terms, the
post-object perspective runs the risk of absolutising human subjectivity itself by
conflating what we know via our ‘authentic’ experience with what actually exists. The
object in-itself is lost.
Thus Brook’s contestation of Greenberg’s authority in the name of an open concept of
the artwork meant, in practice, a greater emphasis upon subjective experience. This shift
in emphasis, from an institutional authority to an individual (but still subjectivist)
authority, can be detected in the transformations that define what is authentic and
legitimate art during this period. I will now trace this transformation.
In Brook’s second response to Greenberg, recorded in an essay titled, ‘Art Criticism:
Authority and Argument’, he explained that his motivation was a desire to contest the
authority of ‘what English language philosophers call The Institutional Theory of Art’ in
Australia.189 It was a theory of art that, in the end, relied upon institutional validation
(i.e. through ‘the artworld’) as the prime court of appeal by which questions of
authenticity and legitimacy were decided. Brook’s article set out to critique not only
Greenberg’s championing of the art object (as the embodiment of a Kantian aesthetic),
but also the arbitrary authority such a position relied upon. For Brook, Greenberg’s
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appeal to the authority of his taste, which on his own admission derived from a
subjective and innate Kantian apprehension of rational Form, is in reality an attempt to
legislate on relevance and legitimacy by a member of a dominant artworld who has been
consecrated to do so. For Brook, it seemed such power had no basis and was hence
illegitimate; in Brook’s words, ‘the heart of my disagreement with Mr. Greenberg [is] the
authority of his nose for relevance seems to me no more final, nor even persuasive, than
the authority of his eye for goodness’.190 Art, Brook continued, may be a matter of taste,
but it cannot be merely a matter of taste.191
It is not true that there is no disputing matters of taste. On the contrary:
matters of taste are pre-eminently disputable. Matters of taste are not matters
of science or logic that is true and one cannot compel the acceptance of this
or that conclusion for this or that evidence, example or argument. But it does
not follow that we are in principle doomed never to persuade each other to
change our minds [and] look at things differently; to see what we previously
missed; to find excellence where we had thought that there was none; to count
as relevant considerations that we had once dismissed, or overlooked. 192

Brook calls for a form of art criticism that would take such distinctions into account.
Brook’s contestation of Greenberg’s authority is thus a broader critique of the
stipulative or definitional authorities that ‘metropolitan artworlds’ are described as
possessing. A particular emphasis of Brook’s argument centred on how he believed this
process of definition reinforced a conceptual hierarchy of culture. Given Greenberg’s
rejection of all relativist accounts of quality, and his insistence that the only judgment
that matters is a Kantian judgement, it was Brook’s view that Greenberg was committed
to articulating a narrow account of value. Brook’s critique is thus aimed at the authority
of the ‘artworld’ to define what the legitimate art of the moment is, and then to claim
that this particular judgment has universal validity.
In this sense, Brook appears to draw parallels between his analysis and Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s critique of essentialist definitions. Proponents of essentialist definitions
‘maintain that all and only these things actually share certain features and that this
shared set of real features—their essence—warrants our calling them by a common
name’.193 Roger Fry’s Formalist definition of art, still influential at this time, is an
example of an essentialist definition. In contrast, for Wittgenstein there is only a set of
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family resemblances between how terms such as art are applied. You can appeal to
history, facts, and specific cases to show how a concept is used in language, and thereby
decide whether a particular descriptive application of a term is appropriate. In this
context, art is seen to be an ‘open concept.’ Its openness, it is argued, is a precondition
of creativity and novelty commonly associated with the concept of art. An open
concept is one for which the conditions of its application are always amendable and
corrigible. It is a matter of stipulation, but not merely stipulation. Rather, the
determination of whether something is art is a social act, a practice, in which the word is
defined according to how it is used in a social context. Wittgenstein termed this type of
definition an ‘honorific definition’.194
Yet the very institutional definitions of art that Brook critiques also owed a great deal to
Wittgenstein’s approach with its emphasis upon meaning as determined by use.
However, the question of use is not arrived at by an appeal to common use, but by
appealing to specific and authoritative use. The emphasis upon authoritative use can be
seen in what is perhaps the most influential formulation of the Institutional Definition
of Art—that of George Dickie. Dickie’s Institutional Definition of Art was an attempt
to formalize Wittgenstein’s model concerning how definitions operate, and apply them
to the identification of genuine works of art. Dickie argued that the term art is a matter
of stipulation, and always involves an appeal to an ‘authority’ such as an ‘Art-world.’
Such definitions are descriptive or operational definitions, whereby the final arbiter is
the institutional authority that determines the status of what Dickie called ‘candidates of
appreciation’—that is, all those objects, events, and acts that are proposed as art works.
Dickie’s definition seeks to define how, and in what contexts, the term ‘art’ can be used,
in contrast to defining an essential condition common to all art. However, Dickie’s
definition, like all essentialist definitions, relied on an appeal to authority, but this
authority was contingent and historical rather than universal and essentialist, which is
characteristic of the Kantian approach. Dickie’s original definition reads:
A work of art in the classificatory sense (1) is an artifact (2) a set of the aspects
of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by
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some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the
artworld).195

The emphasis that Dickie placed on the concept of a dictionary encapsulates the
authoritative process of definition he seeks to describe. For example, Dickie described
his revised 1983 definition as a ‘small dictionary’ of five deliberately circular definitions.
These are:
1) An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a
work of art.
2) A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld
public.
3) A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some
degree to understand an object which is presented to them.
4) The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems.
5) An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by
an artist to an artworld public.196

Such a process of definition, aside from forming a description of the artworld’s powers
of consecration, is useful for its ability to show aspects of what is at stake in the process
of definition itself. Nevertheless, it is a tautological definition because it defines
‘artwork’ in terms of ‘artworld’ and therefore ‘art’ in terms of itself. This is not a
problem in itself since tautological definitions can help clarify what is meant by a term
and how it is used. However, the institutional definition of art clearly articulates the
basis for the artworld’s exercise of its authority, and hence also provides a basis for
understanding a critique of this authority as merely tautological—an arbitrary definition
of what is and is not legitimate art worthy of consecration.
In the difference between Wittgenstein's honorific and open definition, and the process
of definition put forward by Dickie, the continuities between Brook’s open concept of
post-object art and definitions of art that relied upon an appeal to some authoritative
definition can be seen. Crucially, Brook’s concept of post-object art sought to displace
any substantial art object by shifting the emphasis to processes and relations (such as
innovation), which were formally seen as the art object’s proper attributes. However,
the definition of the art object as solely constituted by its relations involves a regressive
move to an essentialist definition of the artwork. What were formally possible qualities,
which were always within the honorific criteria open to amendment, now become the
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defining and authentic, albeit fluid, attributes and Process becomes the only authentic
art object; but, by defining the art object as solely consisting of its qualities, and
disallowing any ‘substance’ to the art object’s qualities, humans become the limit of the
artwork. By doing so, the quality of authenticity itself becomes a defining attribute;
possession of this quality becomes a matter of authoritative stipulation. Thus by
defining artworks not simply in terms of qualities that are currently valued, but as being
essentially constituted by those values, the ability of art to operate outside of a
predetermined set of values becomes vanishingly small. This is precisely the problem
with an entirely relationist, situational, or process-oriented interpretation of art objects.
The concept of post-object art rejected the basis upon which Greenberg exercised his
Kantian judgment, revealing it to be tautological. It turned out, however, that much of
what came to be termed post-object art relied upon a similar act of value judgment that
was also a tautological expression of the subjective exercise of taste.197 The importance
of the subjective judgment of the artist was re-inscribed; however, now the artist,
audience, and respondents to an aesthetic situation became the self-referential judges of
authenticity. In this way, responses to Greenbergian Formalism in art remained within
the framework of an internally apprehended subjective judgment, and hence determined
solely via recourse to the authority of the individual’s (and/or artworld’s) claim of
relevance and legitimacy.
Brook had recognized the problem of subjective judgment and authority, and proposed
a theory of art that sought to overcome this problem, yet his theory of the post-object
artwork remained within the Kantian framework. Subjective judgments were by
necessity a matter of stipulative judgment. There was no other appeal since the
bifurcation between subject and object that informed Kantian and Post-Kantian models
remained in place. There was no access to objects, particularly aesthetic objects, outside
of the context of human relations and so the contradictions in Greenberg’s account that
Brook recognized could not be stepped out of. His theory only displaced the reality of
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the art object onto the qualities themselves, defining the work of art only in terms of
those qualities, the artwork itself now having disappeared from view entirely.
One consequence is that the art object becomes solely a subjective object—that is
wholly on the human side of the correlate between thought and being. In this way
Brook’s apparent definition of the qualities of innovation and communication—now
voiced as the proper ‘objects’ of criticism—marks at least a partial return to Kantian
essentialism. This can be seen in practice, where the institutions of the artworld
continue to define the process of bestowing legitimacy and value to new works of art.
By making the final arbiter of value the subjective judgments of a ‘community of
individuals’ (as distinct from Kant’s transcendental a priori concepts), the role of a
tautological exercise of authority remains in place. This tautology seemed to be
confirmed in the rapid institutional embrace of post-object art. Post-object art, by
largely limiting its ambition to the transformation of the institution of art, was unable to
effect a change in the underlying role that authority played in the exercise of the
artworld’s consecrating power. The centre-margin framework of power that the
artworld operated within—at the level of culture, politics, and economics—remained in
place, and hence also the artworld’s power to define what was and was not legitimate
art.
The details of the co-option of post-object work by an international and institutional
avant-garde appeared to support this diagnosis of the situation. Following his support
for artists Christo’s and Jeanne-Claude’s Wrapped Coast, Little Bay, One Million Square Feet
(1969), art patron John Kaldor sponsored I Want to Leave a Nice Well Done Child Here: 20
Australian Artists, curated by Harald Szeemann, and held at Sydney’s Bonython Galleries
in April 1971 followed by the National Gallery of Victoria in June 1971. 198 Critic Ross
Lansell argued this exhibition represented the continuation of the ‘metropolitan and
provincial’ divide at the level of style, at the level of artworld politics, and a continuation
of artworld dependency:
Szeemann thought that ‘this show proves the autonomous art character of the
local scene.’ Unfortunately, he explains no further this important, and
probably crucial, point, of what he meant by autonomy. Instead we’ve been
198
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left with his fairly insipid selections on which to meditate uneasily, unsure of
whether Szeemann really thought this was great stuff or whether he had
defective taste or whether it was all a colossal if terrible circuitous send-up of
provincial pretensions.199

In support of Lansell’s argument, the events surrounding the creation of the Entropic
Matrices Kit by the Tin Shed’s collective Optronics Kinetics are instructive. This story is
related in the catalogue for the exhibition The Situation Now: Object or Post-Object Art?
(1971). As explained by Brook, the Entropic Matrices Kit was originally conceived by
David Smith, and consisted of a gridded formation of sugar cubes placed in various city
locations:
We made the Entropic Matrix Kit, incorporating order/disorder ideas, but as
well formal ordinary objects, the washers. It is a thing, which I gave away, it
had an element of group participation, and it incorporated the idea that the
artist isn’t in complete control of the work. That’s why I worded the
instructions as openly, least demandingly, as possible. 200

Accompanying the cubes was an instruction sheet intended to involve the public in the
realization of the work. Alex Tzannes, an architectural student, saw the work and
reproduced essential elements of it for inclusion in I Want to Leave a Nice Well Done Child
Here. In response to Tzannes’ blatant copying of their work, the members of Optronics
Kinetics broke into the Bonython Gallery201 and replaced the handmade Perspex circles,
which Tzanne had substituted for the sugar cubes, with ordinary tap washers.202 Kaldor
threatened legal action unless the Perspex disks were returned forthwith. They were not
and, consequently, while legal action did not eventuate, new Perspex discs were
hurriedly manufactured, and the instruction sheet for the public, an idea that Tzannes
had retained, was removed.
This event encapsulates characteristic features of the maintenance of the idea of copy
and original entailed in the binary formation of centre and margin, or authentic and
inauthentic. The work had moved from a joint project undertaken in a public space
(requiring the participation of the public for its successful resolution) to the product of
an individual artist. Though Tzannes argued, repeating what was to become an artworld
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orthodoxy, that authorship no longer matters, maintaining ‘that the concept of any
work of art was of prime importance and that the originator (author) was irrelevant’203
and that ‘it is the concept not the object’204 that counts, yet he was happy, as Optronics
Kinetics were quick to point out, to be identified as the author of the work in the
catalogue for the exhibition. It seemed for Optronics Kinetics that a reversion back to the
authority of the artworld and individual artist had occurred that simply re-inscribed their
role in the art market:
The exchange of the steel washers for the Perspex disks was a comment on
the authorship of the concept, but not necessarily an assertion that steel
washers are only the objects proper to the situation. The subsequent
substitution of Perspex disks for the steel washers seemed to assert—at
enormous expense—that it is not the concept but the object which is being
exhibited. If that was the intention, and the absence of a set of instructions at
this stage seems to bear this out, then one wonders what the original
instructions were all about. What was it Szeeman selected, an object or a
concept?205

Moreover, as demonstrated by the exhibition I Want to Leave a Nice Well Done Child Here,
the art object had simply reformed itself into ‘authentic life situations’.206 In a familiar
pattern, whereby art moves from critiquing artworld institutions to being promoted by
them, the work was exhibited in an established gallery as part of an exhibition that
claimed to survey the state of conceptual art in Australia. In addition, this exhibition
was curated by a pivotal overseas figure in the promotion of Conceptual Art as the
foremost international avant-garde style. At the time, debate about this event focused
on whether Tzannes or Optronics Kinetics could claim to be the works’ authors. In this
way, the notion of author as originating source, a concept that the original work sought
to undermine, persisted. This event testifies to the continuance of a legitimating
framework, one that owed its existence to the centrality of subjectivity as the
inescapable source of aesthetic judgment (itself framed by the bifurcation of subject and
object), and ensured the notion of an authentic, if not original, contemporary art
remained dominant. Coupled to this was the whole notion of an originating author and
the art object’s status as a uniquely human created object. Brook’s and many others’
dream for a new type of art, in which the fundamental relationship between artwork and
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market, and between centre and margin (governed by an apparent arbitrary exercise of
authority), seemed to be stillborn.
While the art object may well have dematerialized during this period, as Lucy Lippard
argued, it remained no less real.207 But it was now a dematerialized spectral set of
qualities. In the absence of an identifiable art object for sale, the question of aura and
authenticity perhaps became even more important. By necessity the status of the artist
shifted from inspired Artist, albeit with their power validated by the critic, to
shamanistic facilitator or impresario of aesthetic situations, the legitimacy of which is
determined by their authenticity, itself a matter of deeming by their social situation.
That this shift in power has occurred is shown by how the creators of such situations
have, in their turn, received their own telling, if sometimes unfair, condemnation as
inauthentic. This can be seen in critic Adam Geczy’s assertion (that takes a cynical view
of the audience as victim and hence re-inscribes the artist as author) that the
authenticity claimed by much relational art is bogus:
[T]he interventions that are undertaken with their own brand of aesthetic
piousness and à point rectitude demand a certain naiveté from their audience,
by placing them in mildly embarrassing situations, in sequences in which the
artist plays the role of svengali-orchestrator, or if you like, is master of the
proverbial game, in which the ‘interactors’ are more like gormless ciphers or
guinea pigs than dignified subjects.208

(iii) Conclusions
So how does correlationism intersect with relational accounts of art objects and objectoriented accounts of art objects? What type of metaphysics of presence is created? And
what alternatives does it suggest to the seeming cul-de -sac described above? The
operation of this in the case of the art object versus post-object question can be seen in
how they both fail to describe how secondary qualities of the artwork intersect with the
artworks’ primary qualities independently of the subjectivity of their audience or
participant/viewer. Accounts of the artwork as primarily object-based, as Brook points
out, position it as withdrawn, the embodiment of qualities that are only available to the
207
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appreciative audience suitably attuned to the ineffable. Similarly, the situated, relational
artwork is likewise only subjectively available to those suitably acculturated or situated
within a social milieu that is able to recognize the extra aesthetic dimensions of the
everyday, of life, of a meal, or an aesthetic generated between social relations. In both
accounts, the object and post-object, arguably, the artwork only exists insofar as it has
an aesthetic human function. Both offer a metaphysics of presence that subjectively
brings the art object near but at the same time distances it. Arguably both accounts fail,
because of the subjectivist underpinning, to capture the primary as well as the secondary
encounter with the object. In both accounts the art objects disappear into the subjective
side of the human world correlate and from there become subjectivist objects. As
entirely subjectivist, there can be no wider human relationship with them as objects in
themselves. They simply become internal, solipsistic, albeit inter-subjective within the
specific artworlds, whether as the refined taste of an object of contemplation for the
suitably qualified connoisseur, or the subject of social engagement for a social cabal
enjoying a binding relational aesthetic experience.
The conflict between object and post-object art can be described as a conflict between
the form of the artwork as representational and object based, versus its form as a
socially constructed, relational, and situational entity. Nevertheless, both of these types
of works were often inflected with the question of identity and authenticity, whether it
was by regional concerns over the domination of the margin by the centre, or anxiety
associated with past and present colonization and invasion in Australia.209 In this sense
the bifurcation between centre and margin, the authentic and inauthentic, continued a
representational logic; a logic that posited a gap between subject and object, nature and
culture, and hence the idea that there was, in the first place, a centre and margin.
Consequently, this chapter has suggested that the choice between object versus postobject art was a false one, and that, as presented, both positions in fact stem from a
common, underlying subject-object ontology that presents a significant problem in
terms of what a work of art is, and is capable of doing. Could the only alternative be,
then, to argue for the irreducible otherness of things, objects that cannot simply be
209
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thought as a process of something else? Is the only way out of this representationalist,
subject-object bind is, then, the recognition of the non-reducibility of the artwork to its
varied relations, perhaps even including its origins in human praxis? Consequently,
contrary to the claims of relational aesthetics and situated art, it is worthwhile revisiting
the idea of the art object as a real, if not always material, object not reducible to its
relations, one with a ‘life’ of its own. This would be an argument for a form of
realism—following Morton, an understanding of the work of art as a self sufficient
entity insofar as it contains an irreducible and non-given gap between what is is and
how it appears, independently of how another entity translates it.
A touchstone for this discussion is Bernard Smith’s call, at the conclusion of the
Antipodean Manifesto, for a focus on ‘the experience of both society and nature in
Australia for the materials of our art’.210 Smith’s argument for the importance of an art
that sought to articulate a specific type of experience—the experience of place—has
often been misconstrued as the endorsement of an exclusively social realist (e.g. socially
constructivist), white Australian art. In 2005, Smith affirmed that non-indigenous artists
in Australia have yet to come to terms with the fundamental question the Antipodean
Manifesto of 1959 posed: what kind of work should art here, and now, (that is
contemporary art) do. Stripped of its nationalist, identitarian and communitarian
connotations (or intentions), the Antipodean Manifesto’s final statement poses a still
relevant challenge to contemporary art. From the perspective of this discussion, Smith’s
realism offers an alternative avenue for exploration. The focus of his realism on
location-specific and time-specific encounters foregrounds creative endeavour as being
concerned with a speculative aesthetic encounter with experience211 —a type of
210
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encounter that is not reducible to any of the relations that produced it, including social
constructivist aestheticism.
Such an art would require a form of realism able to articulate the experience of what
Edward Casey calls implacement:
[O]nce bodies are found or even merely posited, they require places in which to exist. There are
no “actual occasions” (in Whitehead’s composite term for objects as well as events) without
places for these occasions. Although there may be displaced occasions, there are no nonplaced
occasions, i.e. occasions without any form of implacement whatsoever. To exist at all as a (material
or mental) object or (an experienced or observed) event is to have a place - to be implaced,
however minimally or imperfectly or temporarily. 212 [emphasis in the original]

Failure to be aware of the importance of this, on Casey’s account, can lead to forms of
displacement (he recounts the discovery of longitude which is discussed further in
chapter three), which could be characterized by a generalized perceptual agnosia, one
that is not orientating—a mis-comprehension of the relationship between place, time,
and space so that ‘here’ becomes ‘there’, ‘now’ becomes ‘then’, the future becomes the
past, and so on. (The relationship to Casey’s concept of place is further explored in the
third chapter.)One way of thinking about place from an object-oriented perspective,
then, would be to see the various places that ‘implace’ beings as themselves a kind of
object (i.e. the implaced beings are objects, but so is the place doing the implacing). This
object can be understood as acting in a way not dissimilar from Casey’s description of
‘places’ as opposed to ‘spaces’; that is, they are finite, bounded, and transitional, and so
on. In turn, implaced objects are themselves the places for smaller objects (e.g. my body
is both ‘in’ a place, and ‘the’ place within which my cells, organs, and systems are
implaced). While any further discussion of the implications of Smith’s realism may have
to wait for another time, the question of the relationship between vision, realism,
ecology and place are further explored in the next chapter, Something to be seen, a picture on
a Screen. This chapter asks what would an anthrodecentric approach to nature
matter of making manifest the nature and limits of a certain type of conceptual knowledge—descriptive
empiricism—via the act of picturing. In this way, natural history drawing articulates a particular type of
experience and desire. Stafford also cites Alva Noës’ and James J. Gibson’s theories of visual perception,
briefly discussed in the next chapter, as one such configuration. It was an engagement with an empirical
sensorium of things—minute, and ordered into typologies based on physical details—in which
descriptive appearance made manifest the possibilities and limits of a certain type of knowledge via act of
depiction. See Barbara Stafford, Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and
Medicine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 36.
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photography entail? Following chapter two, chapter three, Photo Vision: Photographing
Place, continues to address the question of place, realism, and implacement in the
context of project Konvolut K (Redmond Bridgeman and Jo Law).
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2: Something to be seen: A Picture on a Screen
Ever since someone peeled off the back of the excised eye of a slaughtered ox
and holding it up in front of a scene, observed a tiny, colored, inverted image
of the scene on the transparent retina, we have been tempted to draw a false
conclusion. We think of the image as something to be seen, a picture on a screen. You
can see it if you take out the ox’s eye, so why shouldn’t the ox see it? The
fallacy ought to be evident.213
James Gibson
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception

Introduction
This dissertation is particularly interested in the imaging of nature, and further, how we
are to think representations of nature non-reductively, apart from their relation to
human interpretations. With this question in mind, this chapter asks what would an
anthrodecentric approach to photographs entail? The term anthrodecentrism was first
used by Mathew David Segal and refers to the way humans are placed on equal
ontological footing with other objects.214 It is a ‘decentering’ of the anthropocentric.
How would this decentering apply in the case of photography? These questions are
approached in the following ways:
First, in A Picture on a Screen, I briefly describe James Gibson’s account of what he terms
‘aperture vision’ and the type of visual interaction it engenders. A possible alternative
account of ecological relationships from the perspective of Japanese ecologist Kinji
Imanishi is then explored. Imanishi’s essay, The World of Living Things, prioritizes the
experiential interaction of both living and non-living things, yet Imanishi’s concept of
ecological relationships creates a form of holism in which relational form is the only real
reality, where beings only exist insofar as they are perceived by other beings. It seems to
require a mind to know and constitute these relations. The next section, An Ecology of
Practice?, asks what would be required to overcome the limitations of holism models
such as Imanishi’s. As a first point of reference Alfred North Whitehead’s The Concept of
213
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Nature and its account of what Whitehead termed the bifurcation of nature is examined.
Then, the object-oriented philosophies of Timothy Morton and Graham Harman are
canvassed as possible solutions. To finish I outline Alphonso Lingis’ argument that, far
from being essentially human self-reflections, photographs are capable of bringing
about an encounter with the ‘images that the things, and not the human mind,
engender’. 215

(i) A Picture on A Screen
In The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, James J. Gibson describes the model of
vision to which he contrasts his own as ‘aperture vision’.216 Gibson argues that this type
of vision is actually ‘a peculiar result of trying to make the eye work as if it were a
camera at the end of a nerve cable’.217 According to this theory vision is believed to be
akin to a rapid series of photographic snapshots. The camera obscura, a box-like structure
with a small hole that enables an inverted image to be projected in its interior, was the
favoured explanatory model of how these images are perceived. This leaves vision as a
matter of representations apprehended internally. This being, ensconced in his camera
obscura, sees pictures on a screen. But, Gibson asks, if the homunculus can see these
pictures, who or what is watching the internal images they are generating? In Gibson’s
alternative model of vision, the eye is understood as one component within broader
processes of visual perception, which are themselves nested within a system of senses of
which the kinaesthetic sense and touch are necessary parts. Together the senses form a
sensory array. This array is predicated on motion and dynamic interaction with the
environment. A distinction is drawn between the world of physics and the environment.
The first is apprehended conceptually, whilst the second is apprehended via interaction
with sensory inputs. Visual perception ‘begins with the flowing array of the observer
who walks from one vista to another, moves around an object of interest, and can
approach it for scrutiny, thus extracting the invariants that underlie the changing
215
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perspective structure and seeing the connections between hidden and unhidden
surfaces’.218 Objects are not simply perceived, but the environment affords the conditions
for perception to occur.219 Because the environment provides the opportunity for seeing
‘something’ in the first place, there is no separate vantage point from which this
environment could be observed by a beholder. In contrast, aperture vision suggests that
the ‘external world’, thought of as ‘a picture on a screen’, is knowable only to the extent
that an internal viewer, often thought of as a ‘homunculus’ or ‘little man’, is able to
draw a correlation between their own knowing and the images on the screen.
What kind of ecological model, in which all parts, while they may not play equally
important roles, at least possess equal ontological status, would offer an alternative form
of perceptual interaction to the situation Gibson describes? Kinji Imanishi’s remarkable
book, The World of Living Things , describes such an ecological relationship. The English
title is a translation of the Japanese Seibutso no Sekai.220 The two Kanji characters for Seibutso literally mean living | things. As Parmela Asquith explains, this is a significant
conjunction. Imanishi did not set out to write a study of organisms as living things.
Instead, Imanishi initiated a study of the interaction between things—living and nonliving—and how they give form to their world. A number of implications flow from
this stance. The first one for this discussion is Imanishi’s rejection of the
substantialization of the self. The idea of the existence of a self with its own clear
conscious awareness and surety of its existence, such as the Cartesian ‘I’, implied
apprehension of the world from a distinct and separate vantage point. But this position
of privileged observation, according to Imanishi, is not possible. The self, Imanishi
argues, is an act or event that is constituted through actions in relationship to the total
environment, of which it is an integral part. Nothing could exist outside of this
environment, as it is self-constituted: ‘The perspective that everything developed and
differentiated from one thing is absolutely fundamental to Imanishi’s views on the
relatedness of all things, living and nonliving, in the world’.221
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A second implication is that it is only in the context of such an environment in which all
things, via a structured relationship of difference and similarity, give form to the world
of which they are a part. That is, the world of the living thing recognizes its life in its
world. For example, being non-sentient is not a lack—being sentient is simply
meaningless for animals and plants that do not live in that particular kind of world. This
is the field that Imanishi argued was the proper realm of shingengaku or nature study. He
did not mean by this that nature is a separate thing that can be either preserved or
destroyed. Such a position has no meaning for Imanishi since the existence of nature, as
an abstract yet substantiated thing, like the self, simply does not make any sense. How
could it? It would entail, Imanishi argues, that living things somehow arrived into their
world from elsewhere. Shingengaku is a way of thinking or studying nature from the
inside rather than thinking about it from the outside, from a privileged point of view,
looking on.
Imanishi’s criticism of the notion of the survival of the fittest can help illustrate this
point. Imanishi accepted Darwinian competition as an important component of species
interaction, but rejected it as a primary causative principle. Relationships are co-adaptive
between living things and the world they formed, and, consequently, causal
relationships must be multi-directional. It was this multi-directionality, Imanishi
believed, that was fundamental to interactions between living and non-living things. For
example, the unit of change was not an individual species but what he termed specia.
These are grouped species occupying a certain habitat. This concept was generated from
his study of the ecology of mayfly larvae in the Kamo River near his home. Specifically,
he asked how do different life forms, or species of these larvae, partition or occupy
specific niches in their world? He answered this question by appealing to a process of
differentiation from an original life form, driven by habitat segmentation, which could
describe the similarities and differences in the world of the mayfly.
Imanishi’s account describes the formation of a holistic organic structure that is
constituted by an anthropomorphic perspective that gives it form. Imanishi’s model of
structured relationships between the ‘life’ of both the living and non-living, and how
their interaction in-forms or structures worlds is a precursor account—though clearly
75

emerging out of a specific historical milieu—of Jacob von Uekull’s concept of the umwelt, an ecological model of interlinked experiential encounters between various
subjectivities which create specific habitats. Imanishi’s self-creating ecological habitats
still seem to require an internal picture on a screen, albeit one watched by self-creating
subjectivities. The problem is that this creates a split between the experience of the selfcreated subjective habitat and anything outside of it. Experience is bifurcated between a
known subjectivity with its intersubjective relations and external outside objects. In his
essay Consequences of Object Oriented Ecology: Ethology, Strangers, and

Cosmopolitics, Robbert describes Uexkull’s model of ecological worlds (‘Umwelten’) as
a form of bio-constructivism in which individual agents, via their relational experience,
give form to and assemble their world(s), creating a holistic experiential unity. Yet, a
consequence of this is that nothing outside of these worlds and their intersections can
exist. For things to be otherwise would be to admit that individual beings can pre-exist
(or exist outside of) the Umwelten of the organisms doing the perceiving. Uexkull’s,
perspective Robbert contends, produces a form of holism or relationism, creating an
assemblage of worlds in which relational form is the only ‘real’ reality. We end up with a
set of ecological relationships where beings only exist insofar as they are perceived by
other beings. A relationist world is created that is not realist enough, because it is unable
to lend real existence to anything outside self-creating Umwelten.
This leaves us with the question of what would constitute a truly ecological model in
which the experiences of inside and outside inhabit the same ontological level? The next
section investigates this question more closely, commencing with a discussion of Alfred
North Whitehead and his account of the bifurcation of nature, before returning to the
question of how object-oriented philosophy may offer a non-bifurcated model of
ecological interactions.

(ii) An Ecological Practice?
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Perhaps with the exception of Morton222 object-oriented philosophies are heavily
indebted to the thought of Alfred North Whitehead. By following Whitehead it will be
possible to develop an understanding of nature that is non-bifurcated, which is essential
for fulfilling the conditions Robbert lists. This discussion will focus on Whitehead’s
analysis of the bifurcation of nature in his Tarner Lectures, The Concept of Nature.
So what does Whitehead mean by the bifurcation of nature? Whitehead’s discussion of
the origins of the bifurcation can be situated historically. Because substance in itself is
not perceived, there is a division between what we perceive and its substance. The
question for early empiricists was how to account for this gap and thereby explain what
is actually experienced. As Whitehead explains, John Locke sought to account for this
by the theory of primary and secondary qualities:
Locke met this difficulty by a theory of primary and secondary qualities.
Namely, there are some attributes of the matter which we do not perceive.
These are the primary qualities, and there are other things which we do
perceive, such as colour, which are not attributes of matter, but are perceived
by us as if they were such attributes. These are the secondary qualities of
matter.223

This approach was symptomatic of a bifurcation of nature between secondary qualities,
subjectively knowable, and primary qualities, knowable as a matter of conjecture from
the evidence provided by secondary qualities. However, Whitehead contends, primary
and secondary qualities have over time become increasingly conflated. Because they are
only experienced by human apprehension of them as measurable aspects of physical
reality via secondary qualities, primary qualities have become subsumed or conflated
with secondary qualities. The result is a further bifurcation, a fundamental division
between human and non-human experience. This leaves humans as the only entities we
know of as capable of experience. This is not because other entities are incapable of
experience, but because this framework of possible knowledge means that humans are
the only experiencing beings we can know of. The result is that Locke’s division
between primary and secondary qualities, and subsequent philosophies that conflate this
division, leave subjective human experience as the only knowable experience, thereby
222
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cutting the relational nature, which Whitehead argues is the defining quality of all
entities within experience. For Whitehead this situation has meant that the true
continuum of experience is bifurcated between human experience and experience more
generally.
Whitehead responded by expanding the concept of experience so that it is at the centre
of all relations, not just human-object relations. This entails the radicalization of
empiricism that moves from presuppositions regarding objects from a human
perspective to the fundamental quality of the experiential process. This expansion
entails dissolution of the concept of primary and secondary qualities. Experience is no
longer understood as present to something or somebody who is independently aware of
their experience because they are aware of themselves as being aware. Returning to the
original question of experience, the question Whitehead seeks an answer for is what are
we aware of in perception? Whitehead clarifies this question by noting that awareness
precedes consciousness of something as something, so that perception proceeds
concepts.224 By not taking into account the originating moment of awareness itself, a
false conjecture arises: that the question of what we are aware of in perception concerns
the nature of reality. From this false question, there arises ‘the bifurcation of nature into
two systems of reality’.225 Two realities are created ‘which, insofar as they are real, are
real in different senses […] Thus there would be two natures, where one is the
conjecture and the other is the dream’.226 The conjecture is arrived at via conscious
deduction or induction about what is real, while the dream is what conjecture has no
access to via either deduction or induction. Both realities are already entrapped in a
theory of knowledge that has now trumped actual experience. In this way they are
abstractions of what we are already aware of, but the question of awareness itself is left
unanswered. The result is misplaced abstractions that result from conjectures about
what these theories of knowledge tell us about experience:
In the first place, it seeks for the cause of the knowledge of thing known
instead of seeking for the character of thing known: secondly it assumes a
knowledge of time in itself apart from events related to time: thirdly it
assumes a knowledge of space itself apart from events related in space. 227
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Because subjective experience is constructed from abstractions such as, these the
fundamental conditions of experience that make these abstractions possible is passed
over. Steven Shaviro, with Kant’s logical categories of experience in mind, notes that for
Whitehead the world is experienced prior to any logical categories, it is a process of
pure experience:
The subject emerges out of constructive experience, rather than being
presupposed by it […] Whitehead thus replaces Kant’s ‘transcendental
idealism’—his ‘doctrine of the objective world as a construction from
subjective experience’ with something more of the order of William James’
‘radical empiricism’. 228

Empirical experience and thought are understood as entwined in a fundamentally
relational way that radicalises experience itself. Experience itself is understood as
primary rather than the product of an empirical encounter, solely via the medium of
sense data or secondary qualities, with otherwise independent things. Therefore the
primacy of relations, and therefore experience, is asserted over our apprehension of
things as the occasion for the sensuous reception of an empirical datum. The question
of consciousness is not an epistemological problem to be solved. It is simply the ground
for any awareness altogether. That there is knowledge—or awareness—answers this and
is presupposed by any possible answer. Thus knowledge is itself a ground and not
something to be explained. Isabelle Stengers explains that, for Whitehead, ‘Knowledge
is ultimate. There can be no explanation of the “why” of knowledge; we can only
describe the “what” of knowledge’.229
As Shaviro notes, Whitehead’s empiricism can be situated within a tradition of
empiricism, albeit a radical one. William James formulated an account of ‘radical
empiricism’.230 However, while James is not cited, Stengers argues, his ‘terms appear
unexpectedly, without commentary, which point out that Whitehead is thinking with
James’.231 James absolutises experience as such, where experience (rather than the being
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of things, or causal relations, or atoms) is the fundamental explanatory cause. The
perceptual flux of experience between all entities lends experiential form to things so
that experience is the common element of all things. James’ term, ‘specious present’,
seeks to describe this. It is determined neither objective or subjective measures, though
these may describe how it is experienced. It is undivided, yet divisible, present, which in
the words of Stengers ‘does not designate an external, clocked measure, but a concrete
range, thick with the number of events it includes in a way that is divisible but
undivided’.232 James argues, in The Stream of Consciousness, that the experience of the
specious present is the concrete fact from which our understanding of experience
proceeds:
The first and foremost concrete fact which every one will affirm to belong to
his inner experience is the fact that consciousness of some sort goes on. ‘States of mind’
succeed each other in him. If we could say in English ‘it thinks’, as we say ‘it rains’
or ‘it blows’, we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum
of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on.233

This experience, however, is not confined to human subjective awareness; rather, the
‘specious present’ is characteristic of all experience and plays a fundamental role in the
pure experience of all things: ‘Radical empiricism is the idea that the world’s essentials
are all found in the flux of intuited or perceived experience; this concept transmuted the
stream of consciousness of James’s psychology into the pure experience of his
metaphysics’.234 This expansion of human conscious experience as simply one element
in the fundamental metaphysical flow of experience itself is apparent in Whitehead’s
own emphasis on relations as encapsulating experience itself. As Bruno Latour explains:
Now the originality of James, which was clearly recognized by Whitehead, was
to attack this situation—but not (as had been done for two centuries) in the
name of subjective values, transcendence, or spiritual domains, but quite
simply in the name of experience itself. It is undignified, says James, to call
oneself an empiricist yet to deprive experience of what it makes most directly
available: relations.235

Whitehead scholar David Ray Griffin describes Whitehead’s philosophy as a ‘panexperientialist’.236 Pan-experientialism means that all entities, both living and non-living,
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share no ontological priority in experiential capacity. This includes experience itself. Its
radicalisation of experience renders relations as integral to experience. They are
entwined in such a way that the division between subject and object, as a problem of
knowledge, dissolves, as does any division between primary and secondary qualities. For
Stengers experience dissolves the bifurcation of nature between precepts and
conceptualized spatio-temporal reality:
From the exploration of what we are committed to by the refusal to make
nature bifurcate between percepts, on the one hand, and a reality that is
essentially spatio-temporal and functional on the other, to the exploration of
what is required by the way we relate to experience.237

How is an object-oriented approach useful in this discussion of relations and objects?
How is it a corrective to the forgoing emphasis upon relations and process in
Whitehead’s account of experience? How could it produce a sufficiently realist account
of objects that nevertheless gives equal priority to relations? I next explore Timothy
Morton’s understanding of ecology, encapsulated in his concepts of ‘Strange Stranger’
and the ‘Mesh’, and Harman’s account of ‘vicarious causation’. We begin with Harman’s
concept of vicarious causation. Harman considers Whitehead a pre-eminent critic of
philosophies of access:
the greatest of recent Anti-Copernicans is surely Alfred North Whitehead.
This remarkable thinker abolished the Kantian prejudice by saying that all
human and non-human entities have equal status insofar as they all prehend
other things, relating to them in one-way or another.238

Yet the convergence between Harman and Whitehead on the question of access is also
marked by an important divergence. This centres on how relations between objects are
construed. Whitehead’s relational ontology appears to do away with Kant’s concept of
noumena altogether. In contrast, Harman displaces the bifurcation of nature, which
Whitehead overcomes by developing a model of continuous process and organic
relations, via his understanding of a non-human-centric account of relations between
objects. Harman seeks to radicalise Kant’s concept of noumena, by rendering noumenal
an insurmountable withdrawn quality hidden away within every object’s relation to
every other object, rather than being defined in contrast to the phenomenal human
experience of things. Harman shifts the emphasis from relations between objects to the
objects themselves. That is, Harman’s ontology shifts attention back to the object, but
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not now as a subject of human knowing, because human subjectivity itself becomes an
object amongst other objects.
Harman’s concept of vicarious causation plays a useful explanatory and descriptive role
here. Vicarious causation entails an ontology wherein relations are co-determined by
forms of withdrawal and interaction that determine the nature of materials’ interactaction. The irreducible quality of the alterity of objects becomes integral to their ‘reality’,
rendering their materiality second to this quality. In this way vicarious causation,
because it incorporates the non-relational as an integral part of relations, attempts to
explain ecological interaction. Objects are irreducible to the relations that form them
because they both withdraw from other objects and yet form relations. That is, they are
irreducible, and thus cannot be described solely in terms of their relations, yet at the
same time, they form integral parts of an environment so that, in the words of Adam
Robbert, ‘each object, each entity, is simultaneously itself and environment for some
other object’.239 However, a complementary concept of ecological relations is still
needed, one that shows how these withdrawn objects interact. This would be a model
of ecological relations that radicalises relations themselves in which the human and
human concepts of holism are de-centred. Morton’s concept of the ecological thought
offers an intriguing direction. So what is the ecological thought?
The ecological thought does indeed consist in the ramifications of the truly
wonderful fact of the mesh. All life forms are the mesh and so are all dead
ones, as are their habitats, which are also made up of the living and non-living
beings.240

To begin with Morton’s concept of the mesh: Meshes are formed both via their linkages
as much as their disconnections or negative spaces which together constitute them.
Morton argues that the way entities do not connect is as important as the ways that they
do. Understanding these kinds of relationships produces truly ecological thinking. In
Morton own words the:
ecological thought is the thinking of interconnectedness. The ecological thought is
a thought about ecology, but it’s also a thinking that is ecological… It’s a
practice and a process of becoming fully aware of how human beings are
connected with other beings—animal, vegetable, or mineral.241
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If ‘ interconnectedness’ here means that ‘nothing is fully ‘itself’,242 our encounters with
other beings are both of them and not, they are both familiar and strange, they are
‘strange strangers’.243 This suggests a ‘realism’ of relations rather than a ‘materialism’ of
relations. It is realism without matter, for the same reason that he posited ecology
without nature; for Morton, ‘Nature’ and ‘Matter’ are both abstract concepts that
cannot in any sense be encountered in experience (either by humans or any other
animals). Morton illustrates it in the following way:
Have you ever seen or handled matter? Have you ever held a piece of ‘stuff’?
Sure, I’ve seen lots of objects: Santa Claus in a department store, snowflakes
and photographs of atoms. But have I ever seen matter or stuff as such?
Aristotle says it’s a bit like searching through a zoo to find the “animal” rather
than the various species such as monkeys and mynah birds. 244

These terms, Matter and Nature, also suffer the dual misfortune of reducing the
ecological (‘Nature’) to a certain form of its presence to certain humans, and the real
(‘Matter’) to a certain conception of materiality—which, historically, it is known, has
always been an evolving and contested category. Both are kinds of metaphysics of
presence in which one aspect, a materialist one and Nature, with a capital N, is
designated as the sole reality—that is, a realism of relations whereby materialism is one
component within relations. In this way Morton’s position bypasses the object versus
relations debate by refusing to designate one of these terms as the essential real
definition. In Morton’s expanded concept of ecology every object becomes its own
medium and is itself at the same time. Thus a condition of its own possibility is an
ability to translate other things, that is act as a medium. The problem then of how mind,
medium and matter relate is solve by recognising that they in face co-exist. The
photographic object, from Morten’s perspective must be fundamentally ecological
because it inherently translates images, traces of its encounter with other objects, in
ways that are not solely determined by humans. That is photography is already a
medium – with its own powers of translation – prior to acting as a medium for human
translation of the visual environment. The next section discusses Alphonso Lingis’
unique application of the Kantian imperative and how it applies to his concept of levels
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in the context of one particular medium - photographic technologies and its capacity to
translate things on its own terms.

(iv) The Levels
In The Imperative Lingis puts forward a unique application of Kant’s famous
imperative—the principle of non-contradiction underpinning reason as a universal basis
for right action.245 Visual perception, for Lingis, is understood as a process of
multivalent interaction so that ‘A perceived thing is not simply an amalgamation or a
synthesis of the appearances it shows in the course of our exploration of it’.246 Indeed,
things are not just the passive recipients of our perception. Recalling Gibson’s concept
of affordances, a condition of their perception in the first place is their designation of
themselves as something, which ‘is to be accomplished’.247 Perceptual interaction is
driven by an imperative that does not derive from human concepts at all.248 It is simply
the command of being, the way inter-objectivity must be if it is to occur at all. Lingis’
concept of ‘levels’, by which the world is made up of numerous self-contained mutually
external levels, makes this clearer. Humans needed to adjust their perception and ideas
to these levels or different modes of existence. Ethical imperatives, like his
universalization of the Kantian imperative, come not only from other humans, but also
from animals, plants, and inanimate objects within these levels. The command of the
imperative is not disembodied reason, that imparts form to nature given this, but is
inherent to things having form as something rather than nothing. Seeing then could not
be just be an image of something:249
Our awakening to a field is not a succession of discrete acts that are so many
spontaneous initiatives. We do not open our eyes, capture a flake of the
visible, and then start again to capture another. With the first step a gait is
launched; upon opening our eyes our look slides onto the misty or crisp level
of the visible morning. Our awakening stylises itself at once. The level of the
visible is a directive that advances by unfolding its gradations and variations.
Each move of the look varies the prior one and launches further variations.
The look slides back and forth, seeing the visible from reversed and displaced
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directions. Each look takes form as one of a range of ways of looking,
equivalent and interchangeable.250

Visual perception is such a form of motile sensuality in which, for example, what we see
also sees us as a condition for us seeing in the first place.251 So that:
A thing is not simply a set of internal relations with all the other things. It
pushes back the other things and clamors for all our attention. It is not simply
a relay for a movement that stakes out directions and paths beyond it. It is
also a terminus for our perception. Things are ends and not means only. The
tasks they present to us designate themselves as what is to be accomplished. 252

Lingis admits he did not think of still cameras as a technology that facilitated these
forms of interaction. They seemed to embalm the lived movement of experience,
leaving only collections of inert images:
I had long resisted buying a camera, thinking that there was something false
about collecting images of things seen and people encountered and who have
passed on, trying to retain the past. I thought that what was real was what
from a trip left one changed.253

Lingis changed his mind regarding the camera when he realized that photography is a
complex system that, though made by humans, nevertheless ‘push[es] back and
clamours for our attention’ and thus is capable of changing how we see things in its
own right. It is capable of confronting us with unknown perspectives that were not
human:
I soon realized that the camera had changed my perception. The light: it was
no longer just cleared space in which things took form; it had direction, it led
the gaze, its shafts excavated situations isolated in the dark, sometimes it
spread in a scintillating, dazzling, blazing medium without boundaries.
Shadows took on substance; they stretched, flowed, condensed things in
themselves […] the legs of a child in an arabesque she will never be able to do
once grown up, the grin of a passerby at something inward. The landscape is
abruptly splintered; a segment isolates, magnetizes and pulls the glance into
it.254

This can be seen if the glance and not the gaze is understood as the paradigmatic form
looking takes. The gaze issues from a fixed point, it is a matter of close study that is
given form in visualizing technologies such as the microscope, telescope, or CCTV
surveillance. The glance can be said to be incidental, a product of negotiating
250

Ibid. 36.
Ibid. 30.
252
Ibid. 69.
253
Jonas Shackauskas, ‘Interview With Alfonso Lingis’ in Tom Sparrow and Bobby George (eds.),
Another Phenomenology: Exploring the Sensuous Earth, Volume 1 of Singularum: Lessons in Aesthetics, 2012, 2-15. <
http://singularum.com/interviewwithalphonsolingis >, May, 2013.
254
Ibid.
251

85

relationships with others, including other animals and is tied to forms of interaction.
Both the gaze and the glance play important roles in everyday seeing, but the glance is
the form of looking that is more fundamental.255 While drawing an analogy between the
camera and the gaze describes a specific way of looking, this particular way of looking is
not true of all photographic seeing or of seeing more generally. Lingis acknowledges
this when he writes that photography helps us:
recognize that the things themselves engender ‘images’ or doubles of
themselves – shadows, halos the images of themselves they project on water,
on the glass of windows – and also on the surfaces of the eyes of mammal,
birds, fish. For example, the puddle of water that appears, shimmering, on the
surface of the road ahead in a hot day is not ‘subjectively’ produced by the
mind; it is engendered by the road, and the sun, and everybody in the car that
sees it.256

This returns us to the image as a ‘picture on the screen’ in the quotation that prefaces this
chapter, and to the recognition that to insist upon the existence of this mode of seeing
is to remain in the solipsistic cul-de-sac that Gibson succinctly describes. Michel
Montaigne’s description of playing with his cat elicits just this type of recognition:
‘[w]hen I play with my cat, how do I know that she is not playing with me rather than I
with her?’257 As Sarah Bakewell reports, this was not how Rene Descartes would have
experienced such an encounter:258
Montaigne cannot look at his cat without seeing her looking back at him, and
imagining himself as he looks at her. This is the kind of interaction between
flawed, mutually aware individuals of different species that can never happen
for Descartes, who was disturbed by it, as were others in his century. 259

Descartes sought to formulate a concept of clear consciousness, one that would provide
a foundation upon which justified knowledge of the external world could be built. The
favoured metaphor, deriving from Descartes, of how these images are perceived was of
a homunculus or little man watching them on an internal screen.260 This is in contrast to
Montaigne’s variety of speculative scepticism, appropriate for an encounter with a
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‘strange stranger’, by which he was happy to cheerfully wonder what his cat thought of
him. But how do Lingis’ proscriptions work in practice? What kind of practices are
important in deciphering how objects possess meaning apart from being directly
accessible via the senses and hence as things of the human mind? The next chapter,
drawing upon Walter Benjamin’s ‘intensification’ of the literary strategy of the Denkbild
(thought-image), seeks to address this question in the context of Project X (1999) (Jo
Law, Redmond Bridgeman) and an online project Konvolut K (2006) (Jo Law, Redmond
Bridgeman).
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3: Photo | Visions: Photographing place

Introduction
Perth is the state capital of Western Australia. Perth’s generic skyline can easily be
mistaken for any other city and in many ways it is an unremarkable metropolis. Yet,
Perth has its own idiosyncrasies. Buildings disappear seemingly overnight and are
subsequently reconstructed as façades, the new is made to appear old; the Perth City
Council continually engages in attempts to ‘breathe life back into the city’261, and its
citizens worry that it is dull262 (Plate 2. 2 ). A recurrent theme of these concerns is a selfperception of isolation. Perth is understood as a place in which space and time are out
of synchronization with the less isolated, and therefore ‘implaced’ east coast urban
centres.263 This perception of isolation is closely connected with a parallel sense of
disorientation. As this chapter seeks to show, this sense of disorientation can be
characterized as a generalized perceptual agnosia - a mis-perception of the relationship
between place, time, and space, so that ‘here’ becomes ‘there’, ‘now’ becomes ‘then’, the
future becomes the past, and so on. A marked manifestation of this perceptual agnosia,
is the belief the city is always on the verge of becoming; yet the visions of this becoming
are retrospective now projected as future visions.
This chapter describes the photo-documentary project, Project X (1997-2003) (Redmond
Bridgeman, Jo Law) and Konvolut K (2006) (Redmond Bridgeman, Jo Law) and how they
responded to this sense of disorientation and its accompanying visions. In undertaking
Project X and Konvolut K, instead of travelling to new landscapes we set out to explore
this slippery place where we lived. As the collection of photographs grew, several types
came to prominence: memorial statues, public art (sculptures), hoardings, signs, façades,
and construction sites. In Project X these are documented with photographs, while in
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Konvolut K, which is discussed in the concluding section of this chapter, they are
rendered with materials fragments including photographs, illustrations, diagrams,
animations, sound recordings, newspaper clippings, advertisements, and quotations. An
important guide for this exploration was German critic, Walter Benjamin, in particular
his expanded treatment of the Denkbild (thought-image).
This chapter proceeds in the following way: In the first section, Inscriptio: Denkbild,
Karoline Kirst’s account of Benjamin’s intensification of the Denkbild as a means to
decipher contemporary experience is outlined. Susan Buck-Morss materialist account of
Benjamin's’ method is important here. In the second section, Pictura: Project X, aspects
of Benjamin’s interpretive methodology are applied to describe a process of the
aestheticisation of urban space via urban development and public art works. In the
concluding section, Subscriptio: Konvolut K, it is argued that Benjamin’s account of the
auratic and his recasting of Immanuel Kant’s concept of experience suggest how his
method may be applied more generally. In this context the photo documentary, Konvolut
K, can be understood as employing aspects of Benjamin’s method to depict the
aesthetics of the representational agnosia these spaces possess.

(i) Inscriptio: Denkbild
Like Siegfried Kracauer and Ernst Bloch, amongst others, Benjamin sought to describe
contemporary experience via the short narrative essayistic Denkbild (thought-image). He
developed this mode in One Way Street, wherein descriptive imagery is juxtaposed with
speculative observation in short essayistic form but with no explicit narrative
determination. Following on from One Way Street, Benjamin sought a ‘fiendish
intensification’ of the Denkbild, to include artefacts, quotations and images.264 This
broader concept of the Denkbild would be concerned with collecting, the archive, and
non-didactic accumulation. An important influence on Benjamin’s Denkbild was the
German Baroque emblem, that, Benjamin explains,
combines visual and verbal material. It displays a tripartite structure consisting
of the pictura (icon, device or impresa), containing one main pictorial aspect, the
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inscriptio (motto) above, which describes or enigmatically shrouds the image,
and below, the pictura, the subscriptio (or epigram), the explanatory poem or
text.265

In Karoline Kirst’s words, Benjamin was concerned with the interdependence of parts
that ‘present an image as an integral albeit not immediately recognizable part of the
thought’.266 For Kirst, the tripartite structure of Inscriptio, Subscriptio, and Pictura of the
Baroque emblem offered a model for Benjamin’s aim of presenting the hidden
meanings of contemporary experience in his Arcades Project:267
Like the Baroque emblem the Denkbild is a heuristic trope. The Baroque
emblematists presented their images as suggestive signs, as traces of the
hidden Divine meaning of the world. By means of emblems the Baroque
thinker was taught to inspect the world speculatively. The objects in
Benjamin’s Denkbilder become signs for the hidden fabricated human meaning
of the world and human history.268

The Arcades Project was divided into 36 alphabetized sections or Konvoluts. This term
refers to a bundle, an assemblage of printed material that belongs together. These
Konvoluts consist mainly of citations Benjamin gleaned from research, conducted over a
period of some thirteen years, on the arcades and industrial culture of nineteenthcentury Paris. Benjamin’s intention, write the translators of the recent English edition of
the Arcades Project, was
to grasp such diverse material under the general category of Urgeschichte,
signifying the “primal history” of the nineteenth century. This was something
that could be realised only indirectly, through “cunning”: it was not the great
men and celebrated events of traditional historiography but rather the
“refuse” and “detritus” of history, the half-concealed, variegated traces of the
daily life of the “collective,” that was to be the object of study, and with the
aid of methods of the nineteenth-century collector of antiquities and
curiosities, or indeed to the methods of the nineteenth-century ragpicker, than
those of the modern historian. Not conceptual analysis but something like
dream interpretation was the model. The nineteenth century was the collective
dream which we, its heirs, were obliged to re-enter, as patiently and minutely
as possible, in order to follow out its ramifications and finally awaken from it.
This, at any rate, was how it looked at the outset of the project, which wore a
good many faces over time.269
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Susan Buck-Morss, in The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project,
describes Benjamin’s Arcades project as a materialist investigation of the aesthetics of
experience closely coupled to his political and cultural critique.270 Aesthetics, BuckMorss argues, meant for Benjamin the whole of the modern physis, that is the whole of
physical experience given form by the aesthetic. Buck-Morss’ understanding of
aesthetics is important in her interpretation of Benjamin’s work.271 She is concerned
with Benjamin’s widening and deepening of the Kantian concept of disinterested
beauty, as when she describes aesthetics as embracing the whole ‘corporeal sensorium’:
Aisthetikos is the ancient Greek word for that which is ‘perceptive by feeling’.
Aisthesis is the sensory experience of perception. The original field of
aesthetics is not art but reality – corporeal, material nature. Hence, Aesthetics
is born as a discourse of the body. It is a form of cognition achieved through
taste, touch, hearing, seeing, smell, - the whole corporeal sensorium.272

This broadening of the arena of aesthetics includes changes in perceptual experience
brought about by visualizing technologies, new modes of transportation, and
organizational processes. All these shape aesthetic experience, which is now understood
as the whole of the ‘corporeal sensorium.’ The speed of the production line and train
travel, for instance, involved the adaptation of the eye to increasingly rapid and
rationalized forms of movement. This fundamental shaping of experience via embedded
perception within ‘reality--corporeal, material nature’ in-forms, in the sense of
constituting how they are experienced, the meaning things come to hold.273 The
influence of Benjamin’s understanding of the aesthetic as fundamentally shaped by and
shaping experiential encounters between the objects that constitute reality, can be seen
in Buck-Morse's account of the Arcades Project.
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Buck-Morss, drawing parallels between Benjamin's dissertation The Origins of German
Tragic Drama and the Arcades Project, explains that the latter echoes the Baroque use of
pagan ruins:
When Benjamin conceived of the Arcades project, there is no doubt that he
was self-consciously reviving allegorical techniques. Dialectical images are a
modern form of emblematics. But whereas the Baroque dramas were
melancholy reflections on the inevitability of decay and disintegration, in the
Passenger-Werk the devaluation of (new) nature and its status as ruin becomes
instructive politically. The debris of industrial culture teaches us not the
necessity of submitting to historical catastrophe, but the fragility of the social
order that tells us this catastrophe is necessary. The crumbling of monuments
that were built to signify the immortality of civilization becomes proof, rather,
of its transiency. And the fleetingness of temporal power does not cause
sadness; it informs political practice.274

According to Buck-Morss, in the seventeenth century pagan ruins and the figure of the
skull were appropriated by artists and writers as allegorical emblems of the
fragmentation and chaos of everyday experience in many areas of Europe. These
‘hollowed out’ remains were used to signify the transitory nature of human and natural
history.275 Benjamin also found himself in the midst of a culture of crisis and
fragmentation. He responded by adopting a philological approach to the study of
history that included the whole range of artefacts within the scope of analysis to expose
the ‘threatening and alluring face’ of myth:276
Benjamin’s central argument in the Passagen-Werk was that under the
conditions of capitalism, industrialization had brought about a re-enchantment
for the social world and through it, a ‘reactivation of mythic powers’...
Underneath the surface for increasing systemic rationalization, on an
unconscious, ‘dream’ level, the new urban-industrial world had become fully
re-enchanted. In the modern city, as in the ur-Forest of another era, the
‘threatening and alluring face’ of myth was alive and everywhere. 277

Benjamin discovered the image of the urban environment in the shopping arcade,
where the consumer was brought face to face with the commodities produced by the
capitalist economy. Once given an allegorical dimension, these arcades are
metaphorically transformed from the depository of the debris of capitalism, as they
appeared in the twentieth century, to reveal their true meaning as a ‘worlds in
miniature’, emblematic, like the use of pagan ruins in Baroque Mourning Plays, of
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modernity itself.278 Louis Aragon, whose book Paris Peasant was a significant inspiration
for The Arcades Project, refers to these arcades as ‘human aquariums’ that embodied the
mythological realm of modernity.279 Aragon claims that this realm forms an enchanted
new nature’,280 and that in this new nature objects such as gas pumps were ‘the idols of
today, and have the same totemic power for the modern world as Apollinaire’s beloved
fetishes from Oceania and Guinea had for their own worlds’.281 The totemic power of
the Arcades is hinted at in a tourist guide to Paris, written in the early nineteenth
century when the Arcades were still new, that Benjamin cites,
‘We have’ so says the illustrated guide to Paris from the year 1852, [provided]
‘a complete picture of the city of the Seine and its environs’ repeatedly
thought of the arcades as interior boulevards, like those they open onto. These
passages, a new discovery of industrial luxury, are glass-covered, marblewalled walkways through entire blocks of buildings, the owners of which have
joined together to engage in such a venture. Lining both sides of these
walkways that receive their light from above are the most elegant of
commodity shops, so that such an arcade is a city, a world in miniature. 282

Buck-Morss explains that the cornucopia of commodities, exotica, and curiosities in the
display cabinets of the Arcades were ‘appropriated by consumers as wish images within
the emblem books of their private dream-worlds’.283 However, once the aura the
Arcades possessed as the newest embodiment of progress dissipated, they became
graveyards dedicated to commodities from the recent past.284 Aragon describes these
Arcades as ‘sanctuaries’285 with a mythic dimension:
Although the life that originally quickened them has drained away, they
deserve, nevertheless, to be regarded as the secret repositories of several
modern myths: it is only today, when the pickaxe menaces them, that they
have at last become the true sanctuaries of the culture of the ephemeral, the
ghostly landscape of damnable pleasures and professions. Places that were
incomprehensible -yesterday, and that tomorrow will never know. 286
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The arcades, with the passing of time, and their displacement by newer and more novel
ways of stimulating consumer decisions, were now museums for outworn commodities.
These ‘secret repositories’,287 Benjamin believed, could reveal the historical transience of
capitalism and the unconscious dream worlds of nineteenth-century culture.288 Their
status as a city, ‘a world in miniature’,289 allowed them to function as allegories for Paris,
an archetypical city of capitalism, and hence for Benjamin they provided the means to
decipher the historico-philosophical truth of nineteenth-century modernity.290 BuckMorss argues that in order to do this Benjamin drew a distinction between ‘crude
thinking’291 or materialist thinking, and certain forms of ‘abstract thinking’.292 Abstract
thinking erased the full significance of cultural artefacts. By separating form from
content in such a way that form becomes abstracted and content is lost to myth. The
materialist critique, however, does not simply seek the dispersal of myth; rather, it seeks
to hold up to the light of day the plenitude of meanings objects contain by revealing the
meaning they embody. Buck-Morss explains the process in the following terms:
Whereas the former [abstract thinking] drains the concrete plenitude of the
objects, the latter [materialist thinking] burrows itself into the material thicket
in order to unfold the dialectic of the essentialities. It accepts no generalities
whatever, pursuing instead the course of specific ideas throughout history. But
since for Benjamin every idea is a monad, every representation of such a
monad seems to him to provide access to the world. 293

Presenting the representation of these monads in such a way that their significance
becomes alive entails reconstructing the totality of the context in which they existed.
The dichotomy between form and content created by myth is then dissolved. For these
products to reveal their historical meaning they had to be re-experienced. For Benjamin
the re-experiencing of artefacts entailed citing them in such a way that their original
materially-situated context is revealed. Benjamin declared: ‘This project must raise the
art of quoting without quotation marks to the very highest level. Its theory is intimately
linked with that of montage’.294 It involved the use of juxtaposition and citation to form
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a montage that evokes history, the result of which is that content is restored to artefacts,
to produce an awakening of their meaning.

(ii) pictura: Project x
The aim of Project X ( Appendix 1) was to document the process of construction of
visions of Perth at various building sites and projects in an ongoing manner. This
process took place during a period of eight or so years from early 1990 to around 2001.
These photographs were taken as we walked around the city, sometimes while on a
specific mission to document a particular site, but more often while we went about our
everyday life. This entailed the sensible interaction with sights, sounds, smells, and
touch, of the places we passed through. As Richard Shusterman’s argues, this involves
the whole body’s somatic interaction with its world, whether conscious or not. 295 This
awareness of proprioception, the sense of the body’s relationship to itself, other objects,
relations, and its somatic interaction with the world, also informs Edward Casey’s
concept of implacement and how it creates landscapes.296 Casey argues that landscape is
often understood as something beyond the bounds of experience, something natural, or
wild, that we may look at or paint; but landscape actually surrounds us in various guises:
‘Beyond the house and the neighbourhood lies the landscape. We tend to construe
landscape as natural - paradigmatically, as wildness - but in fact a city constitutes a
landscape, a “cityscape”, as surely as does the surrounding countryside’.297
The relationship between the body and the landscape, either formed by human activity
or other entities, creates an experience of ‘placescapes’:
A landscape seems to exceed the usual parameters of place by continuing
without apparent end; contains it, while it contains everything, including
discrete places, in its environing embrace. The body on the other hand, seems
to fall short of place, to be ‘on this side’ of the near edge, of a given place.
Nevertheless, body and landscape collude in the generation of what can be
called ‘placescapes’, especially those that human beings experience whenever
they venture out beyond the narrow confines of their familiar domiciles and
neighborhoods.298
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Such an experience as ‘placescape’ is created for the tourist who strolls down St.
George’s Terrace, the main business street in Perth. They will come upon a series of
steel plate kangaroos carrying briefcases that, according to Art City, a guide to Perth's
Public Art, are ‘racing back to Kings Park after a hard day at work’.299 (Plate 1.1) Further
down the Terrace three bronze kangaroos ‘begin to bound away led by a large male’
(Plate 1. 2)300 Still further down the Terrace, at the southern entrance to the CBD, live
Western Grey kangaroos in their ‘natural setting’ form part of ‘an entry statement for
visitors’.301 After discovering this ‘wildlife’ near their hotels, the visitors may wish to
further explore Perth, and dotted around the CBD are computer terminals to help them
do so. These present a kaleidoscopic montage of cultural, natural, and scenic attractions
to welcome the visitor to the ‘cosmopolitan, multicultural metropolis of Perth’, one in
which, as the live kangaroos testify, any expectation tourists may have that the famous
Australian wildlife will be close at hand will not be disappointed. A certain type of place
is created that appears to be located in time and space referenced via latitude and
longitude, wherein tourist know where they are within what is now a bounded
landscape.302 This could be understood as similar to the process of implacement, which
creates an inhabited landscape described by Casey:
Body and landscape present themselves as coeval epicenters around which
particular places pivot and radiate. They are, at the very least, the bounds of
places. In my embodied being I am just at a place as its inner boundary; a
surrounding landscape, on the other hand, is just beyond that place as its outer
boundary. Between the two boundaries--and very much as a function of their
differential interplay--implacement occurs. Place is what takes place between
body and landscape. Thanks to the double horizon that body and landscape
provide, a place is a locale bounded on both sides, near and far. 303

Yet, the creation of a landscape is not something that solely emerges from the
interaction of body and place. It can also be created by a planned aesthetisation of
place, to produce a simulation of implacement. In Perth this process ranges from the
creation of new communities around specific visual themes, such as Federation Village,
(Plate 1. 3) to the remodelling of existing urban areas around what is deemed to be their
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distinctive ethnic and cultural characteristics. Perth’s City Vision,304 and the related ‘The
Premier’s Vision’ are two examples.305 City Vision, for example, formulated in the mid to
late 1980s, is set within a discourse of urban renewal, real estate marketing of a
‘cosmopolitan inner city’ and the promotion of Perth as a base for eco-tourism.306
Accompanying these processes has been the renewal of narratives of the pioneer, a
return to nature in urban design, and talk of a new ‘civic space’.307 Public spaces such as
The Perth Cultural Centre, discussed below, are prime sites for the formation of these
plans. They become, as Jane M. Jacob argues, ‘activated spheres of practice’.308 As
spheres of practice they offer arenas where discourses of identity, race and nation are
staged. Nevertheless, Jacobs critiques a tendency to see the creation of aesthetic
experiences and discourses such as these as simply a veil over deeper processes of ‘late
capitalism’: ‘In these accounts the appropriation of vernacular histories, of ethnic
diversity for festivals, and the use of representational discourses in themed development
merely acts to conceal deeper economic regimes of consumption’.309
Jacobs argues that David Harvey and Fredric Jameson have played an important role in
formulating this perspective.310 According to this view the whole spectrum of cultural
activities is appropriated into the service of a new flexible process of capital
accumulation. Jacobs concedes that the representational discourses that are created are
often deployed in ways that are mystifying. However, she argues, the tendency of
accounts that draw upon Harvey and Jameson is to see such aestheticising processes as
simply illusionary:
Culture is certainly not centered in a productive way in these accounts of the
aestheticized city. Rather, here is a version of a far more familiar positioning
of culture as a “mask,” false consciousness, or a “veil” over more “real”
processes (Harvey, 1989, p.87). …The city has become a “city of illusion”
(Boyer, 1993, p.111), a giant theme park (Sorkin, 1992; Zukin, 1991). In this
transformation, culture (understood as aestheticization) comes to serve a
decidedly modernist grand narrative about the new logic of capital
accumulation.311
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Jacobs cites Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacra, with its ‘collapsed division
between the real and the unreal and the emergence of the hyper real’, as having a
fundamental influence on many of these writers to identify an important consequence.
312

Whilst Baudrillard ‘[at his most] productive contributes to uncoupling the chain of

signification and revealing the often arbitrary alignments of sign and things’, his
argument nevertheless results in a tendency for emphasis to be given to the play of
signification.313 Reading off the symbolic meaning of signs and charting their
relationship in a semiotic system of exchange takes precedence over the analysis of their
use in any specific situation. Visual discourses are simply seen as symptomatic of a
generalized unsettling of signification, an unsettling that is characteristic of the new
forms of capital accumulation. Consequently, visual practice and image making are not
seen as a meaningful practice, ‘as something which is socially produced, has politics, is
material, and is productive’.314 In this situation aestheticising processes ‘only ever mark
the appropriative force of post-modern capitalism’.315 Such a stance, Jacobs continues,
ignores local histories and their context of practice within which visual regimes are
produced and operate. What is required, Jacobs argues, if these visual regimes are to be
understood as more than simply illusionary, is an analysis of how specific visual regimes
act as spheres of practice in which power and meaning are negotiated. So that:
if the visual regimes of contemporary cities are thought about as activated
spheres of practice in which various vectors of power and difference are
meaningfully negotiated, then the story of the aestheticization of the city will
unfold in ways that will defy the expected.316

We will now briefly outline an influential plan for the re-modelling of The Perth Cultural
Centre as such an activated sphere of practice. The evolution of the cultural centre was
documented in Visions or Hallucinations? Over Time at the Cultural Centre, an exhibition
curated by Perth architect Duncan Richards. For Richards the Perth Culture Centre is a
‘ghostly place, haunted by past ideas and aspirations’, which are seen as symptomatic of
the overall characteristic of Perth as a city of fragments.317 It is a site that reuses, adds
312
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on, and recycles former structures. With each use its form takes on new shapes,
incorporating the old form into it as the definition of its function changes, transforming
from bush land to a set apart colonial jail and then, as the city crept closer, this form
provided a geometric order into which the institutions of culture were incorporated and
in which they sought to express their meaning and function. However, in the cultural
centre, as elsewhere, these forms were often only partially built, offering in miniature a
model of fragmentation mirroring the form of Perth itself. As architect Martyn Hook
notes:
[Consider] the existing Cultural Centre environment with its collision of grids,
unfinished buildings, fragments of visions, ill-defined edges. Consider the
tenuous links of an apparently random development process governments and
city planning bodies have bestowed upon it. Always something else to do,
always a sequel.318

In contrast to these partial fragments that were actually built, the visions themselves
were often remarkably whole and coherent. While the plans themselves solidified into
the dream of a cultural centre, only a fragment, the first stage of the Museum building,
originally went ahead. Duncan argues in the parallel Redevelopment Framework Draft Report,
to this exhibition, under the influence of rational planning principles, the process of ad
hocism and reuse now become more recognizably concerned with the incorporation of
the grid patterns themselves. Duncan believes the central problem with The Cultural
Centre is the imposition of a 60-degree planning grid upon the original urban grid. These
two spatial orders layered upon each other produce dissonant spatial layers:
Thus the major spatial disharmony in the Cultural Centre results from the
dissonance between the original urban grid to which the buildings such as the
Museum, Hackett Hall, the Gallery Annexes and PICA relate and the 60 grid
imposed for the Gallery, Library and the pedestrian corridor.319

The pre-1970 architecture is displaced from its setting of the natural road level, and its
plotting onto a grid configuration, whilst the post-1970s buildings, the Alexander
Library and Western Australian Art Gallery, plotted on each axis of the 1960 realignment, are out of accord with the original alignment. It was originally intended that
the axial link between the Art Gallery and Library symbolically connect Knowledge and
Art, bypassing an auditorium in which public gatherings and meetings would occur.
318
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This oblique grid acts as an anamorphosis of the urban grid, thus making the
connection between art, knowledge and democracy explicit in the design. The raised
pathway, as the Framework points out has a lot in common with the Ziggurat—a sacred
pathway that leads to and from but is not a place for lingering.320 By anamorphosing the
grid of the street, Duncan argues, these principles are extracted and dramatized, yet the
overall effect is to produce a rather melancholic and hostile place (Plate 1.4). Because of
the spatial disruption caused by the implementation of the 1960 grid, the level changes
disrupt the eye level view. The pedestrians’ gaze tends to be directed outwards, focusing
upon their destination. The pedestrians’ intended role to become a spectator of cultural
functions in the auditorium, or partake in public meetings as they transverse the spaces
between the cultural institutions, is disrupted. The pedestrian then, because of the
failure of (to use Casey’s concepts) of their ‘implacement’ within the landscape of the
Cultural Centre, fails to inhabit the ‘place-scape’ created for them.
To overcome these problems Duncan and Hook recommended that the cultural centre
be re-modelled in terms of a ‘unique Western Australian Landscape [with its] canopy of
trees ... strong natural colouring of ochre’s and reds...[and] shallow pans [of water]
thereby creating a new ‘place-scape’.321 Asides from erasing the fragments from a
piecemeal design process that has left ‘many of the buildings [as] monuments to
intentions long dead, or as remaining fragments of large scale plans now abandoned’,322
the social problems that have characterized the site will be also be displaced. A public
Art Program linked to, and integral with, the re-configuration of the existing place will
both emphasize the spatial structure and its qualities, and contribute significantly to the
enhancement of the identity of the precinct as a particular place.323 The Art Program
will ‘both reinforce the spatial planning concepts and animate and enhance specific
spaces within the Cultural Centre’.324 The work will do this by interrelating with the
layered spatial system. Towards this end, any commissions granted to artists to
undertake this work should specify, as well as budget, site and timetable, a ‘particular
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site specific theme for the artists’ expression’.325 These themes are described briefly—
artists will comment on the history of the site, reveal current activities within the site,
and provide opportunities for interaction with the site. Under the heading Artworks
Associated with Level Changes, Thresholds and Opportunities for Surprise, it is suggested that
small sculptures be commissioned. These Vestiges’ will be essentially mnemonic and
cartographic aids:
A series of small-scale sculptures in the form of left behind objects (or
sounds) which invoke images of the diverse users of the Perth Cultural Centre
and in this way emphasise the links to adjacent precincts of the city,
particularly Northbridge. For example, a ‘coffee cup artwork’ would refer to
the coffee culture of Northbridge, a ‘Tambourine artwork’ would refer to the
Salvation Army Band that plays every Sunday in the Cultural Centre. 326

Like so many such plans before it, Duncan, Smiths, and Hooks prescription for the
Cultural Centre never fully eventuated, but many of the characteristics of their intended
place making can be seen at play in the re-development of Russell Square, a park one
kilometre north of the Cultural Centre. At this site a central rotunda and stage was
erected and then encircled by an assortment of bronze sculptures that reference
Australian native fauna, ethnic communities, ‘Aboriginal cultural’ and pioneer history
(Plate 1. 5).327 In one a snake and lizard repose upon a rock, whilst a satchel, with
boomerang protruding, rests on a retaining wall. In another a Woomera lies on the edge
of the pool (Plate 1. 6); as well, a bush hat, towel and glasses, whose owner presumably
has taken a momentary dip in the pool, are draped over the wall (Plate 1.7). A
foreshortened sailing ship, referencing colonial settlement, is also represented (Plate
1.8).
Together they form an ecological tableau328 whereby art furnishes a narrative of an ideal
‘Western Australian landscape’ in which nature, the colonial, metropolis and
multicultural are conjoined in civic harmony.329 The images produced by Amy Heap and
Fred Flood in Western Australia during the interwar years of a mythological pioneering
and beneficent landscape, peopled by Bush Fairies, pioneer cottages, and happy
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Australian Yeoman farmers, are echoed in new public spaces such as this one. In 1929,
in celebration of Western Australia’s Centenary, The Western Mail, a popular periodical at
the time, presented a special issue.330 It contains an image by Amy Heap, the illustrator
for The Western Mail and text by Anthony Foulkes. In A Hundred Years of Progress (Plate
1.9) Western Australia is described as ‘the coming State’, in which material and cultural
progress will inevitably result in the ‘centre of gravity of the Commonwealth eventually
shift[ing] westward drawn by the magnet of abundance and sustained success’.331 As
historian Tom Stannage explains, these images exist within a discourse of Australian
nationalism and rural utopianism.332 In this context, landscape views of Western
Australia, as Stannage explains were constructed from a stock of images, that
stressed the bounty and beauty of nature, and the harmony, tranquillity and
enjoyment of life in Western Australia. Where struggle was portrayed, and it
was usually rural in character, it always resulted in productive good and
familial contentment.333

In proposals such as those discussed above for the Perth Cultural Centre, an idealized
timeless space of culture is brought together with the universal evolutionary time of
nature. An iconic ‘Australian landscape’ is used to create a ‘public space’ defining
identity, nation and race.334 How this realm is conceived and represented constitutes a
‘public’, which is defined by the forms of social life that are symbolically represented
and that are allegorically enacted. In this context the reconstruction of the Cultural
Centre as a Western Australian Landscape—as the natural place for Western
Australians—can be situated. However, such images of harmonious place have little in
common with the actual experience of place for many of the inhabitants of what is now
Perth, then and now. Recalling Casey, the experience of actual bodies disappears in
favour of abstractions. Steve Mickler, discussing the City Vision project, that also
incorporated plans for the remodelling of the Cultural Centre, describes how such an
ideal of a beneficent civic space erases specific rights and identities in the name of an
abstract concept of the ‘public realm’:
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The whole implication of the CityVision project generally is that social
inequities are the result of bad design, poor urban planning. If Aborigines
present a problem, then it is a problem to be planned out of existence. Clearly
the exclusive ethnic interests of Aboriginal people would stand outside of the
symbolic territory marked off as ‘civic’ by Mr. Warnock and his co-visionaries.
The harsh terms of their accommodation within the cosmopolitan dream-city
is the surrender of any claims to exclusive interests or separate identity. The
category of the city here is interchangeable with that of ‘the people’, whose
paramount interests foreground all policy and decision-making.335

The illusionary quality of this civic unity, its only seeming recognition of diversity and
difference, Mickler, continues, amounts to little more than:
an exotic post-colonial urban reverie in which the sensual delights of
immigrant or indigenous minority cultures - cappuccino, souvlaki, ethnic
carnivals and corroborees - can be made available under strictly controlled,
health department inspected, consumer protected conditions for the AngloCeltic connoisseur.336

Mickler expands his critique via reference to the architectural plans for the Old Swan
Brewery complex, (Plate 2.3) which he describes as creating an experience that ‘conjures
up a retro-vision of imperial majesty in the high colonial period within which
architectural authenticity is sacrificed to a “nowhen”, as purpose-built nostalgia of post
modern urbanity’.337 Moreover, for Mickler, this structure revives,
poignant cultural memories for the inhabitants of the formerly Swan River
Colony. The Galleria is unmistakably simulative of the pavilion-style
architecture of the early Victorian London, but further, I suggest refers to one
building above all others, the Crystal Palace, built in London for the Great
Exhibition of 1851.338

Staged as a celebration of British cultural and imperial achievements, the Crystal Palace
was described by contemporaries as a structure that was ‘incomparably fairy-like’339 and
that left many with a ‘profound faith in the future’.340 Buck-Morss argues that this
structure transformed nineteenth-century industrial culture into a miniature
phantasmagoria that blended,341 ‘machine technologies and art galleries, military
cannons and fashion costumes, business and pleasure, [that] were all synthesised into
335
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one dazzling visual experience’.342
To conclude this section, Joseph Conrad’s short story An Outpost of Progress, is quite
apposite in the context of Mickler’s reference to The Crystal Palace and the above
question regarding, implacement, disorientation, and visions in Perth.343 In An Outpost of
Progress, two ivory traders, Kayerts and Carlier, have been stationed at a remote trading
post in French East Africa by their company’s steamer. These ‘two pioneers of trade
and progress’,344 Conrad writes, spend their days gazing ‘on their empty courtyard in the
vibrating brilliance of vertical sunshine’.345 They ‘understood nothing, cared for nothing
but the passage of days that separated them from the steamer’s return’.346 They lived
like:
blind men in a large room, aware only of what they come in contact with (and
of that only imperfectly), but unable to see the general aspect of things. The
river, the forest, all the great land throbbing with life were like a great
emptiness. Even the brilliant sunshine disclosed nothing intelligible. Things
appeared and disappeared before their eyes in an unconnected and aimless
kind of way.347

‘Their predecessor had left some torn books’ which they discussed at great length. They
became completely engrossed in the fate of the characters, the plots of the novels, and in
discussing the protagonist’s virtues and vices.348 They also avidly read old copies of the home
paper that, in ‘high-flown language’, devoted a column to ‘extol[ing] the merits of those who
went about bringing light, and faith and commerce to the dark places of the earth’349 in the
interests of what it pleased to call ‘Our Colonial Expansion’.350 The two men began to think
of themselves in this fashion. Carlier declared one evening, ‘In a hundred years, there will be
perhaps be a town here. Quays, and warehouse, and barracks, and - and - billiard rooms.
Civilisation, my boy, and virtue—and all’.351
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For Ian Watt, the protagonists in this short story share an addiction to the ‘idealising
abstractions of public discourse, to a language that has very little connection with the
realities either of the external world or of their inner selves’.352 Their belief in progress, and
the ‘sacredness of the civilising work’,353 combined with their own mis-recognition of their
abilities, brings about a kind of blindness to their circumstances and environment.354 The
normal relations of causation are breaking down: ‘[T]hings appear and disappear in
unconnected and aimless kinds of ways’. Kayert and Carlier are aware ‘only of what they
come in contact with (and of that only imperfectly)’.355 The ‘large room’ they inhabit is an
imaginary space defined by their dreams and visions of ‘civilization’, ‘virtue’, and ‘progress’
that they have projected onto their surroundings, making them blind to the actuality of their
situation. The actual place of French East Africa has disappeared from sight behind abstract
discourses. Their visualizations of how things are or could be are more akin to hallucinations
that have little or no relation to their situation. Their awareness of place, and their
connection to it has disappeared into a realm of idealizing abstractions of nowhere spaces.

(iii) Conclusion: Subscriptio: Konvolut K
The online work Konvolut K (2006) asked what would a contemporary form of the
Denkbild entail? Adopting aspects of Benjamin’s methodology, this project presents a
constellation of images and citations from research. The title Konvolut K references
Benjamin’s Konvolut k, in the Arcades Project, labelled, ‘Dream City and Dream House;
Dreams of the Future, Anthropological Nihilism, Jung’. The visual, auditory and textual
threads identified in Project X coalesced around five thematics that we identified as
evocative of Perth’s narratives: ‘Biosphere’, ‘Stasis’, ‘Strata’, ‘Construction’ and
‘Panorama’. The programmed navigation in the online work allows visitors to access
content in various ways such as maps, tours, scrolls, and filing cards via a series of
nodes and navigation directions around the idea of train linkages and the tour. These
filling cards reference various emblematic scenes of these themes. These include
352
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hoardings that narrate Perth as a timeless land; public art that presents is as a site of
beneficent nature and colonial harmony. It brings together visual, auditory, and textual
threads with which visitors can construct their own vision of Perth, a vision, however,
that can only be completed by a site visit to what is proudly proclaimed by its
inhabitants as the ‘most isolated city on earth.’356
One of the most fruitful nodes used the concept of construction. (Plate 2.4) It provides
a series of templates that enable the construction of the main forms of Perth
architecture. These forms are repeated in related nodes such as Statis, in which the built
form of Perth is encapsulated in historical details of social conditions and politics. While
in Biosphere the filed images portray habitats, natural and human. (Plate 2.5)
Construction site reproduces a key text for this project. In One Way Street, under the
heading Construction Site, Benjamin wrote:
Pedantic brooding over the production of objects—visual aids, toys, books—
that are supposed to be suitable for children is folly. Since the Enlightenment
this has been one of the mustiest speculations of the pedagogues. Their
infatuation with psychology keeps them from perceiving that the word is full
of the most unrivalled objects for childish attention and use. And the most
specific. For children are particularly fond of haunting any site where things
are being visibly worked upon. They are irresistibly drawn by the detritus
generated by building, gardening, housework, tailoring, carpentry. In waste
products they recognize the face the world of things turns directly and solely
to them. In using these things they do not so much imitate the works of adults
as bring together, in the artefact produced in play, materials of widely differing
kinds in a new, intuitive relationship. Children thus produce their own small
world of things within the greater one. The norms of this small world must be
kept in mind if one wishes to create things specially for children, rather than
let one’s adult activity, through its requisite and instruments, find its own way
to them.357

How objects and their chance encounters may generate meaning can be illustrated by
the recurrent images of Governor Captain James Stirling with a construction that occurs
through out Konvolut K. (Plate 2.6) Governor Stirling appears in the act of proclaiming
the settlement of Western Australia in 1829. Unveiled in 1979, this statue stood outside
the Rural & Industries Bank of Western Australia until 1994, when the 11-storey
building was demolished and hoardings were erected around the site. For a brief period
the statue could only be seen obliquely from a north-bound approach. The photograph
used in the project was taken during this time, when someone, no doubt in jest, deemed
356
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that even inanimate statues had to conform to health and safety regulations. Like many
of the montage of images in Konvolut K, the chance juxtaposing of statue and hat,
recalling the Surrealist deployment of chance integral to Benjamin’s emblematics of
modernity, generates a possible narrative of the city.358 (Plate 2.7) Was the founding of
Perth less a matter of colonial conquest than a business of property development? Is the
city’s preoccupation with property investments an inheritance from its historical origins
in the laissez faire capitalism of nineteenth century? Are the constant development,
redevelopment, and their ensuing conflicts subconscious re-enactments of its colonial
heritage?
This may help explain the disorientation and hallucinatory role of vision in the
development of Perth. Many scenes in Konvolut K play with the idea of physical travel in
Perth, but navigable space is not presented as an analogue of Perth’s physical place so
the execution always retains spatial ambiguity.359 From the opening prologue when a
plane lands at Perth Airport, space is experienced simultaneously as representation,
including aerial maps, urban road directories, and site elevations, and via its medium of
presentation: the screen. But these images are as if stuck in time because of the
ambiguity within which they exist. This rendition of place can be understood as akin to
Paul Virilio’s description of ‘the snapshot’s image-freeze or rather image-time-freeze’.360
This characterization is apt because the modelling of the actual place dislocates place in
space, it fails as a marker of longitude, ensuring the experience of Perth is rendered
ambiguous.
The disorientation created between representation and place is analogously re-staged in
Konvolut K. Ackbar Abbas’ description of the relationship between abstraction,
representation and disappearance can help fill out how this may work. For Abbas,
contemporary cities, (he has in mind Hong Kong but notes it can be applied to many
modern cities), give rise to increasingly ‘abstract and ungraspable’ places. A significant
characteristic of these ‘abstract spaces’ is the dominance of the visual; yet, Abbas
358
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continues, as stereotypical depictions of identity these images, like photocopies that
have been reproduced too many times, lose their definition. The actual multifarious
meanings particular places hold disappear as representations, fail to represent and
become mis-connected signs pointing to a mirage. In the words of Abbas, if place
‘becomes more varied and multifarious, over saturated with signs and images, at the
same time as it becomes more abstract and ungraspable’, then abstraction becomes the
contemporary mode of disappearance.361 Abbas cites Henri Lefebvre’s concept of
abstract space to draws a distinction between the ‘representation of space’ and the
‘space of representation’. The first is produced as a means of representing space and
hence conceptualizing place:
Representations of space: conceptualised space, the space of scientists,
planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a
certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived
and what is perceived with what is conceived […] This is the dominant space
in any society (or mode of production). Conceptions of space tend, with
certain exceptions to which I shall return, towards a system of verbal (and
therefore intellectually worked out) signs. 362

In contrast, the second is more concerned with orientation and location within space in
order to locate oneself in space by giving form to place:
Representational spaces: space as directly lived though its associated images
and symbols, hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ […] This is the
dominated - hence passively experienced— space which the imagination seeks
to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of
its objects.363

The space of representation displaces the representation of place so that a
disconnection develops, Abbas believes, in which representations no longer have any
relationship with their referent. Nevertheless, these new abstract visions paradoxically
become more concrete as the ability of those within representation space to depict the
actuality of their experience of place fades. Indeed, abstraction now takes the form of
the concrete, and the perception, and hence recognition of the actual place becomes
confused. The result is that a form of disappearance is produced; the concrete actuality
is displaced by an abstraction made concrete:
The more abstract the space, the more important the image become, and the
more dominant becomes the visual as a mode. This relation between
361
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abstraction and the image, however, must be understood in a specific way.
The image is not a compensation for abstraction, an amelioration of its lack of
the concrete; rather it is the ‘concrete’ form that abstraction now takes. 364

The images and spaces thereby created can be likened to immersive panoramas that
seek to draw their inhabitants into a total experience. Such an experience envelops the
whole being, inserting the individual in a narrative of place, race, ethnicity and nation.
Indeed, they often resemble a staged diorama of a particular ‘ecosystem’ similar to a
natural history museum display. Of course the creation of cultural identity with such
plainly legible images, though, is not simply confined to the tourist industry in Western
Australia. It is commonplace to find public spaces and whole communities where the
visual representation of cultural, ethnic, class and national identity is explicitly
articulated. But one way of presenting a different account of experience, and in which
‘representation of place’ is able to produce the kind of implacement Casey describes, is
by re-staging these ‘spheres of aesthetic practice’365 in ways that give the ‘world of
things’ back their own life via chance encounters, and hence their ability to encapsulate
their own history.366
Benjamin adopted a physiological approach to the study of cultural history, but applied
it to the investigation of the origins of modernity. Consequently, he widened the scope
of analysis to include the whole spectrum of cultural artefacts. He was interested in how
cultural products could be presented in such a way that the imbrication of concepts,
ideas, and phenomena becomes transparent, revealing how the myths and social truth of
his contemporary culture emerged historically, yet Benjamin’s focus was on human
cultural artefacts. How could such a method apply to objects that are not human
produced artefacts? That is can Benjamin’s method be extended to objects that are not
human artefacts? Benjamin’s concept of the auratic and his account of speculation
offers some clues. I will now briefly explore this possibility via Howard Caygill’s
discussion of the role speculation plays in Benjamins’ account of experience.
Caygill argues that Benjamin realized that what is needed for the meaning embedded in
the artefact to come alive is a widening of the concept of speculation. This meant
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Benjamin needed to recast Kant’s concept of experience. To do this, Benjamin placed
speculation at the heart of experience as mediated by the Categories. Speculation should
not be detached from the Kantian Categories of the understanding, but these should be
expanded to include speculation as central to how the Categories operate. Caygill
explains:
Benjamin’s elaboration of a non-Hegelian speculative philosophy of
experience redefined the nature and limits of critique. The Kantian view that
critique should confine itself to securing the legitimacy of judgements in terms
of a categorical framework applicable only within he limits of spatio-temporal
experience no longer sufficed. The extension of the bounds of experience
brought with it the demand for a new and extended notion of critique.
Benjamin responded to this demand by returning to the concept of criticism
developed by the Romantic, pre-Hegelian generation of Kant’s critics, above
all Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. From their example he derived a
speculative concept of criticism guided by the method of ‘immanent
critique’367

Benjamin’s inspiration for this was the experience of colour, where ‘the paradigm of
experience […] is not linguistic signification but chromatic differentiation’ and how it
engendered a differentiated response to different experiential possibilities.368 Because
the experience of colour required contextual interpretation for it to be experienced as a
colour in the first place, its boundaries could not be pre-determined. It was thus an
experience (recalling Whitehead’s critique of the bifurcation of nature discussed in the
previous chapter) that occurred prior to any bifurcation into primary and secondary
qualities. Benjamin’s description of the phenomenology of this experience from his The
Rainbow: A Dialogue on Phantasy is cited by Caygill: ‘I too was not, nor my understanding,
that resolves things out of the image of the senses. I was not the one who saw, but only
seeing. And what I saw were not things but only colours. And I too was coloured into
this landscape’.369Analogously, in contradistinction to the claim that speculation lacked
any connection with sensory experience, Benjamin argued, in Caygill’s account, that it is
actually a necessary, a priori condition for grasping causal relationships in the first place.
That is, it operates as a fundamental condition of possibility of our negotiation and
recognition of cause and effect. The experience of colour is a paradigm of experience in
which percept and concept, subject and object are inextricably intertwined,
In this experience two components of Kant’s account of experience —
sensibility and the understanding—collapse into each other, and the
367
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experiencing subjects which would contain them dissolve into its experience.
The opposition between the gaze and the gazed upon collapses, both
threatening a nihilistic dissolution into a pure featureless identity beyond
subject and object but also promising a new chromatic articulation of
experience.370

By allowing the speculative a proper claim to being grounded in experience, Benjamin
sought to expand the range of allowable experience within the Kantian schema.
Benjamin’s widening of the concept of the aesthetic to include the whole of the
corporeal sensorium, his inclusion of speculation within allowable experience, (and how
this intersects with Benjamin’s understanding of the artwork,) can be seen to come
together in his widening of the Denkbild beyond what was primarily a literary form. It
also includes, Caygill explains, the variety of types of visualizing technologies. These, far
from being simply a matter of more efficient forms of mimetic copying, are
technologies of depiction with their own associated conceptual dimensions.371
Moreover, these visualizing modes are not simply enabled by the technologies. The
technology represents their conceptual realization. That is, they are the practical
embodiment of a way of seeing, be it through a microscope, telescope, film, or digital
image. Thus the mass of images produced within modernity by then new visualizing
technologies (in Benjamin’s time photography was aligned with mass printing
technologies) and artistic Modernisms can be understood as modes, in Caygill words,
‘[for] organizing experience and that visual art was a way of speculating upon the limits
of experience from within it’.372 The artwork can not be understood as solely concerned
with mimesis or the harmony of beauty, or form, but the possible form of experience
itself, because its inner life is irreducible to any of these.
But Benjamin’s account of the experience of colour as necessarily involving speculation
also means his account of the experience of artefacts and artworks can be applied to
objects that are not products of human artifice. Benjamin’s account of the auratic offers
some clues as to what this may involve. In A Small History of Photography the auratic is
defined as “ A strange weave of space and time: the unique semblance of distance, no
matter how close the object may be.”373 Duration is monumentalised as the defining
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condition of the work of art which in turn develops an aura that arises from being
placed outside of space and time. By being consecrated into a mythic realm outside of
contingency, such works are placed out side of Kant’s schema. But this auratic affect is
historically produced by humans and it only escapes the conditions of existence by
denying them. Such artworks, in the words of Caygill, “…literally refuse their future”374
There is no escaping their contingency which like speculation is a condition of the
apprehension of experience itself within Benjamin’s recasting of Kant’s concept of
experience. The photographic object consequently can be understood as embodying
this; because, as a product of contingency and speculation, which are embedded in the
photograph itself, as a condition of their possibility, apart from desires or hopes of the
photographer. Benjamin explains,
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his
subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the
tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which reality has so to
speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the
immediacy of that long forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently
that we, looking back, may rediscover it.375

The next chapter, From Beyond , continues to ask the question of how can the irreducible
quality of things be approached outside of human-centric concerns? But now this
question is posed more explicitly in the context of practical strategies for the production
of photographic objects. This involves further deploying Graham Harman’s concept of
ontography, but now coupled with Ian Bogost’s application of Harman’s concept,
which Bogost termed ‘practical ontography’, to ask how can the ghostly inner life of
objects be invoked? 376
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4: From beyond
That Crawford Tillinghast should ever have studied science and philosophy
was a mistake. These things should be left to the frigid and impersonal
investigator, for they offer two equally tragic alternatives to the man of feeling
and action; despair if he fails in his quest, and terrors unutterable and
unimaginable if he succeed. […] With five feeble senses we pretend to
comprehend the boundlessly complex cosmos, yet other beings with a wider,
stronger, or different range of senses might not only see very differently the
things we see, but might see and study whole worlds of matter, energy, and
life which lie close at hand yet can never be detected with the senses we have.
I have always believed that such strange, inaccessible worlds exist at our very
elbows, and now I believe I have found a way to break down the barriers. I am not
joking.377 [Italics in original]
H.P. Lovecraft
From Beyond (1934)

Introduction
This dissertation has sought to address the question of the conceptual horizon opened
up for art practice by speculative realism and object-oriented philosophies. It has
applied these perspectives to a number of past projects. In particular, Graham
Harman’s object-oriented ontology has provided an explanatory model of how
relationships between objects are governed. What could be meant by the agency of
objects or things has been an important issue; in Jane Bennett’s words, ‘can nonorganic
bodies also have a life? Can materiality itself be vital?’378 And if so, how can we
understand our relationship to human produced systems and objects? How do we ‘as
human[s] strive to understand the relationship between particular objects in the world,
relations that go on without us, even if we may be their cause, subject or beneficiary?’379
As Bogost notes,
even if we accept the rejection of correlationism as overtly, selfishly
anthropocentric, how do we deal with things that are also complex structures
of systems crafted or used by humans?380
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This chapter investigates the implications of this question for photographic practice in
the context of a past film project and a future oriented photographic project. First, in a
in A Speculative Photographic Realism?, Tom Gunning’s account of how photographs can
be understood as creating a particular analogical presence rather than a representational
image is discussed. My intention here is to contrast an ontological realism with
representational realism –as the basis for thinking a new kind of photographic realism.
Then, in A Practical Ontography, Bogost’s concept of a ‘practical ontography381 to
explored as a strategic framework for an ontographic photography. Finally, in the
Conclusion, concepts of contingency and the occult to discuss two projects are
deployed.382 These are the short film A Natural History Primer (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman)
and the series of photographs From Beyond and its exploration of the preternatural.

(i) A speculative photographic realism?
Photography is a product of a complex human-centred practice and hence entirely
entrapped within correlationism. At the same time, it is a complex of objects and
interactions that cannot be said to simply reflect human vision. Camiel Van Winkel
argues that from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s conceptual photography deployed
these qualities of photography—of being both clearly a human centred representational
medium and an objective recording device—as ‘an unthinking and, and in a sense
“blind” machine that is able to produce some kind of picture under any
circumstances’.383 Photography, Van Winkel explains, understood as a specific medium,
was just incidental. The artist deployed it, not as the material of his or her expression,
but as a vehicle for the analysis and critique of the language systems, forms of
representation and discourses that were believed to constituted photography and
representation more broadly. Winkel notes that today this objective machine-like quality
continues to cement its role but, rather than as an autonomous aid in the critique of
representational forms and discourses, its objective qualities are now central to
photography’s role within contemporary art as the medium that most clearly addresses
the question of realism. That is, for Winkel, photography tackles the question of
381
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contemporary experience and its multiple modes of knowledge via an inherently
speculative approach that arbitrates between the poles of realism and anti-realism.
The contemporary status of conceptual photography as arbitrating between realism and
anti-realism is evident in photographic theorist and historian Tom Gunning’s essay
What’s the Point of an Index? Or Faking Photographs.384 Gunning argues that the common
critique of photographic realism, upon the basis that there has been (with the advent of
digital photography), a loss of indexicality misses the point regarding the nature of
photography’s encounter with experience:
I am positing a phenomenological fascination with photography that involves
a continuing sense of the relation between the photograph and a pre-existing
reality. While this is precisely what ‘indexicality’ supposedly involves, I am less
and less sure this semiotic term provides the proper term for the
experience.385

The argument for the loss of the analogical character of photography fails, Gunning
argues, because the analogical relationship between the image and its object remains no
matter whether there is any supposed loss of indexicality. He explains that to argue
otherwise is to misconstrue the history and nature of photography and the nature of
evidential standards. Gunning suggests that the claims of occult and spirit photography
paradoxically represent an example of the analogical claims of photography and the type
of realism it is capable of. Their claims, Gunning says, have an ‘irrational appeal’ that
can be explained in part by their wild speculation, their willingness to make realist
claims in the first place; but the real cause of their fascination, Gunning continues, does
not lie in their success or failure of this attempt, but in how their very fakery marks an
escape from the criteria of photographic representation as being properly subject solely
to a human epistemological test.386 Occult and spirit photography, Gunning explains, is
a mode of photography:
that seem[s] designed to flout the truth or even the accuracy claim associated
with photography. While I would not deny that forms of photography can
exist in which this flouting triumphs to such a degree that any referential role
seems to vanish, I think that in most instances such photographs actually
strive to present a contradiction, an oxymoron, an impossible presence,
invoking photographic accuracy or truth even while contradicting it. 387
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To develop this point Gunning cites Andre Bazin’s argument that the photographic
truth to nature possessed by photography has implications for how realism is
understood. Bazin agued:
Originality in photography […] lies in the essential objective character of
photography. For the first time, between the originating object and its
reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a non-living agent.
For the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the
creative intervention of man.388

The inscription or representation of an object via the agency of light upon some form
of substrate, lends the photographic image a degree of objective truth. This truth
attested not only to how things appeared but also to their realism; that is, their existence
apart from any human knowledge of them. Such claims have been widely critiqued, but,
for Gunning, Bazin was not referring to the indexicality of photography as a code or
cipher for a pre-existing reality. This, Gunning continues, misconstrues the implications
of Bazin’s argument:
For Bazin, the photograph is not a sign of something, but a presence of
something, or perhaps we could say a means for putting us into the presence
of something, since clearly Bazin realizes that a photograph differs from its
subject. […] is the indexical relation to a referent enough to truly explain what
Bazin describes as photography’s ;irrational power to bear away our faith’? 389

Realism is thus not reflected in the representational characteristic of photography, its
indexicality, but in its speculative encounter with the real as presence:
An indexical relation falls entirely into the rational realm. Likewise Barthes
describes the power of photography as ‘A magic, not an art’. When Barthes
describes a photograph as an emanation of a past reality rather than a copy of
something, he underscores the way a photograph relates to a single individual
object and a unique moment in the existence of that object. 390

The analogical significance of photographs remains, whether digital or analogical.
Analogy remains at the centre of the photograph as a form of speculative encounter
with the presence of things. In Gunning’s words:
Thus photographs are more than just pictures. Or rather, they are pictures of a
special sort, ones whose visual accuracy invites us to a different sort of
observation. The photograph does make us imagine something else,
something behind it, before it, somewhere in relation to it. Barthes indicates
this, I believe, by his claim that the photograph and its referent “adhere”. And
yet even Barthes, the semiotician, differentiates this adherence of the
photograph from its referent from the way other signs refer. Photography,
Barthes first told us in an early essay, was an image without a code, thus
outside of ordinary semiotics. He later told us, reaffirming his earlier position,
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that photography was not a copy of reality but rather its emanation. In his
self-described ‘realist’ position, Barthes shares Bazin’s belief that a photograph
puts us in the presence of something, that it possesses an ontology rather than
a semiotics.391

But what does analogy involve, and how could it be applied in this situation? According
to Barbara Maria Stafford, analogy is a universalising mode of thought, ‘a reciprocal
relation between two proportions’392 that links the otherwise disparate and unrelated.393
It is often engendered by an encounter with the previously un-encountered. It has a
world-forming role that, Stafford believes,
goes back to Greek mathematics, where it referred to proportion or due ratio
among numbers in a set. This rational sense was extended by Aristotle,
amongst others, to embrace non-mathematical relations in areas like justice,
virtue, poetics. By means of a disciplined inferential logic, one might establish
measurable connections between incongruent phenomena through a stepped
system of predication. The essence of the Parmenidean One, for example,
could be hypothesised by abstracting from the excellences of the many that
descended from it as first course and could then be reattributed, in purified
numerical form, to their superior source.394

Analogy is a form of logic that navigates ‘random and multiple pathways [by
making possible] associative links’.395 The relational encounter amongst members
of a potential set, which describes any collection of things with self-same similarity,
is discerned by a form of inferential connections that draws out or identifies those
features that mark something as belonging to a specific set. It is a mode of rational
extension and connection, a way of thinking that relies on the recognition of
similarities. It is, Stafford continues, a fundamentally visual logic that may form the
basis for propositional logic, but cannot be tested by this same logic. For this
reason, drawing visual analogies has long been derided as unscientific, yet, she
argues, it has played a key role in both art and science. By facilitating connections
between otherwise seemingly disparate phenomena, analogy is able to situate
vision, movement, objects and bodies into new relationships because of its
recognition of their interconnections. From this perspective, the photographic
apparatus, in its blind mechanical recording of information, can not be understood
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as a view from outside but as being interwoven with the environment that enables
it to exist in the first place, as Gunning claims:
It is photography’s resistance to significance, its excessive “noise” which
characterizes its realism, as well as its sense of uniqueness and contingency,
values especially prized in Barthes’ account of photography and essential, I
would claim, to our fascination with photographs as a different sort of
picture.396

Gunning concludes: ‘The description of a photograph as putting us into the presence of
something (and for Barthes especially, the presenting of a past time and place) needs to
be explored outside the concept of the index’.397 But what kind of strategy would
provide a developmental framework for inter-object encounters to engender speculative
yet realist photographic images? The next section draws upon Bogost’s expanded
understanding of Harman’s account of onto-graphy, which he terms ‘practical
ontography’, to investigate these dimensions of photography and their possible
significance for photographic practice.

(ii) A ‘Practical Onto-graphy’
Harman’s object-oriented ontology places the object, broadly conceived, at the centre of
ontological speculation. In order to do this, Harman broadens Kant’s question of how
human cognition constitutes the non-human, to ask how objects, including humans,
interact and yet remain discrete entities? Harman termed this approach to analysis
ontography.398 Harman describes the meaning that this term holds for him in the
following way: ‘“Ontography” would deal with the limited number of interactions that
can occur between objects’.399 Bogost understands Harman’s ontography as involving a
descriptive and analytical process: ‘As Harman puts it in his application of the term,
ontography is ‘a name for the exercise of describing and classifying pairings of
objects’.400 Building on Harman’s employment of the term, Bogost seeks to broaden its
396
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application to include the experience of the interactions and encounters between
objects, not solely the analysis and description of these interactions and encounters. He
describes his method as an ‘alien phenomenology’—a phenomenology of the object via
an ontography practiced with the objects themselves—which he calls a ‘practical
ontography’. It’s not a phenomenology that seeks to solely characterize human
experience, but asks ‘what do objects experience? What’s their proper phenomenology?
In short, what’s it like to be a thing?401 It takes ‘seriously the idea that all objects recede
interminably into themselves, and human perception becomes just one amongst many
ways that object might relate. To put things at the centre of a new metaphysics also
requires us to admit that they do not exist just for us’.402
To develop how Bogost’s concept of an alien phenomenology would invoke the
presence of objects as irreducibly alien to a human phenomenology.403 and how could
be applied it would be useful the terms ‘unit’ and ‘unit operation’ that Bogost adopts
rather than Harman’s ‘object’. Bogost explains: ‘I have absconded with ‘unit operation’
from chemical engineering, which refers to the steps in a process (extraction,
homegenization, distillation, refrigeration, etc)’.404 Units form systems of interrelated but
separate components. These units do things, their ‘unit operations’, but units are not
reducible to these operations. They account for one another via a fractal relationship in
which self-similarity engenders wonder and speculative engagement, but they never
become another object:
The point is this: things are not merely what they do, but things do indeed do
things […] A unit is never an atom, but a set, a grouping of other units that act
together as a system; the unit operation is always fractal. These things wonder
about one another without getting confirmation. This is the heart of the unit
operation: it names a phenomenon of accounting for an object It is a process,
a logic, an algorithm if you want, by which a unit attempts to make sense of
another.405

Bogost refers to Alfred North Whitehead’s account of prehension to help explain what
he means here. Prehension is the technical term Whitehead employs to describe the
affective relations between what he calls actual occasions, which is Whitehead’s term for
embodied moments of existence. Each society of actual occasions—be it a hydrogen
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atom, sunflower, or chimpanzee—prehends (which means to lay hold, seize, and
transform) sets of variables from its surrounding reality. The surrounding landscape of
activity, then, is not other than the actual occasion but becomes a constitutive feature of
that actual occasion itself. In this way, the prehended landscape is not itself separate
from the actual occasion doing the prehending—the occasion and the prehension are
unified in what Whitehead calls a ‘concrescence’.406 The process of prehension can help
explain how different objects or, in Whitehead’s terms, actual occasions, interact and
experience each other. Whitehead draws a distinction between positive ‘pre-hensions’
that are actively within the awareness of a specific entity and negative prehensions that
are those modes of awareness unavailable to a particular entity or that are blocked by a
particular set of circumstances. Adam Robbert explains this in the following way:
Take the interactions between the sun, a plant, and a human for example. The
relationship between plants and the sun is different from the relationship
between humans and the sun. For both plants and humans, the sun is a factor,
or datum, in experience. However, plants can translate sunlight directly into
energy for photosynthesis, humans cannot. The plant prehends sunlight in a
different way than humans do, even as both are interacting with the same sun.
In both cases there are more ways to prehend sunlight than what is available
to either plants or humans; and in this sense there is always more sun than
what is prehended by any one particular entity. There are thus negative and
positive prehension occurring insofar as humans are unable to participate with
the sun in ways that plants can, and vice versa; humans are unable to
photosynthesize solar energy, but might, for example, be able to relate to the
sun as a psychological symbol of clarity or insight in a way not possible for
plants. Prehension is a complex and interdependent process; a consequence of
what Whitehead calls ‘the ontological principle’. 407

Prehension in this context describes the encounter between units and within units in
such a way that similarities and dissimilarities are accounted for. Consequently,
speculative interaction within and between units involves the formation of algorithmic
structures due to the affinity (or lack of) between units and unit operations. Forms of
speculation are fundamental here, yet, as Bogost argues, how speculation is commonly
understood within philosophy and beyond is restricted to questions of human
epistemological verification:
What is the meaning of Speculation? And how does it apply in practice? In
philosophy, ‘speculation’ has a particular meaning that must be overcome.
Traditionally, speculative philosophy names metaphysical claims that cannot
be verified through experience or through science. It is here that the looseygoosey abstractions of scruffy-bearded, sandal-wearing philosophy takes root,
406
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in questions like what is being? What is thought? Speculative philosophy is
sometimes contrasted with critical philosophy, which involves the testing and
verification of theories.408

What is needed is an understanding of speculation as fundamental to thought and as
implicated in experience. Whitehead’s concept of prehension, very briefly described
above, captures the speculative encounter not only between humans but also between
objects. From this perspective, Bogost cites Alphonso Lingis’ account of how an
imperative operates at different levels to help fill out the phenomenology of the unit
and unit operations:
[T]hings constantly machinate within themselves and mesh with one another,

acting and reacting to properties and states while still keeping something
secret. Alphonso Lingis calls these behaviours the imperatives that structure
the perception of things.409

Nevertheless, the encounter between units cannot be a window looking out to an
outside, it is necessarily like all objects: to use Whitehead’s term, a concrescence of
perspectives. Bogost describes it as more akin to a mirror, but not a clear modern one:
rather one that bends light, and offers a distorted image, an image that is necessarily
compounded by the object that does the looking as well as the situation or environment
within which the looking occurs:
A speculum is a mirror, but not in the modern sense of the term as a device
that reflects back the world as it really is, unimpeded and undistorted […] A
mirror was an imprecise device, usually a convex disc of polished metal that
reflected enough light to give a viewer a rough sense of the figure placed in
front of it.410

Bogost is in part arguing for the validity of the contention that representational realism
can have consequences for, intersect with, and even produce an ontological realism.
While representation is entirely within a correlationist framework, it is a view from a
specific human perspective using technologies that enact or give form to that
perspective, yet the photographic image is also automatic, autonomous in the way that it
records what is in front of the lens:
On the one hand, it offers a view of the world that is representational as ‘a
way of looking’, thanks to the photographer’s framing and choice of exposure.
On the other hand, it offers an automatically encyclopedic rendition of a
scene, thanks to the photographic apparatus’s ability to record actuality. 411
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This superfluity of detail, for Bogost, this amassing of information, signals the
photograph’s ontographic capacity. Its analogous relationship with the list exemplifies
the inter-objectivity of things because it partially escapes the view from a particular
place - it presents the abundance of things, of objects, before they have been placed
into some kind of order according to the relations between one object, here the
anthropomorphic viewpoint, and the multiplicity of units and their inter-objectivity. In
this way unordered lists can exemplify the life of things:
Let’s adopt ontography as a name for a general inscriptive strategy, one that
uncovers the repleteness of units and their inter-objectivity. From the
perspective of metaphysics, ontography involves the revelation of object
relationship without necessarily offering clarification or description of any
kind. Like a medieval bestiary, ontography can take the form of a
compendium, a record of things juxtaposed to demonstrate their overlap and
imply interaction through collocation. The simplest approach to such
recording is the list, a group of items loosely joined not by logic or power or
use but the gentle knot of the comma. Ontography is an aesthetic set theory,
in which a particular configuration is celebrated merely on the basis of its
existence.412

An alien phenomenology is glimpsed in the onto-graphic list because it is a compilation
of these phenomenologies: ‘An ontograph is a landfill, not a Japanese garden. It shows
how much rather than how little exists simultaneously, suspended in the dense
meanwhile of being’.413 A realism of the multitude is created in which representational
realism conjures up the ontological realism of units, not by showing how they really are
in themselves, as this is impossible, but the multitude of being:
Ontography is the practice of increasing the number and density, one that
sometimes opposes the minimalism of contemporary art. Instead of removing
elements to achieve the elegance of simplicity, ontography adds (or simply
leaves) elements to accomplish the realism of multitude. It is a practice of
exploding the innards of things - be they words, intersections, shopping malls,
or creatures. This ‘explosion’ can be as figurative or as literal as you like, but it
must above all reveal the hidden density of a unit. 414

Bogost describes two modes of ontographic practice: metamorphism and carpentry.
Together, these can demonstrate the plenitude of objects, and the multiplicity of their
interactions. Metamorphism is the sideways allusion to the being of objects. It employs
a strategy of dismorphism, of not showing how things are but of alluding to how they
could be despite, in the language of Harman, their withdrawn quality. As discussed in
Chapter Three in the context of Walter Benjamin’s deployment of the Denkbild, the
412
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metaphor as an emblem creates a rebus, a puzzle for deciphering withdrawn qualities,
for solving hidden meanings. It requires and instigates careful observation and
attention. Nevertheless, it does this without the twin conceits that reality is either wholly
inaccessible (because of the anthropocentrism that objects conform to the mind of the
subject and are essentially products of human cognition) or accessible (because human
subjectivity has a unique access to things outside of its own enabling conditions). This
chapter concludes with a discussion of the short film, The Natural History Primer (Jo Law,
Redmond Bridgeman), and its exploration of contingency. The second part discusses a
project titled From Beyond. The intention of this project is to test the hypothesis that a
speculative yet realist photographic strategy can test the limits set by correlationism.

(iii) Conclusions
The Natural History Primer (Appendix 3)
Robin Mackay, in the Medium of Contingency, draws on Meillassoux’s account of
contingency and Reza Negarestani's concept of ‘anonymous materials’ to assert that
there needs to be a rethinking of the role of chance in creative endeavour.415 He argues
that when it is situated within a correlationist context, the role of chance is understood
as a form of human mastery over material, such as calculated happenstance. Tropes of
artistic production including openness, raw materials, process and situation, are
celebrated as producing an aesthetic affect. Mackay calls for a dissolution of these
meaning-making practices via forms of complicity with ‘anonymous materials’ that cede
to contingency its rightful role as the pivotal medium in art works. Mackay cites
Negarestani’s philosophical novel Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials as
exemplary. In this novel, as Negarestani explains, the plot twist becomes a wholly
contingent event that drives the narrative:
The so-called plot twist seizes the reflective space of narration or simply turns
the ‘knowing’ of the narration into the narrative object of contingencies and,
therefore, subjects the narration to an inquisitive speculation from the
perspective of complicity between objective resources, which in radically
contingent ways play their influence over the narrative causality. What used to
be ‘knowing’ is now, all of a sudden, revealed to be a literary gimmick
facilitating a plummet into what was always already there but could not be
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reflected upon—a short-lived resolution (dénouement) degenerating into a cosmic
conspiracy at the speed of a trashy airport thriller.416

Causative direction propelled by authorial authority does not determine narrative
causality. Rather, narrative possibilities possess hidden causative powers unrelated to
their human conception:
narrative viewpoints harbour a twist that might creep on them at any moment
for no reason whatsoever, confiscating their narration on behalf of a chasmic
reality that can be narratively fabricated by the complicity of cosmic
viewpoints—a narration accreted by the perspective of anonymous (cosmic)
materials.417

For Mackay, making oneself ‘a good meal’ for these anonymous materials means
embracing a concept of the non-calculable uncaused event.
in parallel with the theoretical clarification of the meaning of contingency, this
‘practice’ must dissolve certain clichés that have crystallized around the artistic
engagement with contingency. We always risk relapsing onto models that fail
before contingency: models that return us to the metaphysics of chance and
calculation, or which affirm the privilege of meaning making over material
contingency. Negarestani; whose book Cyclonopedia is subtitled ‘complicity
with anonymous materials, asks what sorts of rigorous conceptual preparation
is necessary in order to make ones work—or oneself, a good meal for these
anonymous materials.418

The question is not how to present a true representation of something so as to generate
meaning, or demonstrate sensitivity to material. Rather, it is how to allow contingency a
role - or should that be not allowing - but asking what role does the dynamic,
ambivalence, and contingency of materiality play in the work’s ‘life.’ In this way the plot
twists can be understood as realist interventions driven by the speculative encounter
between Harman’s object, Bogost’s units, or Whitehead’s actual occasions.
Negarestani’s explanation of the twist as a contingent, speculative and realist
intervention in narrative causation suggests this:
the twist as the force of the realist speculation (realist in the sense that it is
asymptotic to the contingent reality that drives the universe) approximates the
function of the philosophy of Speculative Realism in which speculation is not
driven by our grounded experience or reflection but by the exteriority and
contingency of a universe that always antedates and postdates us (that which
thinks us from the other side).419
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But how can these accounts of material agency coupled to contingency intersect with
creative endeavour in practice? That is, how can complicity with them help engender
Bogost’s practical ontography? How could they help organise or structure objects or
units so that narrative meaning is not simply imposed? The question of structure and
allowing materiality its own agency arises in natural history films. These, for example
David Attenborough’s, are commonly given narrative order by a (if in the case of
Attenborough, a mild mannered) God-like authorial voice.420 What happens if this
narrative device is rejected and something akin to Negarestani’s proscriptions is
attempted?
This is the type of question The Natural History Primer, a disparate collection of footage,
assembled over a number of years and shot using various media, including Super 8,
16mm and digital video, asked. Towards this aim Hollis Frampton’s film work, Zorns
Lemma (1970), and its use of algorithms was instructive. 421 The footage that comprises
The Natural History Primer was filmed in the Waychinicup National Park located in the
Great Southern region of Western Australia. It consists of a series of short scenes
depicting many of the creatures that inhabit this part of the world without naming them
or providing any contextual narrative or dramatic structure. The Natural History Primer
arose from a project that researched algorithms as conceptual models, experimentations,
and strategies in developing innovative screen works. “Using both natural algorithms
(e.g. DNA, fractal geometry) and artificial algorithms (e.g. programmable languages)” to
act as construction agents, we investigated how pre-ordered ‘sets’ can be strategically
used to generate meaningful patterns. By patterns we do not mean visual similarity but
coherent forms that make visible the otherwise invisible relationships and formations
ranging across the human—the tele-visual, political, social, cultural, and the nonhuman—things, natural systems, the Great Andromeda Nebula, and the model
organism Aplysia californica.
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In their most basic terms, algorithms are procedures or sets of instructions - a recipe of
sorts where the principal ingredients may be numbers or data. Numbers and data are
objects that can be organised or grouped into sets by a common thread (e.g.
characteristics like prime, or multiples of a numeral). An algorithm can also generate
sets. The best-known manifestations are the Julia Set (produced by using the simple
equation of z = z2 + c) and the Mandelbrot Set (mapping of the Julia Set). ‘Algorithms
means the rules of performing complex calculation by a sequence of simpler ones’, and
iterations are a necessary part of algorithms.422 Our interest lies in how algorithms can
be utilised to manipulate data or building blocks (such as audiovisual images) to
construct new configurations of aural and visual language. Pattern creation (and
recognition) is one of the central functions algorithms perform. Their transformative
ability—taking one level of abstracted information and translating it into another—
enables them to play a key role in the mediation and interaction between different
types of information. The use of algorithmic generative techniques developed into a
distinct genre in electronic art. One of the most influential early works was Karl Sims’
Galapagos (1997), inspired by Richard Dawkins’ Biomorph Breeder experiment, which uses
a particular understanding of evolutionary theory to produce self-replicating images
that evolve according to human aesthetic selection. But this particular Galapagos is
primarily a human thing; the ‘phenotypes’ produced owe their form to Dawkins’
concept of ultra-Darwinism mediated by human aesthetic choices.423
Some important distinctions to Sims’ rule-driven work, and our aims in The Natural
History Primer, can best be described with reference to Canadian filmmaker Hollis
Frampton’s film Zorns Lemma. This film borrowed its title from Max Zorns Lemma, a
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specific type of set.424 A Lemma is a proposition that is assumed to be true in order to
test the validity of another proposition. The first section of the film consists of a dark
screen and a reading from an eighteenth-century Massachusetts elementary school
lesson book titled The Bay State Primer. The second part of the film lists objects,
primarily via New York street signs, to axiomatically create sets and subsets of words
and images determined by a system of substitution and progressions ordered by the
twenty-six letter alphabet of the English language used in the primer. In the third
section of the film a chorus of six voices in turn read from neo-Platonist Robert
Grosseteste in On Light, or the Ingression of Forms. Each word is read in time to a
metronome to methodically spell out Grosseteste argument that light is the infinite
form that gives form to all matter. While this recitation is occurring a couple,
accompanied by a cantering dog, slowly walk into the distance across a snow-covered
field. This static shot lasts as long as they take to vanish into the snowfield, leaving the
viewer with the almost entirely white cinematic screen.
Frampton employs Zorn’s Lemma and Grosseteste’s philosophy as axiomatic
structures to explore how within a subset of two open systems, language and the
infinite frames of film, creative order is possible. By harnessing set theory’s potential to
structure abstract representation of perceptions intersecting planes in infinite
combinations, Frampton hoped to bring narrative and non-narrative montage structure
into new configurations using image, sound and text as primary materials. For
Frampton, Zorn’s Lemma acted as a procedural guide, a way of testing a proposition
that would open up new conceptual possibilities. His intention was not to use a preexisting set to programmatically organise data. If he did so, his film would be
illustrative in the way that Sims’ work arguably simply models a human-centred notion
of geno-centrism.
Frampton’s engagement with set theory was part of a broader strategy that explores
how a materially focused practice (here structural film) can engender the emergence of
new and infinitely creative works by allowing the material itself its own contingency in
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contrast to human-centred calculation or choice.425 Thus, his investigation of visual and
auditory patterns is not simply a combination of choices picked from sets of preexisting data, but is genuinely novel.426 His aim was to allow another pattern that
established a new type of filmic structure distinct from Eisenstein’s theory of montage,
whether consciously or not a dominant procedural guide to filmic structure, with its
emphasis on the principle of juxtaposition as reflective of a pre-given set of truths,
whether of dialectical materialism or the superiority of Mazda cars.427 Brian Massumi’s
point regarding the importance of both allowing things to be themselves and an
aesthetic of awareness of their potential by paying attention to the non-reducibility of
situations is apt here:
Experiencing [the] potential for change, experiencing the eventfulness and
uniqueness of every situation, even the most conventional ones, that’s not
necessarily about commanding movement – it’s about navigating movement.
It’s about being immersed in an experience that is already underway [...] It’s
more like surfing the situation, or tweaking it, than commanding or
programming it.428

We see this ‘not programming’ as crucial. This ‘not commanding’ can be taken as a
‘not scripting’, a ‘not storyboarding’, approach to practice. It is an open-ended ‘make it
up as it goes along’ approach that allows an immersion in the situation at hand, with its
specific needs, thus allowing new things to happen. Such an approach is founded more
on a principle of re-activity, in the sense of active engagement with particular
encounters, than a concern with manufacturing a stimulus/response inter-activity
between audience and artwork. The Natural History Primer can be thought of as this kind
of response, a type of primer that generates a list of things as a reaction to the more
than human nature of one of the most biologically diverse places on the planet.
From Beyond (Appendix 4)
Each day an uncountable number of images are produced. Recorded, snapped,
uploaded, downloaded, deleted, printed, glanced at, shared, hoarded or forgotten, this
425
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almost infinite multiplication of images forms a global photosphere.429 But what is the
relation between this photosphere and the planet below? In The Dust of This Planet,430
Eugene Thacker understands correlationism as the latest formulation of the question of
the relationship between the human and the planet, which he describes as ‘simply that
which remains “after” the human’.431 Thacker describes a tripartite situation between:
(1) the-world-for-us432 which is ‘the world that we, as human beings, interpret and give
meaning to, the world that we relate to or feel alienated from, the world that we are at
once a part of and that is also separate from the human’;433 (2) the world-without-us, which
‘may co-exist with the world-for-us, indeed the human being is defined by its impressive
capacity for not recognizing this distinction’;434 (3) and finally the planet, which can be
thought of as the non-human world, ‘this is the world in some inaccessible, already given
state’435 […] the world-without-us is the subtraction of the human from the world.’436 The
first two of these modes can be understood in the following way: (1) World (as it is forus) connotes the experience of being-in-the-world as a certain kind of being, while (2)
Earth (the world in-itself) represents the cumulative view of the physical and life
sciences. Both World and Earth are different renderings of sensual objects in Harman’s
language. (3)The third mode of the ‘Planet’ (the world without us, beyond all access)
can be understood as corresponding to the world beyond all access, or Harman’s real,
yet withdrawn, objects.
The genres of supernatural horror and science fiction provide a guide to thinking about
the planet, the world-without-us, Thacker explains:437
In a sense, the world-without-us is not to be found in a ‘great beyond’ that is
the exterior to the World (the world-for-us) or the Earth (the world-in-itself);
rather, it is in the very lapses, or lacunae in the World and the Earth. The
Planet (the world-without-us) is, in the words of darkness mysticism, the ‘dark
intelligible abyss’ that is paradoxically manifest as the World and the Earth. 438
429
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For Thacker, horror or weird fiction such as H. P Lovecraft’s short story From Beyond.,
exemplifies the human encounter with fear, but not of multi-pedal bug eyed monsters,
but of the unknown, wholly alien, (Bogost’s alien unit?), the world-without-us, and the
planet below:
I would propose that horror be understood not as dealing with human fear in
a human world (the world for us), but that horror be understood as being
about the limits of the human as it confronts a world that is not just a World,
and not just the Earth, but also a Planet (the world-with-out-us.)439

The unnamed narrator of From Beyond recounts the experiments of one Crawford
Tillinghast, who created a technical apparatus—a ‘detestable electrical machine, glowing
with a sickly, sinister violet luminosity’.440 The function of this machine is to stimulate
the pineal gland which Tillinghast has discovered is capable of ‘transmit[ting] visual
pictures to the brain […] from beyond’.441 In this short story, Thacker claims, the magic
circle is no longer simply a gateway to the supernatural, but has now become a
technological means capable of dissolving the boundaries of space and time. It would
liberate the limitations imposed by, as Tillinghast’s laments, our ‘five feeble senses’ that
ensure we ‘see things only as we are constructed to see them and can gain no idea of
their absolute nature’.442 The boundaries between mind and matter would be broken
down via a super-sensibility akin to the omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence
of a God, enabling humans to ‘overleap time, space, and dimensions, and without
bodily motion peer to the bottom of creation’.443

Thacker emphasised how Lovecraft’s fiction stages horror as essentially an encounter
with the unknown world with-out-us inaccessible to human thought - a hidden realm.
Parallel to Thacker’s emphasis, is Harman own discussion of Lovecraft and the occult.
Harman’s account will now be discussed for its ability to further clarify some of the
implications such gaps hold. In Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy,444 Harman
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describes Lovecraft as a writer of ‘gaps and horror’.445 For Harman, Lovecraft’s fictive
world generates gaps that perplex cause and effect to produce a bafflement of the
common sense relationship between things. Objects take on a monstrous life that
confounds ‘the power of language to describe them […] and the qualities they
possess’.446 Lovecraft renders reality weird, it becomes alien to human life, things are
experienced as ‘anything but bundles of qualities’.447 Harman is thinking here of David
Hume and his critique of causation. For Hume, the only bases for the apprehension of
causal relationships between events are perceived qualities that, via a process of habitual
association, lead to inductive inferences of cause and effect. This human-centred world,
Harman recounts, is very different from Lovecraft’s dissection of the geometry of
existence: ‘While for Hume objects are a simple amassing of familiar qualities, Lovecraft
resembles Braque or Picasso slicing an object into vast cross-sections of qualities,
planes, or adumbrations, which even when added up do not exhaust the reality of the
object they compose’.448 Lovecraft’s worlds exist at the intersection of these planes.
They can be understood as the multifaceted concretions of Thacker’s, the world-for-us,
the non-human-world, and the world-without-us. It is within this geometry that Lovecraft’s
cosmologies are generated. Horror is engendered when humans encounter, often only
by inexplicable chance, an entire world-without-us, the planet, that barely notes their
existence. When such an encounter takes place it is indescribably alien, even
unrepresentable. The narrator in the The Dunwich Horror declares:
It would be trite and not wholly accurate to say that no human pen could
describe [the dead creature on the floor], but one may properly say that it
could not be vividly visualized by anyone whose ideas of aspect and contour
are too closely bound up with the life forms of this planet and of the three
known dimensions.449

It is for his evocation of the gaps between the thing and its description, between
perception and what is perceived, and between objects themselves that Harman finds
Lovecraft’s writing compelling: a form of realism, but of weird realism - particularly
from an anthropocentric perspective. As discussed in the Overview, for Harman the
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innate withdrawal of objects from other object engenders a weird reality. This reality is
external to empirical sense datum, which is the human encounter with its sensuous
surface. Objects withdraw from each other absolutely but this means that the question
of the encounter with reality becomes a question of speculative interaction between
objects to produce a weird reality. As Harman explains:
My thesis is that objects and weirdness go hand in hand. An object partly
evades all announcements through its qualities, resisting or subverting efforts
to identify it with any surface. It is that which exceeds any of the qualities,
accidents, or relations that can be ascribed to it: an ‘I know not what’, but in a
positive sense. Against frequent efforts to dismiss objects as fantasies
assembled by humans from a pre-given surface of experienced contents, I
contend that reality is object-oriented. Reality is made up of nothing but
substances—and they are weird substances with a taste of the uncanny about
them, rather than stiff blocks of simplistic physical matter. Contact with reality
begins when we cease to reduce a thing to its properties or to its effect on
other things. The difference between objects and their peripheral features
(qualities, accidents, relations) is absolute. 450

Harman’s account of weird realism broadens our understanding of what realism may
entail.451 It would be a realism of a speculative encounter between objects and their life
that would not claim to show absolutely how things really are but would argue for the
validity of speculation regarding how they might be. It would be a weird realism that
invokes the presence of objects apart from, or anterior to, human knowledge of them.
One name for this could be a preternatural realism. Celina Jeffery explains the
difference between preternatural, supernatural and natural:
Preternatural or Praeter naturam came to denote that which is ‘beyond nature’
and its ontology has been dependent on two sister concepts: the supernatural,
or Supra naturam, signifying that which ‘above nature’, and nature, or natura,
which is defined by the habitual patterns of the world. 452

The preternatural operates between the two realms of the natural and supernatural. It
aligns with the second of Thacker’s modes - the world-without-us. A speculative yet realist
photography could adopt a parallel strategy. It would, in a similar way to Bogost’s
strategy of practical ontography, act as a correlate of ontological speculation with the
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aim of creating a realist and speculative photography.453 Like evidential photography,
which sought to record visual evidence of some event or object, it would harness the
‘blind sight’ offered by the camera, but its aim would be to instigate an encounter with
the shadowy presence of objects stripped of their correlationist context.
The subtitle of Bogost’s book, What it’s like to be a thing? Intentionally echoes a wellknown thought experiment proposed by Thomas Nagel in his essay What’s It like to be a
bat?454 Referring to this essay, Levi R. Bryant argues for realist wildness ontology:
The dominant paradigm of critical theory tends to reduce the world to an
alienated image of ourselves in a mirror wherein we do not recognize
ourselves. The task thus becomes to show that what seems to issue from the
mirror in fact issues from us. The world thus becomes our own text. [But] If
we are to think climate change, if we are to think technology, the paradigm of
the world as screen is not enough […] The analytical philosopher Thomas
Nagel infamously asked ‘what is it like to be a bat?’ […] Beyond human
conceptual content and meaning, there is an entire other world of rocks,
quarks, wolves, buildings, cities, technologies and aardvarks […] Wildness
ontology is an invitation to explore the world of alterity, to adopt the point of
view of these other entities.455

For Bryant, being able to productively explore this wildness means recognising the
validity of a democracy of objects and to inhabit the wildness of things as an equal.
Between these objects the preternatural operates as the mode of aesthetic interaction.456
In one of its modes it would characteristically be neither a science nor an art, but entail
a sensible encounter with objects that is akin to science and art and their ability to evoke
a ‘things haecceity’:
Neither science nor art, but also science and art, it is the preternatural that
exposes us to the alterity of things. As art, the preternatural is that special
form of sensibility, that aiesthesis, that allows us to discern the thinglyness of
things, their being-for-themselves, rather than their being as sign, omen,
meaning, or use for humans.457

Inhabiting this dimension involves paying attention to the meaning that an object holds
not just for us but also for itself. This kind of attention emerges most clearly when we
pay attention to the experience of the encounter with other entities. One of the forms
453
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of attention is a process of depiction that, paradoxically, rather than revealing a selfreflection, often unveils the ‘decontexualised’ thing:
The meaning of the object for us begins to drop away in the activity of
drawing and painting and the thing appears like a phantom in all its alienness.
Similarly, in the activity of drawing, painting, and photography, the context of
the thing is bracketed, subtracted, and the thing makes its appearance in a
decontextualized way.458

But could attention-paying work in this way? If it is to be successfully carried out,
depiction demands that attention is paid to the object itself. The more down to earth
arena of perceptual science may hold part of the answer. Alva Noë’s research into visual
perception suggests some of the reasons why this might be important for any sentient
object that exists within the wildness of things. Owing much to James Gibson’s
ecological theories of visual perception, briefly discussed in Chapter Two, Noë’s
research is relevant here for the way it facilitates a rethinking of the relationship
between experience, vision, and the visual depiction of experience. Noë, in Action In
Perception, explains that picture making—he includes photography and drawing in this—
is a particularly sophisticated method of negotiating visual experience. It is not, nor
could it be, he is at pains to point out, simply expressive (he means reflective) of
experience. To be so would entail stepping out of an event as it occurs. Rather, it
involves something more like a construal of experience after the event. Noë explains,
‘experience itself is transparent. There’s no experiencing it. There’s only encountering
the world—content—as you experience it. [The task ] is rather to catch experience in
the act of making the world available’.459 Here Noë appears to be referring to Gibson’s
concept of affordances, whereby the world is available for perception not because it is
simply there to be observed but because the environment affords the basis for any form
of perception to occur in the first place.460 It relates to experience as an encounter with
a situation that affords a construal of that experience after the event. The encounter
between the eye and the environment it inhabits allows perception to be structured.
Because it is ecologically embedded within the encounter, as an event between two or
more objects, perception structures experience. Picture making is particularly adept at
this task. While it is often thought of as representational, which is understood as a type
458
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of mimetic or reflective process, Noë believes it is more correct to think of it as
constructive activity, an activity nested within an ecological framework in which the
parts dynamically interact via feedback, not by matching representations to objects in
some internal filing system, but by constructing images from the parts afforded by an
environment of which the seeing organism is an integral dynamic part, and within which
it co-evolved. Experience is given form via its conceptual picturing so that, in the words
of Noë, picturing is ‘like experience itself […] an activity of reflection on what you see
and what you have to do to see’.461
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5: Conclusion
Tillinghast had once been the prey of failure, solitary and melancholy; but now
I knew, with nauseating fears of my own, that he was the prey of success. I
had indeed warned him ten weeks before, when he burst forth with his tale of
what he felt himself about to discover. He had been flushed and excited then,
talking in a high and unnatural, though always pedantic, voice. “What do we
know,” he had said, “of the world and the universe about us? Our means of
receiving impressions are absurdly few, and our notions of surrounding
objects infinitely narrow. We see things only as we are constructed to see
them, and can gain no idea of their absolute nature.462
H.P. Lovecraft
From Beyond (1934)

Tillinghast’s encounter with an absolute in From Beyond was somewhat different from
my own encounter. To use H. P Lovecraft’s attenuated diction, this event occurred on a
foetid winter’s day an eon ago on which, as a somewhat eldritch student, I came across
a page in a dusty journal with a simple black line running around its borders, captioned
in Gothic script: The Absolute. The page was empty, devoid of any image whatsoever.
The journal was titled Mind: A Quarterly of Psychological and Philosophical Research.463 Its
dismissal of the concept of the absolute would have met with amused, yet restrained,
agreement amongst its sober subscribers. Its stated purpose, after all, is to research, in a
properly scholarly manner, using empirical and evidential methodologies, the nature of
consciousness. For Mind, the existence of any absolute, or not, is not a question that can
be answered in any sensible and verifiable way. Yet, nevertheless, the absolute can be
said to haunt Mind. Its inaccessibility, discussed in the Overview in relation to the
empiricists John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, was a founding principle
upon which journals such as Mind helped define their empiricism. The question of the
absolute, of bridging a gap between mind and matter, has also been a central concern in
this dissertation, but it has not been in search of an unspeakable, ineffable wholly other.
Rather, the absolute is understood in terms of its root meanings of being separate, apart
and disconnected from human contexts, and whether, despite this, it is knowable in
some way. From this perspective, this project asked how can we understand a self462
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sufficient art-object apart from relational or social contexts, and whether this can
broaden the conceptual horizons for photography and its relationship to realism. I will
now review where this speculative investigation has taken this dissertation and then
suggest further areas for research.
This dissertation examined Speculative Realist and object-oriented philosophies and
how they have focused attention on how objects are understood and experienced. Its
intention has been to examine the aesthetics of these encounters and investigate the
implications this has for creative endeavour. While it has addressed this question it has
not attempted to arbitrate between the poles of realism and anti-realism. The
implications of these philosophies for objects or entities that are complex structures or
systems made by humans have been a central importance, with photography taken as
the site of such a complex system. Drawing upon the writings of Quentin Meillassoux,
Graham Harman, Ian Bogost, and Timothy Morton, amongst others, it argued that the
photographic image can act as a speculative medium that, via metaphor and allusion,
bypasses what Meillassoux describes as correlationism. A recurrent theme of this
discussion is how photography paradoxically encapsulates both an anti-realist
epistemology (that defines the limits and extent of human knowledge) and a realist
ontology in which knowledge of reality is thought possible independently of our
conceptual and perceptual frameworks.
These perspectives inform a retrospective analysis of three projects in the first three
chapters of this dissertation. First, The Object versus Post Object Question in the Australian Art
World during the 1970s reconsiders previous research on a historical debate on the status
of the artwork as self-sufficient object or relational social process. This dissertation was
particularly interested in the imaging of nature. In this context the second chapter,
Something to be Seen, A Picture on a Screen, asked why is an anthrodecentric approach to the
photographic image desirable and what would it look like? The third chapter, Photo|
Vision: Photographing Place, asked how do correlationist perspectives inflect
representations of place? This is discussed in reference to Walter Benjamin’s expanded
concept of the Denkbild (thought-image) and in the context of the project Konvolut K (Jo
Law, Redmond Bridgeman). The fourth chapter, From Beyond (title from H.P Lovecraft’s
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short story of the same name), examined how these perspectives may inform future and
current creative endeavour.
The terrain covered in this dissertation will now be revisited in more detail:
In the Overview, I discussed how for Quentin Meillassoux the Kantian Copernican
revolution was only apparently a move from a human-centric model of knowledge. In
fact, he argues, the Ptolemaic view, in which the world and human perspective was the
centre of the cosmos, persisted but now the framework of knowledge was the necessity
that certain human epistemological conditions must be fulfilled to validate knowledge
claims. He described this framework as correlationism:
By correlationism, I thus understand, in a first approximation, every
philosophy that maintains the impossibility of acceding through thought to a
being independent of thought. We never, according to this type of philosophy,
have access to any intended thing (understood in the most general sense) that
is not always - already correlated to an act of thinking (understood, again in
the most general sense). Consequently, correlationism posits, against all
materialism, that thought cannot escape from itself so as to accede to a world
not yet affected by the modes of apprehension of our subjectivity.464

The central question then becomes one of the nature of the correlation between human
thought and knowledge of being outside of thought. Meillassoux claims this has had a
perverse result because it legitimised fideistic declarations as the only possible claims of
absolute knowledge of something. The Enlightenment attack on faith had, ironically, led
to the affirmation of faith as the only subjectively apprehended certainty, and an
emphasis upon intersubjectivity as the only level of certainty that science could aim for.
Meillassoux’s novelty is not to simply dismiss the arguments of correlationism but to
show how, if correlationism is to avoid the charge of being another justification for
fideism, it must rest upon an absolute - that something is known, separate from human
knowing:
My thesis (which may seem bizarrely classical) comes down to saying that
thought is capable of the ‘absolute’, capable even of producing something like
‘eternal truths’; and this despite the various destructions and deconstructions
that all traditional metaphysics have undergone over the last century and a
half.465
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In this way, Meillassoux’s aim is not to discard correlationism, which he argues would
be to simply step back into a pre-critical realism, but through clarifying the basis for
correlationist argument reassert the truth claims of a materialist speculative science—
‘materialism is a speculative thesis […] it affirms that one can think that which is
independent of all thought, of all subjectivity’.466 While Graham Harman’s objectoriented philosophy derives from a different philosophical background of Heideggarian
phenomenology, he has developed in fruitful dialogue with Meillassoux’s account of
correlationism. Yet Harman’s argument on the nature of correlationism and realism is
markedly different from Meillassoux’s. For Harman objects, by which he means all
entities, whether material or not, have equal ontological status, and are irreducible to
what can be know about them. The question of what humans can know about objects is
displaced by the question of how do objects interact? For Harman, the question of
realism thus takes on new dimensions. It is no longer a human epistemological question
of whether something exists and can be known apart from, or outside, the necessary
correlate between human thought and things. The question is rather what is the nature
of the interaction between objects?467
In the context of this question Timothy Morton’s expansion of the concept of ecology
and aesthetics is relevant to my thesis because of how he rethinks the relation between
objects or things. Morton formulates a model of ecological interaction in which all
entities, through being awarded equal ontological status, interact via a poetics of the
experiential event. There is no outside, only what he terms the mesh, in which ‘the
ecological thought’ itself becomes aware of its own embedded irreducible condition.
Thereby Morton is able to broaden the meaning of aesthetics by making it a central
causative principle of the interaction between objects. Rather than a principle of
sufficient reason being searched for, whether of a materialist or idealist origin, as the
root cause of things, causation becomes a multifaceted, multidirectional, interaction
between all entities. Morton’s description of the demonic dimension provides a clue of
what this may mean. He describes a broadened account of agency in the cosmos of
inter-objective space:
What would it mean not to eliminate the demonic dimension from causality? I
do not encounter patterns and relations that are resolved in my mind into
466
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paintings, mud and glasses. These things encounter me directly, as themselves.
But more precisely, every entity throws shadows of itself into the interobjective space, the sensual space that consists of relations between objects,
carving out its own version of Plato’s cave. 468

In Chapter One, we sought to ground this discussion and explore some of its
implication by considering the object versus post-object debate that occurred in
Australia during the 1970s as a case study of the fraught status of the art object. The
choice between the object and post-object was often seen as simply a choice between a
concept of the artwork as an abstract, disembodied, imperial Kantian form that was in
reality a means of social and political domination, and an analysis of the work that art
does and its social role. Thus, social authenticity, and hence legitimacy, was thought to
be the appropriate criterion of artistic judgement. Yet it soon became apparent that a
subjectivist set of criteria remained in place. The source of this subjectivism is then
outlined in relation to an understanding of authenticity as wholly defined within a
solecism of the individual’s internal judgement of taste - a seeming return to what was
widely believed to be Clement Greenberg’s position.
In the conclusion of this chapter we touched upon how a focus on a realism of
experience suggested by historian Bernard Smith acts as one possible arena for
reconsideration of these relations and the subjectivist position. As Morton notes,
‘Realism is often considered a rather dull affair, with all the panache and weirdness on
the antirealist side of the debate’.469 Morton presents a counter version of realism that
offers a non-human-centric account of relations and objects that does not fall into
subjectivism, an explanation that may enable a reconsideration of realism as a form of
causal encounter and exploration with a reconcieved aesthetics at its centrer. Magic is
understood as signalling a rejection, contra Meillassoux and Kant, of the principle of
non-contradiction, and endorsing an anything is possible approach as an emergent quality
of the actual (as the existing state of affairs). Morton explains his intention of his book
Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality in the following way:
Realist Magic is an exploration of causality from the point of view of objectoriented ontology. I argue that causality is wholly an aesthetic phenomenon.
Aesthetic events are not limited to interactions between humans or between
humans and painted canvases or between humans and sentences in dramas.
They happen when a saw bites into a fresh piece of plywood. They happen
468
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when a worm oozes out of some wet soil. They happen when a massive object
emits gravity waves. When you make or study art you are not exploring some
kind of candy on the surface of a machine. You are making or studying
causality. The aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension. 470

In order to explore these issues further a number of approaches to the imaging of
nature were discussed in the second chapter. These included Kinji Imanishi’s holistic
account of ecological interaction between living and non-living things and James J.
Gibson's model of ecological approach to visual perception. Alfred North Whitehead’s
analysis of what he termed the ‘bifurcation of nature’ is then described.471 Whitehead
seeks to rectify any anterior separation of percept and concept resulting in a bifurcation
of nature via his ‘ontological principle’.472 In the context of Whitehead’s analysis, I
sought to delineate some characteristics of an anthrodecentric approach to
photographic practice. Alphonso Lingis’ concept of levels of existence is then explored
as a possible example for how an anthrodecentric photography could be thought.
To investigate the question of an anthrodecentric photograph in the context of an
actual photographic project, in Chapter three, Project X (Redmond Bridgeman, Jo Law)
and its related endeavour Konvolut K is considered. These projects are situated in relation
to Walter Benjamin’s deployment of Denkbild as a speculative strategy for describing
contemporary experience. This chapter considers how Benjamin’s approach to objects
can be situated in relation to contemporary object-oriented approaches to creative
endeavour.473 From this perspective, it is argued that Benjamin’s speculative account of
objects offers a precursor account of the irreducibility of meaning that objects hold,
which, although it was developed in relation to human artefacts and their emblematic
meaning for humans, can be applied more broadly to objects that are not human
artefacts.
The question remained, though, how could a suitably dynamic and fruitful approach to
objects, which treats them as ontologically equal, be embedded in photographic
endeavours? In the Fourth Chapter, in the context of the foregoing object-oriented
470
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perspectives, the emphasis shifts to consider a speculative framework for photographic
endeavours. This chapter, and the work in progress described in its Conclusion, do not
operate as an exegesis of current work. Rather, they are concerned with a possible
conceptual framework for a strategy of engagement with current and future
photographic projects. In pursuit of this objective, Tom Gunning’s account of
photographic realism as engendering a presence that displaces the epistemological
critique with a photographic ontology of presence, is deployed.
Two projects are then surveyed that encapsulate many of these issues. The aim of the
first discussion is to formulate an understanding of the interplay between chance,
objects, and structuration via an analysis of the short film The Natural History Primer (Jo
Law, Redmond Bridgeman). This discussion draws on both Meillassoux’s account of
contingency and Reza Negarestani’s concept of ‘anonymous material’. The second
project is concerned with strategy for depicting presence. Harman’s account of
ontography, Ian Bogost’s application and expansion of Harman’s concept in his own
development of a ‘practical ontography’, and Eugene Thacker’s analysis of the occult
are deployed here.
This dissertation sought to explore how speculative realist and object-oriented
philosophies can broaden the conceptual horizon for photography. 474 In terms of the
aims of this dissertation, occult and spirit photography, and the various obsolete or
dead visualising technologies associated with them, offer a model of photographic
practice (as outlined in my discussion of Bogost’s argument in Chapter Four) in which
an after image and seeing intersect to describe a mode of seeing that is open to
speculative possibilities. Therefore, if photography exists in its own right as an
autonomous entity apart from human interpretations, acted upon and acting upon other
entities, then historical occult photography, with its ambition of making visible fluidic
vapours, ectoplasms, and various materialisations from a beyond, is an area for future
research.475 Deploying largely ‘dead’ technologies476 and exploring how their spectral or
474
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ghostly status haunts the current forms these technologies take;477 the aim of this
‘practical ontographic’ research would be to investigate the hypothesis that historical
occult photography can conjure up the realist conceits of photography; and thereby test
the limits set by correlationism.
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Appendix 1
Project X

Plate 1.1
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Plate 1.5
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Plate 1.7
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Appendix 2

Konvolut K
< http://www.photonicsmedia.net/konvolutK/ >

Plate 2.1

Plate 2.2
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Plate 2.3

Plate 2.4
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Plate 2.6
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Plate 2.7

171

Appendix 3
The Natural History Primer
http://vimeo.com/70672788
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Appendix 4
From Beyond

A. Diorama of animals donated to the museum housed on the 3rd floor of the National
Museum Of Nature and Science, Ueno, Taito-ku, Tokyo. Once an hour The African
Savannah (5 min) plays.
B. Children’s playground Toyama Park, Okubo, Shinjuku – Ku. Tokyo.
C. Owl, Inokahira Park Zoo, Kichijoji, Tokyo.
D. A cat: resident in a small park in Takadanobaba 3-chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.
E. An antique toy dog at Picon Cafe Gotokuji, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo
F. Plastic Boxer, Takadanobaba 3-chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.
G. Hawk Moth, NSW, Australia
H. Orb Weaver, NSW, Australia
I. Isamu Noguchid’s children’s playground Merenuma Koen, Hokkaido. For more
information http://www.photonicsmedia.net/botanising/1150
J. Noguchid’s children’s playground Merenuma Koen, Hokkaido.
K/L. Lok Fu, Hong Kong
M. Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong
N. Bibbulmun Track, Western Australia
O. Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
P. Waychinicup, Western Australia
Q. Grandeur Terrace, Hong Kong
R. Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.
S/T. Two Peoples Bay, Western Australia
U. Waychinicup, Western Australia
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V. Mandurah, Western Australia.
W. Sea Horse, NSW
X. Octopi, Wan Long Oriental Supermarket, Wollongong.
Y. Sea Bass, Sha Tin, Hong Kong
Z. Found photograph Circa 1910, Niagara Falls in Winter
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